# Hammock v. State

> Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas · May 23, 2001 · 46 S.W.3d 889

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9650496

## Case

- **Full name:** Harold Lee HAMMOCK, Appellant, v. the STATE of Texas
- **Court:** Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
- **Decided:** May 23, 2001
- **Citations:** 46 S.W.3d 889; 2001 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 39; 2001 WL 540053
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Keller
- **Judges:** Holland, Meyers, Price, Johnson, Hervey, Holcomb, Womack, Keller, Keasler
- **Cited by:** 450 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9650496

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that party opposing admission of evidence bears burden of requesting limiting instruction and, in absence of such request, evidence is admitted for all purposes
- recognizing that once evidence is admitted without limiting instruction, it may be used for all purposes and trial court is not required to include limiting instruction in jury charge
- holding that because appellant did not request a limiting instruction contemporaneously with the admission of the evidence, the evidence was admitted for all purposes
- holding trial court did not err by not submitting limiting instruction because defendant did not request limiting instruction when he first had opportunity to do so and therefore evidence was admitted for all purposes

## Opinion text

*896 KELLER, P.J.,
filed a concurring opinion in which WOMACK, and KEASLER, JJ., joined.
I join the Court’s opinion except to the extent it relies upon policy reasons for its holding. The Court says, “Allowing the jury to consider evidence for all purposes and then telling them to consider that same evidence for a limited purpose only is asking a jury to do the impossible.” Slip op. at 8.
First, I disagree with this statement. On other occasions we wait until the jury charge to ask jurors to disregard certain evidence, and we assume they do so. When the issue is raised, we instruct jurors, in the charge, to disregard evidence obtained in violation of the law. 1 And although in Rankin 2 we quoted with approval a statement of “impossibility,” the foundation for the holding was that giving the instruction at the time of admission was the better and more effective application of Rule 105(a). 3
Second, if a defendant is faced with a choice between an ineffective instruction and no instruction at all, presumably he would opt for the former since it could not hurt him to do so. That being so, the policy reasons in the Court’s opinion offer no basis for refusing him that instruction if he requests it.
I agree that the trial court did not err in refusing to give a limiting instruction in the jury charge.
. Article 38.23, Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann.
. Rankin v. State, 974 S.W.2d 707, 713 (Tex.Crim.App.1996).
. Id.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9650496. Public record. Not legal advice.