# Collins v. Director of Revenue

> Supreme Court of Missouri · May 29, 1985 · 691 S.W.2d 246

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9653156

## Case

- **Full name:** Lester R. COLLINS, Appellant, v. DIRECTOR OF REVENUE, State of Missouri, Respondent; Naomi L. JOHNSON, Appellant, v. DIRECTOR OF REVENUE and State of Missouri, Respondents
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Missouri
- **Decided:** May 29, 1985
- **Citations:** 691 S.W.2d 246; 1985 Mo. LEXIS 257
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Rendlen
- **Judges:** Gunn, Higgins, Billings, Blackmar, Donnelly, Rendlen, Welliver
- **Cited by:** 145 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9653156

## Opinion text

RENDLEN, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. If no evidence was presented at the de novo hearings establishing that, at the time of arrest, the officers had probable cause to believe that each of the appellants was driving while the alcohol concentration was 13/100 of one percent or more, then reversal would seem to be proper. However, because of the uncertainty in this new procedure remand should be ordered to allow for the development of evidence regarding the arresting officer’s belief.
Section 302.505.1, RSMo Cum.Supp.1983, explicitly requires that the arresting officer have “probable cause to believe” at the time of the arrest that the subject’s alcohol concentration was 13/100 of one percent or more. Moreover, the section provides that the department shall suspend the driver’s license only upon its determination that the arresting officer had probable cause for such belief. That is, did the suspect appear more than mildly intoxicated at the time of arrest? What behavior informed the officer of the level of intoxication? However, a careful reading of the statute does not permit the department to suspend a driver’s license merely on the basis of the officer’s initial belief, as the principal opinion suggests. The statute clearly refers to alcohol concentration in the person’s blood or breath — indicating that subsequent testing will occur which, if in verification of the officer’s belief, shall lead to license suspension. Thus, to conform the process to the statutory requirement these cases should be remanded for further proceedings to develop evidence regarding the arresting officer’s beliefs at the time of arrest and if the necessary probable cause is shown the evidence of any subsequent chemical tests should be considered and these facts in combination would provide the basis for the administrative license suspension determination.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9653156. Public record. Not legal advice.