# Johnson v. Mortham

> District Court, N.D. Florida · February 7, 1996 · 915 F. Supp. 1574

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9659687

## Case

- **Full name:** Andrew E. JOHNSON, Et Al., Plaintiffs, v. Sandra MORTHAM, Etc., Et Al., Defendants
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Florida
- **Decided:** February 7, 1996
- **Citations:** 915 F. Supp. 1574; 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1701; 1996 WL 65299
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Hatchett
- **Judges:** Hatchett, Paul, Vinson
- **Cited by:** 2 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9659687

## Opinion text

HATCHETT, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the order as it relates to burdens of proof because I understand it to mean: (1) plaintiffs have the burden of proving through a preponderance of the evidence that the DeGrandy court did not have a compelling interest in drawing the Third District as it exists and did not narrowly tailor the Third District through the use of the least restrictive means; and (2) the change from the traditional sequence of the parties’ presentation of proof at trial is simply for the convenience of the court and neither alters the plaintiffs’ burden of persuasion nor the defendants’ burden of production. See Lisbon Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 828 F.2d 759, 765 (Fed.Cir.1987). Therefore, the plaintiffs bear the burden of proving a prima facie case on all of the essential elements of their case; the defendanVintervenors must produce evidence tending to show that the DeGrandy court had a compelling interest for drawing the Third District as it did and used a means that was appropriate, and ultimately the plaintiffs must persuade the court that they are entitled to relief.
*1583 I dissent in part, however, because I maintain the belief that the majority errs in finding authority for its actions in Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 , 113 S.Ct. 2816 , 125 L.Ed.2d 511 (1993) and Miller v. Johnson, — U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 2475 , 132 L.Ed.2d 762 (1995). See Johnson v. Mortham, 915 F.Supp. 1529, 1558-59 (N.D.Fla.1995) (Hatchett, J. dissenting). Both Shaw and Miller address Fourteenth Amendment challenges to state legislatures’ redistricting plans. It is clear from both Shaw and Miller that the principles flowing from those decisions apply in that context. See, e.g., Shaw, — U.S. at-, 113 S.Ct. at 2819 (recognizing that the case addressed the propriety of race-based state legislation); Miller, — U.S. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 2488 (stating that in assessing the sufficiency of a challenge to a districting plan, courts must be sensitive to the complex interplay of forces that enter a legislature’s redistricting calculus)..
In this case, however, plaintiffs challenge a three-judge federal court drawn plan — not a state legislature’s plan. Therefore, I do not believe Shaw and Miller control this case. The Supreme Court’s treatment of DeWitt v. Wilson, however, provides a more appropriate framework for resolving this matter as that case addressed a three-judge federal court drawn plan. DeWitt v. Wilson, 856 F.Supp. 1409 (E.D.Cal.1994), aff'd in part and appeal dismissed in part, — U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 2637 , 132 L.Ed.2d 876 (1995).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9659687. Public record. Not legal advice.