# Jeter v. B.R. McGinty Mechanical > Court of Appeals of Arkansas · May 6, 1998 · 62 Ark. App. 53 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9663100 ## Case - **Full name:** Lee Wayne JETER v. B.R. McGINTY MECHANICAL - **Court:** Court of Appeals of Arkansas - **Decided:** May 6, 1998 - **Citations:** 62 Ark. App. 53; 968 S.W.2d 645; 1998 Ark. App. LEXIS 333 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Crabtree - **Judges:** Jennings, Pittman, Arey, Crabtree, Meads, Roaf - **Cited by:** 29 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9663100 ## Opinion text Terry Crabtree, Judge, dissenting. I do not believe the Commission’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and would reverse. The facts in this case are characterized by both parties as relating to a subsequent injury or disability, or a recurrence, and their arguments revolve around those concepts. However, it is more appropriate to assess the dispute in terms of whether the second procedure was reasonably necessary medical treatment for Jeter’s admittedly compensable 1992 heart attack. The appellant’s treating physician, Dr. Murphy, opined that: . . . the exact blockage was back at the exact same location in his right coronary artery. It is very clear from his coronary angi-ograms that a new blockage had not developed but the old blockage had recurred at the exact same site. However, B.R. McGinty arranged for Jeter’s records to be reviewed by another cardiologist, Dr. Jones. Dr. Jones states, in generalities, the causes of heart disease, and then, without ever seeing or treating Jeter, opined that the need for further treatment was caused by genetics or high cholesterol. Admittedly, the Commission has wide latitude in weighing the medical evidence; however, when a case turns on such evidence, its decision must still be supported by substantial evidence. In this case, the Commission reviewed a cold record giving no weight to the assessment of the determination of credibility made by the ALJ in its de novo review of the record. This procedure begs the question of why there is a hearing at all if there is no deference whatsoever given to the tribunal that actually sees and hears the witnesses. It would be more economical to forego a hearing and send the case to the appellate courts without a hearing and solely by depositions. Of course, the abbreviated procedure may fly in the face of procedural and substantive due process, but it is analogous to the situation that currently exists where the Commission, without assessing the personal attributes of the witnesses testifying, reverses a decision of the ALJ on credibility. This case is particularly notable because the Commission evidently accepted the testimony of a physician hired to review Jeter’s medical records who testified to heart disease in general, whereas Dr. Murphy actually treated the appellant and was aware of the unique circumstances of his case. The Commission cites Dena Const. Co. v. Herndon, 264 Ark. 791 , 575 S.W.2d 151 (1979), for the proposition that a decision cannot rest on speculation and conjecture. The Dena case has been cited many times for this proposition, but the holding in Dena was that of an appellate court and not the Commission. The Commission is to weigh the evidence presented to it and give whatever weight it considers appropriate to the testimony of the witness. Hanson v. Amfuel, 54 Ark. App. 370 , 925 S.W.2d 166 (1996). They need not set aside their common sense in making their decision. The Commission may make reasonable inferences from the testimony received and base its decision on both the direct evidence and the inferences that may be drawn from that testimony. To reject the testimony of the treating physician in this case, and accept that of a doctor who never saw the patient and testified in generalities, is to shirk the obligation to make a decision based upon reasonable inferences from the evidence. Such a well-settled procedure cannot be characterized as relying on speculation and conjecture. In this case, there is more than enough evidence in the record to indicate that the medical services provided to the appellant were a result of the initial injury. Dr. Murphy was clear in stating that the blockage was in the exact same place as the previous blockage. The reasonable inference to be drawn from this fact is that the blockage was site-specific as a result of the initial injury. Any other conclusion would in fact result in speculation and conjecture on the part of the Commission. With due respect to my fellow judges, I dissent. Meads, J., joins in this dissent. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9663100. Public record. Not legal advice.