# Vaughn v. Ag Processing, Inc. > Supreme Court of Iowa · July 18, 1990 · 459 N.W.2d 627 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9658537 ## Case - **Full name:** Howard L. VAUGHN, Appellee, v. AG PROCESSING, INC., Appellant - **Court:** Supreme Court of Iowa - **Decided:** July 18, 1990 - **Citations:** 459 N.W.2d 627; 7 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1679; 55 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 40,555; 57 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1227; 1990 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 183; 1990 WL 102401 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Harris - **Judges:** Schultz, Harris, Lavorato, Neuman - **Cited by:** 84 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9658537 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that civil rights statute preempted claims of wrongful discharge, unfair employment practices, and termination in bad faith and actual malice because all were premised on religious discrimination - holding that expert medical testimony was required to establish causation between harassment at work and physical symptoms “that peaked three months after [plaintiff] left his employment” - finding that the ICRA provides the exclusive remedies for discrimination and that a plaintiffs cause of action under § 729.4 “is preempted by that chapter” - finding civil rights statute preempted claims of wrongful discharge, unfair employment practices, and termination in bad faith because all were actually based on religious discrimination - holding that a contract claim which arose in the context of alleged discrimination was not necessarily preempted by Chapter 216 ## Opinion text HARRIS, Justice (dissenting in part). I respectfully dissent from divisions I C. and II because I believe there is sufficient evidence to support the trial court findings. There is no dispute that Mueller, acting as the company supervisor in directing Vaughn’s work, acted in a callously outrageous manner and that the company, management was aware of it. The company concedes the point, contending only that (1) it was not aware that religious discrimination was included in the cruel epithets to which Vaughn was subjected; and (2) it took reasonable steps to remedy the situation. The issue was joined on both these two points and the trial court, acting as fact finder, resolved both points in favor of Vaughn and against the company. On a de novo review we might resolve both of these factual issues in favor of the company. But our review is on error, and we are hence bound to affirm if the trial court findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. In sorting out whether substantial evidence exists it makes no difference whether our findings would be the same or that there is conflicting evidence on the point. It is for the finder of fact to determine the credibility of witnesses, weigh the evidence, and to decide what evidence to accept or reject. We view the record in the light most favorable to the finding. In stating these most elementary principles I do not suggest the majority in any way disagrees with them. They are so well settled they scarcely call for citation of authority. See, e.g., Northrup v. Foster, 204 N.W.2d 889, 890 (Iowa 1973). When outrageous discrimination occurs at the workplace we should not, I readily agree, automatically blame the employer for it. On the other hand we should be alert for the fact that employers who do less than the law demands, who turn a managerial eye the other way, will routinely claim to have been militant in attempting to stamp out discrimination. It is much *640 more difficult to escape by such a ruse when the discrimination is inflicted, not by just another coworker, but by a supervisor whom the employer has placed in charge of the victim of discrimination. In determining whether prompt and reasonable steps were taken the trial court, as fact finder, was obliged to consider that Mueller, as Vaughn’s supervisor, was the agent of defendant employer. Agency principles are relevant. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 , 106 S.Ct. 2399, 2408 , 91 L.Ed.2d 49, 63 (1986). I. Religious Discrimination. As mentioned, the majority does not seem to doubt that the discrimination occurred. Rather it holds there was not substantial evidence to support the trial court finding that management was aware that religious discrimination was included in Mueller’s outrageous conduct. I part from this view on two grounds. First, the holding overlooks the fact that the discrimination was inflicted by management’s own representative, Vaughn’s supervisor, who was a former assistant plant manager. My second ground of disagreeing on the point is based on actual testimony which the trial court obviously found to be true. Mueller had in fact once been assistant plant manager and later became supervisor of the maintenance department where Vaughn worked. At that time another maintenance worker, Pat McKeighan, who was familiar with Mueller’s proclivities, became plant superintendent. There was ample evidence to show that McKeighan took this knowledge with him when he was promoted. In fact Vaughn testified without objection as follows: And it was a constant thing, and they knew it. The company, I’ll say I know Pat McKeighan knew it because I had told him and I know that he informed Tom Ray of everything that I have said at least up until I told him. Religious discrimination occurred prior to Vaughn’s conversation with McKeighan. McKeighan as plant superintendent knew of the discrimination. There is direct testimony that Ray also knew of it. II. Employer’s Response. This employer’s justification for the discrimination was a self-condemning one: the chosen supervisor was simply “not a people person.” The point seems to be that Mueller did not confine his outrageous conduct to Vaughn, that he was inclined to treat everyone outrageously. The point also carries an innuendo of knowledge by the employer. Tom Ray, the plant manager, responded to Vaughn’s early complaints by saying “he would take care of it,” that the company would send Mueller to a school “where he can learn to talk to people.” It is most significant that this was not done. Although Vaughn complained of Mueller’s treatment several times, the majority seems to conclude he should have done even more to inform management. Other factors, however, support the trial court’s finding. In the first place Vaughn’s position as subordinate of Mueller placed him in a “Catch 22” situation. The plant superintendent warned him not to be complaining to management about Mueller, stating “If you ever go behind Al’s [Mueller’s] back, you’ll be in a hell of a lot of trouble.” The trial court findings on Mueller’s conduct and the company’s awareness were quite specific. The trial court held: Sometime prior to the time that Mueller’s harassment of plaintiff was accentuated by virtue of his reference to his religion, [Vaughn] had talked to Tom Ray and Ray assured him that “he would take care of it.” Ray at that time admitted that Mueller was not a “people person” and that they were going to send him to a school “where he can learn to talk to people.” This was not done. Plaintiff talked to Tom Ray on at least two occasions prior to June 14 concerning the treatment he had received from Mueller. On these occasions as well as on the occasion subsequent to June 14 when Mueller met plaintiff in Ray’s office, Tom Ray took notes on the meetings. These notes have never been produced. It was defendant’s policy to have plant managers report to the Omaha office whenever a labor relations incident arose. Yet the Omaha office failed to *641 disclose any correspondence from Tom Ray involving Mueller’s conduct prior to May 30, 1986. Many of the instances set out occurred out of the hearing of other employees. All of the instances with reference to religion were out of the hearing of other employees. This type of approach is the most insidious of harassment, particularly when inflicted by a supervisor upon an employee. The trial court at another point held: [Defendant employer is liable for the imposition of punitive damages by virtue of the fact that Mueller was employed in a managerial capacity in charge of the maintenance department. But, in any event, even though it could be contended that he was not acting in such capacity, the managerial agents, namely McKeigh-an and Tom Ray, both knew of the outrageous conduct imposed by Mueller upon the plaintiff and by standing placidly by ratified or approved the same. This finding was supported by substantial evidence. For example Vaughn himself testified: Q. And Pat McKeighan was the next person in chain of command? A. Yes. Q. You say nobody ever apologized. Did Mr. Ray ever tell you, “we’re sorry,” or “we’ll try to work this out with you,” or make amends? A. No. He just told me to go out and shake hands with him and that was it. “I wish you’d forget it,” he said. Q. Did Mr. Mueller ever apologize to you? A. No. Q. Did anybody on behalf of the company ever write a letter or anything indicating remorse or regrets that these incidents happened? A. No. Vaughn testified that, rather than remedy the conduct, management told Mueller and Vaughn to “shake hands and forget it.” This is far from an adequate employer’s response to outrageous conduct. Under the civil rights Act, Vaughn should not have to forget it. Once outrageous discriminatory conduct has been established an employer is required to do even more than disavow or apologize for it. Escape from liability at such a stage can only result from prompt and reasonable steps to remedy the discriminating working environment. Unless we are to undertake a de novo review, and reject testimony accepted by the trial court, we are bound to conclude that- substantial evidence supports the trial court finding that the employer here did not take those reasonable steps. When, as here, an experienced trial court finds the employer did not act with reasonable dispatch to stamp out outrageous discrimination we should be especially alert to apply the proper scope of review. The temptation is great, when reaching the crucial issue of employer’s response, to slip toward a de novo review. We should undertake a de novo review in this case only to the extent we are willing to do so in all discrimination cases. III. Emotional Distress. Substantial evidence also supports the trial court’s finding that Vaughn was severely distressed by the outrageous conduct. Indeed I find the evidence supporting this finding to be unusually strong. Vaughn was shown to be inordinately sensitive about his religious faith and strongly committed to it. The evidence indicates the religious harassment was devastating to him, and that he suffered serious physical problems as a result. The majority reviews this evidence, I respectfully suggest, on a de novo basis and disagrees with it. Apparently in the belief Vaughn was impeached by it, the majority places great weight on Vaughn’s answer to one question. It concerned his reaction to Mueller’s anti-Catholic statement: “I never really thought about it.” We instruct jurors in their fact-finding duties not to disregard the testimony of an impeached witness if they otherwise believe the witness’s testimony to be true. The trial court here was entitled to do the same. Because of its holdings the majority did not reach questions which I also do not address. It is enough here to state my *642 disagreement with the majority opinion in the two matters previously discussed. LAVORATO and NEUMAN, JJ., join this dissent. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9658537. Public record. Not legal advice.