# Commonwealth v. Robinson

> Superior Court of Pennsylvania · March 29, 1976 · 238 Pa. Super. 508

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9649811

## Case

- **Full name:** Commonwealth v. Robinson, Appellant
- **Court:** Superior Court of Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** March 29, 1976
- **Citations:** 238 Pa. Super. 508; 362 A.2d 1005; 1976 Pa. Super. LEXIS 1737
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Price
- **Judges:** Watkins, Jacobs, Hoffman, Cercone, Price, Van Voort Spaeth
- **Cited by:** 8 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9649811

## Opinion text

Concurring Opinion by
Price, J.:
Although I agree with the majority that the judgment of sentence should be affirmed in this case, I disagree with the rationale employed by the majority in reaching this conclusion. It is clear that the appellant violated Rule 1100 by filing his petition to dismiss on October 16, 1974, prior to the expiration of the prescribed 270 day period. Certainly, the appellant should not benefit in any way from his improper action. Thus, any period of delay directly resulting from the appellant’s improper action should be excluded from the computation of the 270 day period. Here, the appellant should be held responsible for the period of delay between the filing of the petition to dismiss on October 16, 1974, and the disposition of that petition by the lower court on October 22, 1974. The majority, however, additionally charges the appellant *513 with the period of delay between the disposition of the petition on October 22, 1974, and the commencement of trial on October 29, 1974. I believe that the Commonwealth, and not the appellant, should be held responsible for this seven day period.
The appellant, in this case, filed his petition to dismiss two days before the expiration of the prescribed time period on October 18, 1974. Because the running- of the 270 day period was tolled until October 22, 1974, the time for the commencement of trial was extended until October 24, 1974. Nevertheless, trial did not begin until five days later. At any time during this five day span the appellant could have properly petitioned the lower court to dismiss the charges against him because of the violation of his right to a speedy trial as prescribed by Rule 1100. However, the appellant failed to file such a petition during this period. Because the appellant did not petition the court below to dismiss the charges before trial commenced, and at a time when the prescribed period had expired, as required by Section (f) of Rule 1100, I believe that the appellant is now barred from claiming relief under Rule 1100. I would therefore affirm the judgment of sentence.
Van der Voort, J., joins in this concurring opinion.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9649811. Public record. Not legal advice.