# Harned v. Farmland Foods, Inc.

> Supreme Court of Iowa · March 16, 1983 · 331 N.W.2d 98

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9659256

## Case

- **Full name:** Jeffrey L. HARNED and Kathy L. Harned, Appellants, v. FARMLAND FOODS, INC., and Aetna Life & Casualty Insurance Company, Appellees
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Iowa
- **Decided:** March 16, 1983
- **Citations:** 331 N.W.2d 98; 1983 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 1426
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Carter
- **Judges:** Carter, Harris, McCORMICK, Reynoldson
- **Cited by:** 23 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9659256

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding that the plaintiff had failed to establish an intentional tort and therefore refused to pass on the question
- holding that where a party is dissatisfied with care, the proper forum is the workers’ compensation commission
- affirming dismissal of tort action arising from employer’s failure to provide chiropractic care to employee based on exclusive jurisdiction of commissioner

## Opinion text

CARTER, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent because I cannot conclude that the exclusive remedy provision of Iowa Code section 85.20 (1981) applies to all of the claims for which the plaintiff seeks to recover in his petition. As to plaintiff’s claims against the insurance carrier, the exclusive remedy provision of section 85.20 is expressly limited to claims against an employer or other employee of such employer. The statute affords no defense to a direct action against an insurance carrier for alleged torts it has visited on an injured employee.
As to plaintiff’s claims against his employer, the exclusive remedy provision of section 85.20 only extends to rights and remedies “on account of injury ... for which benefits under [the workers’ compensation act] are recoverable.” Whatever their merit or lack thereof, it appears that at least some of the plaintiff’s claims are cognizable, if at all, entirely outside the scope of the workers’ compensation act.
It is alleged that the employer willfully withheld from the employee the medical care to which he was entitled under the compensation act and that, as a result, he required additional surgery which could have been avoided and lost time from work which otherwise would not have been the case. I do not believe that such claims are of the type for which benefits under the compensation act are recoverable. The same is true for plaintiff’s claims alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress as a result of alleged outrageous conduct by the employer.
I believe the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiff’s petition in its entirety based upon the exclusive remedy provision of the compensation act and would reverse the judgment for that reason.
REYNOLDSON, C.J., joins this dissent.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9659256. Public record. Not legal advice.