# Goodman v. State

> Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas · November 21, 2001 · 66 S.W.3d 283

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9654552

## Case

- **Full name:** Donna Jean GOODMAN, Appellant, v. the STATE of Texas
- **Court:** Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
- **Decided:** November 21, 2001
- **Citations:** 66 S.W.3d 283; 2001 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 112; 2001 WL 1472597
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Hervey
- **Judges:** Cochran, Keller, Meyers, Keasler, Hervey, Womack, Price, Johnson, Holcomb
- **Cited by:** 656 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9654552

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- reasoning that "when the evidence is in 'fair equipoise' (meaning that a rational juror could either find for or against a proposition), any one of the [three rational] conclusions [found by the jury] should be upheld by a reviewing court" and, thus, concluding that the eviden…
- stating 8 … Fernandez’s house was only about ten miles from Castillo’s parents’ house, where she was staying. 12 that it “is a jury, not a reviewing court, that accepts or rejects reasonably equal competing theories”
- reasoning that an eyewitness could testify he was “pretty sure” the defendant dropped a baggie of cocaine, but it “could have been [a] paper napkin,” and this would be legally sufficient to support a conviction
- stating that the testimony of a person with five perjury convictions, standing alone, is factually sufficient to support a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt finding

## Opinion text

HERVEY, J.,
filed a concurring opinion in which KELLER, P.J., and KEASLER, J., joined.
I join the Court’s opinion and Presiding Judge Keller’s opinion. I write separately to emphasize that the Court of Appeals did not afford the jury’s verdict the “due deference” required by our decision in Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1 (Tex.Cr.App. *301 2000). There this Court explained that in applying the factual sufficiency standard of review an appellate court “is not empowered with the right to substitute its judgment for that of the fact finder’s” on credibility and weight determinations. See Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 12 , and at 7 (factual sufficiency review should not substantially intrude upon the fact finder’s role as the sole judge of the weight and credibility given to witness testimony), and at 8 (factual sufficiency review “can consider only those few matters bearing on credibility that can be fully determined from a cold appellate record”), and at 9 (“due deference” must be accorded the fact finder’s determinations “particularly those determinations concerning the weight and credibility of the evidence”). The resolution of the material issues at appellant’s trial involved the jury’s credibility and weight determinations to which the Court of Appeals should have afforded “due deference.”

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9654552. Public record. Not legal advice.