# Colton v. Branstad

> Supreme Court of Iowa · July 31, 1985 · 372 N.W.2d 184

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9665007

## Case

- **Full name:** Milo COLTON, Leo P. Miller, Josephine Gruhn, Johnie Hammond, Elaine Baxter, Sue Mullins, Julia Gentleman, Janet A. Carl and Kay Chapman, Individually and as Members of the 70th General Assembly of Iowa, Appellees, v. Terry E. BRANSTAD, Governor of the State of Iowa, Appellant
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Iowa
- **Decided:** July 31, 1985
- **Citations:** 372 N.W.2d 184; 1985 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 1085
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Carter
- **Judges:** Reynoldson, Carter
- **Cited by:** 22 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9665007

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- applying the public-important exception to mootness in a line-item veto case

## Opinion text

CARTER, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent. The major premise articulated by the majority as the basis for its result is that “by attaching an unrelated ‘rider’ as a contingency to an appropriation, [the legislature] cannot invade the governor’s constitutional power to veto bills of general legislation.” The primary problem with this formula is that its application requires the assumption that the scope of the governor’s veto power is a given when, in fact, this is the very issue before the court. In addition, the stated premise immediately raises two additional questions: (1) When is a “rider” to an appropriation unrelated to the appropriation? and (2) What is a bill of general legislation?
As to the first of these questions, I would submit that, ordinarily, a condition or contingency cannot be considered as “unrelated” to an appropriation when the legislature has established an interrelationship on the face of its enactment. And, as to the second question, I submit that a condition or rider is not a piece of general legislation if it is expressly linked to a particular appropriation item. It is, in the latter instance, an integral part of the appropriation.
I view the constitutional amendment permitting item vetoes as applicable only to those instances where the will of the legislature is not frustrated except as to the item which is vetoed. This is the teaching of Rush v. Ray, 362 N.W.2d 479, 482 (Iowa 1985) and Welden v. Ray, 229 N.W.2d 706, 710 (Iowa 1975). In the present case, frustration of legislative purpose exists not only in the abrogation of the directives contained in section 12 (the item vetoed), but also in the resulting transformation of section 4(6) from a conditional appropriation to an unconditional appropriation. I do not believe that it was the intent of that constitutional amendment to grant to either the executive or judicial branch the power to pass judgment upon the bona tides of conditions or contingencies whose purposes are clear on the face of the act. This can only lead to repeated confrontations between the executive and legislative branches of government, which, in turn, will give rise to a string of future court challenges.
For purposes of deciding the present case, I submit that, where a condition placed on an appropriation to an agency of government relates, even inferentially, to a function of that agency, this creates sufficient nexus between the appropriation and the condition that the condition may not be excised by item veto. That is the situation here. I would affirm the district court.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9665007. Public record. Not legal advice.