# H. Rouw Co. v. Texas Citrus Commission

> Texas Supreme Court · January 30, 1952 · 151 Tex. 182

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9665230

## Case

- **Full name:** The H. Rouw Company v. the Texas Citrus Commission
- **Court:** Texas Supreme Court
- **Decided:** January 30, 1952
- **Citations:** 151 Tex. 182; 247 S.W.2d 231; 1952 Tex. LEXIS 449
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** On rehearing
- **Judges:** Griffin
- **Cited by:** 31 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9665230

## Opinion text

ON REHEARING
On original submission all parties briefed and argued the case on the premise that unless the tax levied were a license, or privilege tax, as distinguished from a revenue-raising measure, (which all parties called an occupation tax), the tax in question violated the constitutional requirements that it must be equal and uniform. The appellee in its brief never quoted or referred to Sec. 1 of Art. VIII of our State Constitution for any purpose whatsoever. On the contrary, in its brief, the appellee took the position that the tax was not an occupation tax, as follows:
“* * * Appellant cites many cases which hold that an occupation tax must be equal and uniform and some of these cases specifically hold that an occupation tax cannot be levied against a corporation without at the same time being levied against an individual engaging in the same occupation. However, the tax in question is not an occupation tax, as discussed in our Fourth Counter Point, and the cases cited by Appellant are not applicable. The requirements of equality and uniformity apply only to general revenue raising taxes and not to regulatory taxes under the police power. * * *”
4 In its motion for rehearing appellee, for the first time, contends that even if the tax be held to be an occupation tax, it is valid within that part of Sec. 1 of Art. VIII of the State Constitution, which reads as follows: “* * * except that persons engaged in mechanical and agricultural pursuits shall never be required to pay an occupation tax; * * *” The present tax is not a tax levied upon persons engaged in “agricultural pursuits” within the meaning of the above quoted phrase from the Constitution. As is said in the amicus curiae brief supporting appellee’s position “the tax is levied upon the activity of packing or *191 placing in containers and marketing or processing and selling citrus fruit grown in Texas. (It is stipulated that only the packing and marketing applies to this defendant). The tax is exacted of any person, engaged in any vocation whatever, who performs these acts, whether he be commercial packer, gift fruit shipper, canner or citrus or bottler of lemon juice, processor of frozen orange juices, marmalade manufacturer, or whatever.”
The motion for rehearing is overruled.
Opinion delivered April 9, 1952.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9665230. Public record. Not legal advice.