# Moylan v. Moylan

> Supreme Court of Minnesota · April 11, 1986 · 384 N.W.2d 859

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9657488

## Case

- **Full name:** In Re the Marriage of Bonnie Y. MOYLAN, Respondent, v. Gerald G. MOYLAN, Petitioner, Appellant
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Minnesota
- **Decided:** April 11, 1986
- **Citations:** 384 N.W.2d 859; 1986 Minn. LEXIS 760
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Yetka
- **Judges:** Amdahl, Yetka, Kelley
- **Cited by:** 196 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9657488

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- recognizing that Act of June 9, 1983, ch. 308, § 17, 1983 Minn. Laws 1748, 1757-59, and its subsequent revision by Act of April 25, 1984, ch. 547, § 16, 1984 Minn. Laws 933, 938, required application of the child support guidelines in all cases, not just those involving public…
- stating, in child-support context, that “[w]hile the record may support a trial court’s decision, it is nevertheless inadequate if that record fails to reveal that the trial court actually considered the appropriate factors”
- holding that a reversal based on abuse of discretion requires “a clearly erroneous conclusion that is against logic and the facts on record”
- holding it improper to independently review the record to find support for a trial court’s decision, so long as it is unclear whether the trial court considered statutory factors

## Opinion text

YETKA, Justice
(concurring specially).
I concur specially in the result of the majority opinion, but I deem it necessary to explore more fully the implications of applying the child support guidelines not involving public assistance.
Upon in-depth study, it is apparent to me why the author of the legislation advised the senate that the law applied only to welfare cases.
1. Could the legislature pass a statute requiring married parents to provide a minimum dollar support for their children beyond adequate food, clothing, medical care? I think not. It would be considered a gross invasion of the privacy of the family that I predict would be quickly stricken down as being unconstitutional. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 , 92 S.Ct. 1526 , 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972). This is because some families, even with great financial resources, might want to raise their children in a spartan atmosphere in order to impress upon their children the value of money and the sacrifice and effort required to raise it. Other parents might be extremely generous, granting their children material privileges few other children will ever see or experience in their lifetimes. Such is life. Our courts, in interpreting our constitution and our laws, do not mandate equality in lifestyle; they only mandate that all citizens have an equal opportunity before the law. Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600 , 94 S.Ct. 2437 , 41 L.Ed.2d 341 (1973); see also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 , 100 S.Ct. 2671 , 65 L.Ed.2d 784 (1980). If, therefore, the legislature cannot impose dollar amounts on married parents in supporting their children, how can it do so with regard to separated, unmarried or divorced parents? I submit that the legislature cannot except when the parents are either unable or refuse to support their children adequately and thereby impose a burden on the taxpayers. Then, and only then, is there a reason for the state to intrude into the custodial support of children. Thus, I believe that the original intent of the legislature was to apply the guidelines only to welfare cases. I believe, however, that the majority opinion is realistic when it finds that the guidelines should be considered in all custodial support cases. Since the guidelines are applied to welfare cases, a court will quite naturally refer to them in other child support cases as well. Moreover, the 1984 amendments to the statute do indicate, at least to some degree, that the legislature intends that the courts take the guidelines into consideration in non-welfare cases. Thus, I concur that the guidelines apply to all cases.
2. Can the legislature mandate that a trial judge apply the guidelines to the income of a non-custodial parent without regard to the income of the custodial parent and without regard to other non-cash support of the non-custodial parent? For the reasons that I have outlined in paragraph 1, I believe the obvious answer is no. It would be a violation of the separation of powers doctrine for the legislature to deny a trial court its inherent authority to determine, on the facts of each case, what the support shall be. Minn. Const. art. III, § 1; see, e.g., State v. Olson, 325 N.W.2d 13 (1982) (it is the judicial function to deter *867 mine the exact criminal sentence to be imposed). The language in the statute which authorizes a judge to deviate from the standards by spelling out its reasons, however, saves the statute from being unconstitutional. I agree that a trial judge must set forth his or her findings and the reasons therefor in every case regardless of statute. Each case has its unique problems. In one situation, a child may be able to get an adequate education in the public schools and good medical services from an HMO and, therefore, the support provided in the guidelines will be adequate. In other cases, the child may need to be educated in special schools or require the care of medical specialists, in which case the guidelines may prove inadequate. The final decision is that of the trial court whose hands cannot be tied in advance by the legislature. The discretion must be retained by the trial courts to decide each case on its own facts and within the limitations of both parents’ financial resources.
3.Let us take a closer look at the guidelines. Minn.Stat. § 518.551, subd. 5 spells out a sliding scale of child support based on the net income per month of the “obligor.” Obligor is defined in Minn.Stat. § 518.54, subd. 8 as follows: “ ‘Obligor’ means a person obligated to pay maintenance or support.” Obligee is defined in Minn.Stat. § 518.54, subd. 7 as being “a person to whom payments for maintenance or support are owed.”
The scale ranges from 14% of the monthly net income for one child of the obligor if the obligor’s income is from $401 to $500 per month to a high of 25% for one child if the obligor’s income is from $1,001 to $6,000 per month. Thus, if an obligor has a net monthly income of $6,000 per month or more or approximately $72,000 per year net income — not an uncommon situation for professional people — the guidelines set a requirement of $1,500 per month for that child or $18,000 per annum. Many would consider that figure without some qualifications as not only unreasonable, but also a flagrant abuse of legislative authority. I submit that is why the majority opinion has interpreted and limited the statute.
Without such limitations, these questions would immediately arise:
a. If the non-custodial parent is the obli-gor and must pay $18,000 per year, what would be the requirements of the custodial parent? If the custodial parent had individual wealth and income of his or her own, would he or she also have to contribute $18,000 per year to a single child, making a total of $36,000 per year? I see no reason why such an obligation couldn’t be imposed under the implications of the guidelines.
b. Would the custodial parent be legally obligated to expend all of the money on behalf of the child? Would the child have a legal right to require an accounting? What would be the social and economic effect of a child receiving support at the $18,000 per annum level when it reaches the age of emancipation?
c. If a duty to account existed, would children of married parents have the equal right to demand that their parents account to them for all money expended on their behalf? If not, would there be a violation of the equal protection clause of the federal or state constitution?
4. As it must be readily apparent, in order for the guidelines to be constitutional, they must be only what the name implies: guidelines for the courts to consult as a reference. They cannot be mandatory, but must be carefully and judiciously applied to the facts of each case. Undoubtedly, one of the objectives of the guidelines is to force separated or divorced parents to support their children more adequately and to relieve the taxpayers of that duty. That is a legitimate and laudable goal, but other remedies are, or should be, available to mitigate the state intrusion into the lives of its citizens entailed by this act.
5. I, therefore, interpret the majority opinion as applying the guidelines set forth in the statute in this manner:
a. While the guidelines apply to all custodial cases, they are only guidelines and are not mandatory.
b. Each parent can be an obligor towards his or her children.
*868 c. All the resources and income of each parent can be considered in arriving at the total support for the child or children.
d. The order for support should be drawn in such a way that the custodial parent not incur legal liability for an accounting to the child or children being supported.
e. The court should, in every case, draft findings and reasons for its support order.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9657488. Public record. Not legal advice.