# Sheets v. Dollarway School District

> Court of Appeals of Arkansas · June 18, 2003 · 82 Ark. App. 539

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9656610

## Case

- **Full name:** Garrett SHEETS v. DOLLARWAY SCHOOL DISTRICT
- **Court:** Court of Appeals of Arkansas
- **Decided:** June 18, 2003
- **Citations:** 82 Ark. App. 539; 120 S.W.3d 119; 2003 Ark. App. LEXIS 550
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Crabtree
- **Judges:** Josephine Linker Hart
- **Cited by:** 8 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9656610

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that whether a school district has complied with the TFDA is a question of law

## Opinion text

Terry Crabtree, Judge, dissenting. In this decision, the majority refuses to abide by precedent established by the supreme court, and in the process, the majority reverses on an issue that was not raised by the appellant and reverses on an issue that should not be addressed by this court. To make matters worse, the majority makes findings of fact on appeal. I dissent.
In separate years, the school district voted not to renew appellant’s existing employment contract. The essence of appellant’s complaint was that on both occasions the school district had breached his contract by failing to strictly comply with the requirements of the Teacher Fair Dismissal Act, and he claimed that he was entitled to damages in the form of wages he lost as a consequence of the district’s breach. In denying appellant’s claim, the trial court made two, equally dispositive findings. The court ruled: (1) that the Act did not apply to appellant’s contract because he was a probationary teacher, and thus the district could not be held to the standard of strict compliance; and (2) that, even if the Act did apply, appellant was not entitled to any damages because of his failure to mitigate.
In any given case, it is the task of the appealing party to present an argument that warrants reversal of the trial court’s decision. Likewise, it is a longstanding principle that on appeal the appellate court reviews only the errors that are assigned. Rosser v. Columbia Mutual Ins. Co., 55 Ark. App. 77 , 928 S.W.2d 813 (1996). In this case, the appellant has offered two issues on appeal for our consideration. First, appellant states, “THE DOLLARWAY SCHOOL DISTRICT FAILED TO STRICTLY COMPLY WITH THE TEACHER FAIR DISMISSAL ACT AND ITS OWN PERSONNEL POLICIES THUS BREACHING ITS 1999-2000 AND 2000-2001 WRITTEN TEACHER’S CONTRACTS WITH SHEETS.” As his second point, appellant states, “SFIEET’S 1999— 2000 CONTRACT AUTOMATICALLY RENEWED ON MAY 1, 2000, THUS HE WAS A ‘TEACHER’ AS DEFINED BY THE TEACHER FAIR DISMISSAL ACT DURING THE 2000-2001 SCHOOL YEAR REGARDLESS OF THE DUTIES TO WHICH THE SUPERINTENDENT RELEGATED HIM.” Tucked within the first issue, one can discern an argument that can be read as a challenge to the trial court’s ruling that the Act does not apply to probationary teachers. However, appellant makes no argument whatsoever contesting the trial court’s alternative ruling that appellant had suffered no damages as a result of any alleged breach. Not one word is devoted to an argument that the trial court erred either in its application of the law of mitigation or that the trial court’s calculations were somehow in error. Indeed, the word “mitigate” is not to be found in the argument section of appellant’s brief.
Appellant’s total failure to challenge the trial court’s ruling with respect to damages is fatal to this appeal. The supreme court has held that, where a trial court makes independent, alternative rulings that are each dispositive of an appellant’s claim, and where the appellant attacks only one of those rulings on appeal, the case will be summarily affirmed without addressing either ruling, even if the challenged ruling has merit. Pugh v. State 351 Ark. 5 , 89 S.W.3d 909 (2002); Pearrow v. Feagin, 300 Ark. App. 274 , 778 S.W.2d 941 (1989). We, ourselves, have applied the supreme court’s reasoning in Camp v. State, 66 Ark. App. 134 , 991 S.W.2d 611 (1999). Thus, following the law, appellant’s failure to challenge the trial court’s ruling on damages means that this case must be affirmed in every respect without discussing the merits of either of the trial court’s rulings. To put it simply, the trial court’s ruling that appellant was not damaged by any alleged breach cannot be reversed because appellant does not claim that this ruling was in error. And, because appellant has not challenged the trial court’s ruling on damages, we need not address, and certainly cannot reverse, the trial court’s decision that the Act does not apply. Nevertheless, the majority disregards the settled law and reverses both of the trial court’s rulings. This court followed the law in Camp v. State, supra. That we follow the law one day and ignore it another day will subject this court to the well-deserved criticism that this court is arbitrary in its decision making.
The majority also falls into error by finding as a matter of fact that the district breached appellant’s contract. The trial court made no findings of fact as to whether or not the district breached appellant’s contract. It was not necessary for the court to make those findings in light of its determination that the Act did not apply. The evidence presented by the parties in this case was sharply conflicting. Yet, the majority resolves the conflicts in appellant’s favor. However, the appellate court cannot act as the fact-finder in cases at law appealed from circuit court. See Coran Auto Sales v. Harris, 74 Ark. App. 145 , 45 S.W.3d 856 (2001). Thus, if it were necessary to reverse this case, it would also be necessary to remand for the trial court to determine if the district breached appellant’s contract.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9656610. Public record. Not legal advice.