# Pennington v. Marcum

> Kentucky Supreme Court · October 24, 2008 · 266 S.W.3d 759

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9666432

## Case

- **Full name:** Christopher M. PENNINGTON, Appellant, v. Heather M. MARCUM (f/K/A Miles), Appellee
- **Court:** Kentucky Supreme Court
- **Decided:** October 24, 2008
- **Citations:** 266 S.W.3d 759; 2008 WL 4691184
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Venters
- **Judges:** Noble, Abramson, Schroder, Scott, Cunningham, Venters, Minton
- **Cited by:** 101 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9666432

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- recognizing that visitation is not the most accurate legal term for a joint custodian’s time with his/her children, although the terms visitation and timesharing are often used interchangeably
- discussing how requests for changing the child’s primary residence without requesting a change in parental decision-making power–i.e., not requesting a change from joint custody to sole custody–are essentially requests for modifying timesharing rather than custody
- noting that a parent having joint legal custody of a child who does not primarily reside with that parent is often incorrectly referred to as having visitation, rather than timesharing with the child
- recognizing the overlapping use, but stating “visitation” is not the most accurate legal term for a joint custodian’s time with his/her children
- holding that a decision to relocate with a child necessitated a modification of custody

## Opinion text

Dissenting Opinion by
Justice VENTERS.
I join Justice Cunningham’s dissent in this case simply because I agree with his point, and the Appellant’s argument, that the trial court took the unilateral relocation of the child as a fait accompli without adequate consideration of impact of the relocation on the child and on the child’s other family relationships. Doing so, I believe, encourages such unannounced re-locations when we should adopt, or at least promote, a policy that requires the joint-custodians to discuss the relocation before it occurs. The Appellee’s pre-emptive move to Virginia was the ultimate usurpation of the status of “sole custodian” despite the joint custody decree then in effect. Except in the case of very young infants, a pre-emptive move can only rarely be accomplished without involving the child in the secrecy, to the detriment of its relationship with the non-residential parent.
Otherwise, I agree fully with Justice Noble’s analysis in the majority opinion, and note that I concurred with the majority in the companion case of Frances v. Frances, 266 S.W.3d 754 (Ky.2008).
I distinguish this case from Frances because, in Frances , no child custody determination had been made by any court pri- or to the child’s relocation.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9666432. Public record. Not legal advice.