# Board of Trustees of Univ. of DC v. DiSalvo

> District of Columbia Court of Appeals · July 2, 2009 · 974 A.2d 868

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9649998

## Case

- **Full name:** BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF the UNIVERSITY OF the DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Appellant, v. Graciette DiSALVO, Et Al., Appellees
- **Court:** District of Columbia Court of Appeals
- **Decided:** July 2, 2009
- **Citations:** 974 A.2d 868; 2009 D.C. App. LEXIS 244; 2009 WL 1883705
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Newman
- **Judges:** Washington, Newman, Farrell
- **Cited by:** 40 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9649998

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that "heightened foreseeability 'does not require previous occurrences of the particular type of harm, but can be met instead by a combination of factors which give defendants an increased awareness of the danger of a particular criminal act' ” (quoting Doe, 524 A.2d a…
- stating that in Kline, " 'crimes of violence, robbery, and assault [] had been occurring with mounting frequency on the premises' and the landlord had been asked to secure the building in light of the crime” (quoting Kline, 439 F.2d at 480)
- stating that “heightened foreseeability factors directly into the duty analysis” and that “consideration of whether a duty exists to protect another from intervening criminal acts includes consideration of heightened foreseeability”
- noting that, in the special category of injury resulting from an intervening criminal act, "heightened foreseeability factors directly into the duty analysis because a defendant is only liable for the intervening criminal acts of another ‘if the criminal act is so foreseeable …
- noting that “[tjhere is general support for the practice of confining foreseeability questions to the proximate cause analysis and basing the duty analysis solely on the relationship between the parties”

## Opinion text

NEWMAN, Senior Judge,
dissenting:
An experienced District of Columbia trial judge, fully familiar with the controlling cases on the issue relevant in this appeal, beginning with our decision in Ramsay v. Morrissette, 252 A.2d 509 (D.C.1969), and continuing with such cases as Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Ave. Apartment Corp., 141 U.S.App.D.C. 370 , 439 F.2d 477 (D.C.Cir.1970); District of Columbia v. Doe, 524 A.2d 30 (D.C.1987); Potts v. District of Columbia, 697 A.2d 1249 (D.C.1997); and District of Columbia v. Beretta, U.S.A. Corp., 872 A.2d 633 (D.C.2005) (en banc), as well as other cases cited in the majority *876 opinion, determined that the DiSalvos had presented a sufficient quantum of evidence from which a reasonable juror, acting reasonably, could conclude that the University of the District of Columbia had breached the duty owed to the DiSalvos under these cases. The trial judge instructed the jury on this issue, instructions to which no relevant objections were made. Based on the evidence and these instructions on the law, twelve residents of the District of Columbia, serving as jurors, unanimously found that the University of the District of Columbia had breached its duty to the DiSal-vos, as defined by our jurisprudence. Now, two judges of this court hold, as a matter of law, that the experienced trial judge and all twelve jurors acted unreasonably. Because I find myself in agreement with the “unreasonable thirteen,” rather than the “reasonable two,” I dissent.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9649998. Public record. Not legal advice.