# McClellan v. Commonwealth

> Kentucky Supreme Court · June 12, 1986 · 715 S.W.2d 464

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9647210

## Case

- **Full name:** Raymond McCLELLAN, Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellee
- **Court:** Kentucky Supreme Court
- **Decided:** June 12, 1986
- **Citations:** 715 S.W.2d 464; 1986 Ky. LEXIS 274
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Stephenson
- **Judges:** Stephens, White, Gant, Vance, Leibson, Stephenson, Wintersheimer
- **Cited by:** 113 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9647210

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that “[e]xtreme emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable explanation . . . reduces the degree of a homicide from murder to manslaughter [and] [i]n that respect . . . serves the same function as ‘acting in sudden heat of passion’ ”
- noting that constitutionally relevant evidence.” Id. at 380; see also “the condition must be a temporary disturbance of the Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 276 (1998). An emotions as opposed to mental derangement per se”
- noting that “the condition must be a temporary disturbance of the emotions as opposed to mental derangement per se”

## Opinion text

STEPHENSON, Justice,
dissenting.
I am in complete agreement with the excellent analysis and definition of extreme emotional disturbance contained in the majority opinion.
However, I do not believe that the circumstances of this case warrant an instruction on criminal trespass. Had McClellan testified that he blacked out and remembered nothing, that would be the defendant’s theory of the case and require an appropriate instruction. This theory is entirely subjective. Here, the testimony that he did not intend to commit a crime when he entered the room, after shooting off the lock and then proceeding to murder the victim and kidnap his wife, should be tested objectively by the jury. While McClellan’s testimony can be considered by the jury on intent to murder, the facts here are such that, in my opinion, a criminal trespass instruction is not required.
The direct testimony of the Dean of Christ Church that McClellan was sincere and was sorry for his acts is incompetent and irrelevant; thus the cross-examination complained of can hardly be characterized as prejudicial.
Neither do I believe that McClellan was entitled to an instruction on unlawful imprisonment in the second degree.
Accordingly, I dissent.
WINTERSHEIMER, J., joins in this dissent.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9647210. Public record. Not legal advice.