# Worsham Steel Co. v. Arias

> Texas Court of Appeals, 8th District (El Paso) · May 20, 1992 · 831 S.W.2d 81

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9648630

## Case

- **Full name:** WORSHAM STEEL COMPANY, Appellant, v. Gonzalo ARIAS, Appellee
- **Court:** Texas Court of Appeals, 8th District (El Paso)
- **Decided:** May 20, 1992
- **Citations:** 831 S.W.2d 81; 1992 Tex. App. LEXIS 1259; 1992 WL 108427
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Larsen
- **Judges:** Osborn, Barajas, Larsen
- **Cited by:** 120 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9648630

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- rejecting argument that “no cause of action for wrongful discharge exists unless a claim for workers’ compensation has been filed at the time of discharge” but finding “all that is required to prosecute such a claim is evidence that shows an employee took steps towards institu…
- finding a retaliatory motive where an employer terminated an employee a few days after injury specifically to deny employee the opportunity to file a claim
- finding that a jury’s award of damages for mental anguish is virtually unreviewable
- finding retaliatory motive where employee fired a few days following injury in order to deny employee ability to file claim

## Opinion text

LARSEN, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I would hold, in deference to the implied finding of the jury, that sufficient evidence of mental anguish existed to support the verdict on actual damages. It is true, as the majority recites, that for plaintiff to recover for mental anguish he must prove such painful emotions as grief, severe disappointment, indignation, wounded pride, shame, despair or public humiliation. Havens v. Tomball Community Hospital, 793 S.W.2d 690, 692 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, writ denied); Underwriters Life Insurance Co. v. Cobb, 746 S.W.2d 810, 819 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1988, no writ). The best proof of these emotions, however, is not necessarily a rote recitation of this language from the case law, which is what the majority seems to require. The jury and the trial court who witnessed plaintiffs testimony that he was very sad and that his life had changed both economically and morally, were clearly satisfied that he had suffered painful emotions sufficient to justify an award for mental anguish. It is our role as a reviewing court to respect that conclusion by those who were present in the courtroom where there is some evidence in the record to support it. It is not our role to second guess the fact finder because we do not find that same evidence sufficiently compelling upon our reading of the cold record in the confines of our ivory tower. 1
Awarding mental anguish damages is an area where deference to the fact finder is vital; those painful emotions which justify an award for mental anguish are most reliably reflected in the demeanor, tone of voice and hesitations of a witness, not in a rehearsed litany of authorized words. A glib and well-practiced plaintiff is not necessarily more entitled to mental anguish damages than is a stoic or guileless one, yet that is the logical extension of what the majority holds here.
I see no real difference between this plaintiffs testimony that his termination made him “very sad,” insufficient in the majority’s view, and testimony in another case recently before this Court. See Skaggs Alpha Beta, Inc. v. Nabhan, 808 S.W.2d 198, 202 (Tex.App.—El Paso, 1991, no writ). This Court upheld an award for mental anguish in Nabhan , where a plaintiff testified that because of her injury she frequently lost patience with her customers, her ability to sell clothes had been affected and she had chronic headaches and trouble sleeping. There is no real difference between the two cases, I submit, beyond a purely semantic game.
I find another aspect of this decision troubling. Mr. Arias’s testimony was translated from Spanish into English. The word or words he used which the interpreter translated as “sad” and “very sad” could have dramatically different connotations in Spanish. For example, triste translates literally as sad; lúgubre as sad, mournful, gloomy, melancholy, lugubrious, dismal; pensativo as pensive; pena as pain, affliction, sorrow, grief, uneasiness of the mind, anxiety, a violent emotion of the mind; dolor as affliction, anguish, grief or painfulness; melancólico as melancholy, sad, gloomy, fanciful, cloudy, mournful and hypochondriacal. Velazquez, Spanish and English Dictionary, Follett Publishing Co., 1974. Perhaps Mr. Arias’s Spanish testimony was simply that he was “very sad,” or perhaps that was an easy translation of much more loaded terms. We, as an appellate court reviewing the record, are not in a position to judge this. The jury *89 and trial court, who watched the witness testify, were in a much better position to determine the impact of what plaintiff actually said.
Additionally, Mr. Arias's rather odd statement that everything had changed for him, economically and morally, is perhaps explained by one translation of the word “grief”: “dolor moral, como el causado por una desgracia,” literally, moral pain, as caused by misfortune or adversity. See generally, Velazquez, Spanish and English Dictionary, Follett Publishing Co., 1974. Moreover, “moral” in Spanish translates in English as both moral and morale, two very different concepts. Thus, the word “moral,” which seems entirely out of place (even nonsensical) in the English translation, may be a word of great emotional impact in plaintiffs original Spanish testimony.
In any event, it is not this Court’s role to speculate or second guess a translation, but I believe that greater deference to what actually took place in the courtroom is required here, particularly because we are twice removed from plaintiffs testimony: we are reading the transcribed record of words translated from another language.
This case illustrates precisely that result which our heightened deference in reviewing mental anguish awards is designed to prevent. Converting emotional anguish into dollars is a subjective process uniquely within the discretion of the fact finder. See Brown v. Robinson, 747 S.W.2d 24 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1988, no writ). The process of deciding just what quality or quantity of evidence will trigger an award of mental anguish damages is an equally subjective process, uniquely dependent upon evidence which cannot be reflected in the cold record. The jury’s initial decision to award mental anguish damages should be just as deferentially treated as is the review of the dollar amount of such an award. A truly anguished plaintiff powerless to artfully voice his misery, whether because of personality, lack of education or pride, jeopardizes his award. Meanwhile, a manipulative plaintiff schooled in the correct language will see his award upheld simply because he articulated the right phrases. This seems an unjust result and not one which the law requires.
I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.
. This is not a philosophical rejection of factual sufficiency review, but an acknowledgement that we were not in the courtroom to view the evidence. Without that acknowledgement, "deference to jury findings” loses its meaning.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9648630. Public record. Not legal advice.