# Slaughter v. Commonwealth

> Kentucky Supreme Court · November 5, 1987 · 744 S.W.2d 407

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9648279

## Case

- **Full name:** James Earl SLAUGHTER A/K/A James Earl Slawter, Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellee
- **Court:** Kentucky Supreme Court
- **Decided:** November 5, 1987
- **Citations:** 744 S.W.2d 407; 1987 Ky. LEXIS 257; 1987 WL 1261
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Vance
- **Judges:** Gant, Lambert, Leibson, Stephens, Stephenson, Vance, Wintersheimer
- **Cited by:** 124 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9648279

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that both parties have great leeway in making closing arguments
- holding reference to defendant as a “bit of evil” permissible

## Opinion text

VANCE, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The appellant requested an instruction on second-degree manslaughter and objected to the failure of the court to give it. I believe he was entitled to such an instruction.
Esther Stewart died from a stab wound inflicted upon her during the course of the robbery. Appellant denied that he stabbed Mrs. Stewart but admitted to police investigators that he stood outside as a lookout while another man committed the robbery. Other witnesses testified that appellant admitted to them his involvement in the crime and stated that when he asked the woman for money she screamed, and he then hit her with his gun and stabbed her to stop her from screaming.
A detective testified that appellant stated that he was in the store when the robbery occurred but that nobody was supposed to get killed.
The appellant was convicted of intentional murder. Intentional murder requires a specific intent to cause death. K.R.S. 507.-020. A specific intent to cause death may be inferred from the circumstances, and the circumstances in this case were sufficient to warrant the jury to believe that appellant committed the robbery and stabbed Esther Stewart with an intent to kill her.
In view of appellant’s statement that nobody was supposed to get killed and that he stabbed Mrs. Stewart to stop her from screaming, the juiy might have believed that he stabbed Mrs. Stewart, but nevertheless have had a reasonable doubt as to whether or not he intended the stabbing to cause her death. If such a doubt existed in a juror’s mind, but yet there was no doubt that appellant was aware of and consciously disregarded a substantial risk that death might result from the stabbing, he could reasonably have been found guilty of second-degree manslaughter by wantonly causing the death of another person.
Because the evidence was such that the jury could have had a reasonable doubt that appellant intended to kill Mrs. Stewart, yet not have doubted that he was aware of an unjustifiable risk that his act would cause the death of Mrs. Stewart, he was entitled to an instruction on second-degree manslaughter, a lesser included offense of the offense of murder.
LAMBERT, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9648279. Public record. Not legal advice.