# Maryland Green Party v. Maryland Board of Elections

> Court of Appeals of Maryland · September 11, 2003 · 377 Md. 127

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9646148

## Case

- **Full name:** MARYLAND GREEN PARTY, Et Al. v. MARYLAND BOARD OF ELECTIONS, Et Al.
- **Court:** Court of Appeals of Maryland
- **Decided:** September 11, 2003
- **Citations:** 377 Md. 127; 832 A.2d 214; 2003 Md. LEXIS 762
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Harrell
- **Judges:** Harrell, Eldridge
- **Cited by:** 38 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9646148

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that Article 7 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights "has been held to be even more protective of rights of political participation than the provisions of the federal Constitution”
- explaining that a dual registration system of active and inactive voters is "antithetical" to Article 7 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights
- holding that a classification affecting the right to vote is afforded a higher level of scrutiny

## Opinion text

Concurring Opinion by
HARRELL, Judge
in which RAKER and WILNER, JJ., join.
I concur in the judgment because I agree with the Majority’s holding in Part III that Article 33 §§ 1-101(gg) 1 and 6-203(b)(2) of the Maryland Election Code, which differentiate between “inactive” voters and “active” voters, are invalid. I disagree, however, with Part IV of the opinion, where the Majority concludes that the State’s double petition requirement for minor political parties and their candidates violates the equal protection component of Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Requiring a political organization to petition statewide to achieve status as a minor political party and then requiring a candidate of that minor political party to petition to obtain at least the signatures of 1% of the registered voters in the geographical district from which he or she intends to run for office in order to appear on the ballot is constitutional.
When the State’s classification is asserted to infringe on a fundamental right or interest, the Court should analyze the matter according to a “strict scrutiny” standard. Attorney General v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 705-06 , 426 A.2d 929, 941-42 (1981). In order for a statute or regulation to withstand equal protection scrutiny under the strict scrutiny standard, *166 the State must show that the law is “necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest.” Waldron, 289 Md. at 706 , 426 A.2d at 941 (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 , 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1331 , 22 L.Ed.2d 600, 615 ). If a fundamental right is not at issue, then the standard of review is the “rational basis” test, a notably less strict standard. As the Majority points out, when a court is dealing with political candidate restrictions, it must examine the extent and nature of the impact on the voters to determine the appropriate standard of review. Majority op. 377 Md. at 162-63, 832 A.2d at 235. Although it is debatable whether the Majority is correct in concluding that the petition requirement has a substantial impact on voters, under either test Maryland’s double petition requirement should be found constitutional.
Because the equal protection guarantees found in the federal constitution and Maryland’s Declaration of Rights are considered “in pari materia,” federal case law which interprets the federal equal protection clause is instructive here. See Waldron, 289 Md. at 714 , 426 A.2d at 946 . Although the Majority is correct in noting that Article 24 and the federal Equal Protection Clause are independent provisions which are capable of differing interpretations (Majority, op. 377 Md. at 158, 832 A.2d at 232), in actual application this Court has interpreted Article 24 to apply “in like manner and to the same extent as the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.” Waldron, 289 Md. at 704 , 426 A.2d at 941 (quoting United States Mortgage Co. v. Matthews, 167 Md. 383, 395 , 173 A. 903, 909 (1934)). In fact, in Bureau of Mines v. George’s Creek, this Court explained that it is well established that “the decisions of the Supreme Court on the Fourteenth Amendment are practically direct authorities” for this purpose. 272 Md. 143, 156 , 321 A.2d 748, 755 (1973).
In its analysis, the Majority does not seem to dispute the fact that the State has a legitimate interest in regulating the quantity and quality of the candidates who appear on its ballots. Majority op. 377 Md. at 144-45, 832 A.2d 224 . This is in line with the reasoning of the Supreme Court, which has held repeatedly that states have a compelling interest in *167 preventing ballots from being overrun with candidates, the effects of which include voter confusion and frivolous candidacies. See Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 715 , 94 S.Ct. 1315, 1319 , 39 L.Ed.2d 702, 708 (1974) (describing the State’s interest in managing its ballot as one of the highest order). To this end, the Supreme Court has declared that a state is permitted to require candidates to demonstrate “a significant modicum of support” before being placed on the ballot. See Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 , 91 S.Ct. 1970, 1976 , 29 L.Ed.2d 554, 562 ; see also American Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 783 , 94 S.Ct. 1296, 1307 , 39 L.Ed.2d 744, 761 (1974).
Just as the Majority does not dispute a state’s right to require a showing of a “significant modicum of support” in order to gain ballot access, it also does not contest that the 1% of registered voters signature requirement in a given geographical district for a nomination petition is itself unconstitutional. Instead, what the Majority rejects is the combination of the petition requirements because it feels that the double petition requirement subjects minor political party candidates to two showings of support, where the same is not true of independent candidates or candidates of the two current and long standing major political parties. Majority op. 377 Md. at 164-65, 832 A.2d at 236.
The Majority’s analysis of the State’s election laws and the purpose behind each petition requirement, however, is incomplete. The first petition requirement, which is a state-wide petition for a political group to gain recognition as a political party, is not designed to demonstrate a “significant modicum of support” for a minor political party candidate in the district from which he or she may wish to run for office. Voters who sign the party-recognition petition neither are pledging their loyalty to the party nor promising to support a particular candidate in a future election. Rather, these sig-nators simply are indicating their view that the named party should be recognized as a political party in the State of Maryland. Maryland Code (2003), Election Law Article, § 4-102. Once the potential candidate’s party is recognized as a political party statewide, the potential candidate must *168 petition to get the signatures of 1% of the voters from the political subdivision he or she wishes to represent. It is this latter requirement, in contrast to the former, that demonstrates the “significant modicum of support” that the Majority seems to acknowledge is a compelling state interest.
In Mathers v. Morris, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland considered a challenge to Maryland’s election laws similar to that mounted here. 515 F.Supp. 931 (1981). There the plaintiffs were challenging the constitutionality of Maryland’s two-part design for determining political party status, which included a political organization filing petitions signed by 10,000 voters in order to achieve recognition as a political party followed by attaining at least three percent of the vote in a Presidential or Gubernatorial election in order to maintain its status as a political party. Mathers, 515 F.Supp. at 937 . In rejecting the plaintiffs’ challenge, the court explained that, given that the 10,000 statewide signature requirement for recognition as a political party is a relatively low threshold requirement, the more burdensome requirement of polling a 3% popular vote to maintain party status is not on its face unconstitutional. Id. Moreover, the court stressed that the State’s interest in requiring a significant modicum of support “does not disappear once an organization has complied with some initial threshold requirement.” Mathers, 515 F.Supp. at 938 . This is analogous to the argument that the Green Party mounts in the present case. The 10,000 signature statewide petition, which measures a political entity’s popular support to be recognized as a political party, does not impinge on Maryland’s independent, legitimate interest in having that party’s candidates demonstrate a “significant modicum of support” in a specific district before being allowed to appear on the ballot.
Like Maryland, Pennsylvania also conditions ballot access for minor political party candidates on a modest showing of popular support. Although the election laws of the respective states differ somewhat, there are sufficient similarities between the two systems to make persuasive here case law analyzing the constitutionality of Pennsylvania’s election laws *169 with respect to minor political parties recognition requirements persuasive here. As explained in The Patriot Party v. Mitchell, in Pennsylvania, if a political body’s candidates received at least 2% of the largest vote cast in the most recent general election, then it is recognized as a political party in the Commonwealth. 826 F.Supp. 926, 929 (E.D.Pa.1993), aff'd, 9 F.3d 1540 (3d Cir.1993). Pennsylvania law then classifies a political party as “major” if its membership consists of at least 15% of registered voters in the State and as minor if its registration is less than 15% of registered voters statewide. Id. While major political parties use the primary to determine who will represent them on the ballot, minor political parties must use nomination petitions to gain access to the general election ballot. Id. For a nonstatewide elective office, a minor political party candidate must garner the signatures of at least 2% “of the largest entire vote case for any officer ... elected at the last preceding election in said electoral district for which said nomination papers are to be filed.” 25 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 2911(b) (2002).
In The Patriot Party case, the Patriot Party of Pennsylvania, an offshoot of Pennsylvanians for Ross Perot, was certified as a minor political party, but Surrick, a candidate for the party, was unable to appear on the ballot because he failed to obtain the requisite number of signatures on his petition. 826 F.Supp. at 930 . Like the petitioners in the case before this Court, the plaintiffs in The Patriot Party argued that the state’s election laws were unconstitutional because it was unfair to require minor political party candidates continually to meet the signature requirement to gain access to the ballot because they already demonstrated the “significant modicum of support” when Pennsylvania recognized their political organization as a minor political party. The Patriot Party, 826 F.Supp. at 934 .
Finding their rationale unpersuasive, the Pennsylvania federal court soundly rejected the plaintiffs’ argument, holding that is not unconstitutional to require minor political party candidates to undergo a petition requirement in order to appear on the ballot. The Patriot Party, 826 F.Supp. at 935 . *170 The court upheld the constitutionality of Pennsylvania’s election scheme, in part because the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that there are differences between historically established political parties and small, newly-founded political parties and that it is not inappropriate for a state to recognize these differences. 2 Id. (cited in Jenness, 403 U.S. at 441-42 , 91 S.Ct. at 1976 , 29 L.Ed.2d at 562 ). While Ross Perot received over 902, 000 votes in Pennsylvania in the 1992 Presidential election, the Patriot Party was unsuccessful in its efforts to solicit members. The Patriot Party, 826 F.Supp., at 935 . Because the Patriot Party “has not historically demonstrated broad support in Pennsylvania,” the court reasoned that the Commonwealth constitutionally can require minor political parties to use the nomination process, which would demonstrate such support, so that Pennsylvania may achieve its interest of managing the number of candidates on the ballot. Id.
Like the Patriot Party, the Green Party also lacks established support on the record of this case. While the Green Party was able to garner the 10,000 signatures statewide to be recognized as a political party, according to the record there are only 229 voters statewide who have registered as Green Party members or otherwise expressed a desire to be associated with the group. Employing the rationale of The Patriot Party case, the lack of established support for the Green Party serves to justify Maryland’s double petition requirement. It is the second petition requirement, and not the party-recognition petition, which ensures that a minor political party candidate actually has a significant modicum of support in the geographical district from which he or she wishes to run.
*171 For the aforementioned reasons, I respectfully disagree with the Court’s conclusion that the State’s double petition requirement violates Article 24 of the Declaration of Rights.
ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
ELDRIDGE, Judge.
Pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-605, the defendant Maryland Board of Elections has filed a motion for reconsideration, asserting that this Court’s opinion “prevents the State Board of Elections ... from following the mandates of federal law in a federal election” and “places [the Board] in the position of having to violate two federal statutes, the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, and Article 2 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.” (Motion for Reconsideration at 1.) Specifically, the Board asks this Court to review Part III of the opinion holding that certain statutory provisions and administrative regulations which treat “inactive” voters differently from “active” voters, and which provide for a separate inactive voter registration list, are invalid under the Maryland Constitution. The Board argues that the National Voter Registration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg et seq., and the Help America Vote Act of 2002, 42 U.S.C. § 15301 et seq., “compel[3 states to establish a process for removing the names of certain ineligible voters from voter registration lists used in federal elections” and that “[a]t least for federal elections, [the] ... voter registration list must contain an ‘inactive’ category.... ” (Motion for Reconsideration at 2.) Correctly noting that this Court’s decision prohibits the creation of a separate inactive voter registry, the Board claims that “federal law ... compels creation of such a category.” (Ibid.) In sum, the Board states, “there is no way that Maryland election officials can comply with both federal law and this Court’s decision.” (Id. at 3.)
For the reasons outlined below, we disagree with the arguments advanced by the Board.
*172 I.
The National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (“NVRA”) was enacted, inter alia, “to establish procedures that will increase the number of eligible citizens who register to vote in elections for Federal office,” as well as “to ensure that accurate and current voter registration rolls are maintained.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg(b)(1) and (b)(4). Under § 1973gg-6(a)(4), a State is required to implement a program which removes from the official voter registry the names of voters who have died or have changed their residence. In pertinent part, § 1973gg-6(a)(4) states:
“(a) In general. “In the administration of voter registration for elections for Federal office, each State shall -
* * *
“(4) conduct a general program that makes a reasonable effort to remove the names of ineligible voters from the official lists of eligible voters by reason of-
(A) the death of the registrant; or
(B) a change in the residence of the registrant, in accordance with subsections (b), (c), and (d) [of this section].”
Section 1973gg-6(b) requires that the program implemented to remove voters under subsection (a)(4) must be a nondiscriminatory program and that the program “shall not result in the removal of the name of any person from the official list of voters registered to vote in an election for Federal office by reason of the person’s failure to vote.” Subsection (b) provides, in relevant part:
“(b) Confirmation of voter registration. Any State program ... ensuring the maintenance of an accurate and. current voter registration roll for elections for Federal office-
“(1) shall be uniform, nondiscriminatory, and in compliance with the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (42 U.S.C.1973 et seq.); and
*173 “(2) shall not result in the removal of the name of any person from the official list of voters registered to vote in an election for Federal office by reason of the person’s failure to vote except that nothing in this paragraph may be construed to prohibit a State from using the procedures described in subsections (c) and (d) to remove an individual from the official list of eligible voters if the individual-
(A) has not either notified the applicable registrar ... or responded during the period described in subpara-graph (B) to the notice sent by the applicable registrar; and then
(B) has not voted ... in 2 or more consecutive general elections for Federal office.”
Section 1973gg-6(c)(1) sets forth an example of a program for the removal of ineligible voters from the registry. We stress that a State is not required to implement the program described in (c)(1); the statute merely provides an illustrative example, which, so long as it does not offend the State’s Constitution and election laws, may be used by a State in complying with the requirements of subsection (a)(4). Subsection (c)(1) provides in relevant part as follows (emphasis added):
“(c) Voter removal programs. (1) A State may meet the requirement of subsection (a)(4) by establishing a program under which—
(A) change-of-address information supplied by the Postal Service ... is used to identify registrants whose addresses may have changed; and
(B) if it appears from information provided by the Postal Service that — •
(i) a registrant has moved to a different residence address in the same registrar’s jurisdiction in which the registrant is currently registered, the registrar changes the registration records to show the new address and sends the registrant a notice of the change ... by *174 which the registrant may verify ... the address information; or
(ii) the registrant has moved to a[n] ... address not in the same registrar’s jurisdiction, the registrar uses the notice procedure described in subsection (d)(2) to confirm the change of address. 3
Finally, § 1973gg-6(d) addresses the removal of names from the official registry. Subsection (d)(1) sets forth a prohibition with two exceptions. The statute prohibits the States from removing the name of a registrant on the grounds of a change of residence unless one of two situations exists: First, where the registrant confirms in writing that he or she has moved out of the registrar’s jurisdiction. Second, where the registrant fails to respond to a specific type of notice sent by the registrar in conformity with paragraph (d)(2) and the registrant has not voted in the previous two general elections following the transmission of the notice to the registrant. Subsection (d)(1) provides (emphasis added):
“(d) Removal of names from voting rolls. (1) A State. shall not remove the name of a registrant from the official list of eligible voters in elections for Federal office on the ground that the registrant has changed residence unless the registrant—
(A) confirms in writing that the registrant has changed residence to a place outside the registrar’s jurisdiction in which the registrant is registered; or
(B) (i) has failed to respond to a notice described in paragraph (2); and
*175 (ii) has not voted ... in an election during the period beginning on the date of the notice and ending on the day after the date of the second general election for Federal office that occurs after the date of the notice.”
Paragraph (2) prescribes the detailed requirements of the notice which the Board must send to a registrant before the Board may remove the registrant’s name from the official list. The notice must (1) be a postage prepaid and pre-addressed card, (2) be sent by forwardable mail, (3) provide the registrant with the opportunity to state his or her current address, (4) notify the registrant of the date when he or she must return the card, and (5) state the consequences of not returning the card timely. In relevant part, § 1973gg-6(d)(2) provides:
“(2) A notice is ... a postage prepaid and pre-addressed return card, sent by forwardable mail, on which the registrant may state his or her current address, together with a notice to the following effect:
(A) If the registrant did not change ... residence, or changed residence but remained in the registrar’s jurisdiction, the registrant should return the card not later than the time provided for mail registration under subsection (a)(1)(B). If the card is not returned, affirmation or confirmation of the registrant’s address may be required before the registrant is permitted to vote ... during the period beginning on the date of the notice and ending on the day after the date of the second general election for Federal office that occurs after the date of the notice, and if the registrant does not vote in an election during that period the registrant’s name will be removed from the list of eligible voters.
(B) If the registrant has changed residence to a place outside the registrar’s jurisdiction ..., information concerning how the registrant can continue to be eligible to vote.”
Finally, § 1973gg-6(d)(3) requires a registrar to correct the official list to reflect the change of address information which the registrar receives from a voter responding to the confir *176 mation notice sent pursuant to (d)(2). A corresponding provision appeared in § 3-504(d) of the Maryland election laws, which we did not invalidate in our opinion in this case. Subsection (d)(3) simply provides:
“(3) A voting registrar shall correct an official list of eligible voters in elections for Federal office in accordance with change of residence information obtained in conformance with this subsection.”
Before addressing the specific federal statutory provisions which the Board relies upon, we emphasize that Part III of our opinion conforms with the fundamental thrust of the federal statutes. For instance, in our opinion we held that Article I, § 2, of the Maryland Constitution contemplates one uniform registry as opposed to two separate registries, one for “active” voters and another for “inactive” voters. Nothing in the above-cited federal statutes suggests that a state must create a separate inactive voter registry. Indeed, § 15483(a)(1)(A) of the Help America Vote Act provides that “each State ... shall implement, in a uniform and nondiscriminatory manner, a single, uniform, official, ... computerized statewide voter registration list ... that contains the name and registration information of every legally registered voter in the State ....” Moreover, § 15483(a)(1)(A)(viii) states that “[t]he computerized list shall serve as the official voter registration list for the conduct of all elections for Federal office in the State.”
Our opinion repeatedly underscored that being a frequent or active voter was not an eligibility requirement under Article I of the Maryland Constitution. The federal statutes cited by the Board are entirely consistent with this. As the Board concedes, § 1973gg-6(b)(2) of the National Voter Registration Act directs that a State’s program “shall not result in the removal of the name of any person from the official list of voters registered to vote in an election for Federal office by reason of the person’s failure to vote ....” Even more emphatic is the mandate contained in § 15483(a)(2)(B)(ii) of the Help America Vote Act, which requires that “[t]he list maintenance performed ... shall be conducted in a manner *177 that ensures that * * * only voters who are not registered or who are not eligible to vote are removed from the computerized list.” Additionally, § 15483(a)(4)(B) provides that “[t]he State election system shall include provisions to ensure that voter registration records are accurate and are updated regularly, including * * * [safeguards to ensue that eligible voters are not removed in error from the official list of eligible voters.”
Finally, our opinion made clear that the second-class status conferred upon “inactive” voters, and the corresponding inferi- or set of rights affixed to that status insofar as petitions are concerned, violates the Maryland Constitution. Once again, we find nothing in the federal statutes relied upon by the Board which supports the notion that an election board may refuse to count signatures on a petition because the persons signing were “inactive” voters.
As to the federal statutory provisions relied upon by the Board, we believe that subsections (b), (c), and (d) of § 1973gg-6 of the National Voter Registration Act should be construed in harmony with the general intent of the Act, which, inter alia, is to establish procedures that will increase the number of registered voters and ensure that accurate and current voter registration rolls are maintained. See §§ 1973gg(b)(1) and (b)(4). Subsection (b) of § 1973gg-6 is consistent with our opinion. That provision requires a uniform and non-discriminatory program to maintain accurate and current voter registration records and rejects a program that results in the removal of a registrant’s name from the official list by reason of the registrant’s failure to vote.
Likewise, subsection (c) does not mandate any procedure that is inconsistent with our opinion. On the contrary, that provision suggests a permissive sample program — a guideline. It explicitly provides that a State may meet the federal statute’s requirement in § 1973gg-6(a)(4) by establishing a program under which change-of-address information supplied by the Post Office is used to identify registrants whose addresses may have changed. It neither requires the states *178 to implement the specific program illustrated, nor does it state that the guideline described therein is the exclusive method to be used by the states in order to maintain accurate and current registration rolls.
Moreover subsection (d) does not appear to be a mandate which is irreconcilable with our opinion in this case. To begin with, (d)(1) prohibits the states from removing the name of a registrant from the official list of eligible voters on the ground that the registrant has changed residence, except in the event of two alternative situations. The remainder of subsection (d) sets forth exceptions to this prohibition. An exception to a prohibition is not normally construed to be an affirmative mandate. Consonant with our opinion, § 1973gg-6(d)(1)(A) allows a state to remove from the official list the names of registrants who affirmatively confirm that they have moved out of their original district. Similarly, § 1973gg-6(d)(1)(B) allows a state to remove the name of a registrant who fails to respond to the registrar’s confirmation notice and has not voted for a prescribed period of time. Consistent with the well-settled principle that a statute should be construed so that all of its parts harmonize with each other and are consistent with the statute’s general intent, 4 we read subsections (c) and (d) together as suggesting a particular program for meeting the requirement of § 1973gg-6(a)(4) that ineligible voters be removed from the registration list. Subsection (e)(1) clearly states that a state “may” adopt the program described in subsection (c)(1)(A) and (B), and (B)(ii) then *179 refers to the notice procedure “described in subsection (d)(2) to confirm the change of address.” Thus, the procedure in (d)(2) seems to be part of the program which a state “may,” but is not required to, adopt.
As our opinion in this case held, under Article I of the Maryland Constitution, the boards of elections may not maintain separate registries of “inactive” voters based on “passive proof’ that a voter may no longer be eligible to vote in the district in question. Our opinion stated that “the Board’s practice of creating a separate ‘inactive voter’ registry] for voters whom it suspects might have moved out of an election district, and the Board’s subsequent removal of such ‘inactive voters’ from that registration list without affirmative proof that the voter has, in fact, moved to a different election district, cannot be squared with the constitutional provisions [set forth in Article I of the Maryland Constitution].” In its motion, the State Board of Elections asserts that “[w]hether maintaining a separate list of these [inactive] voters violates the requirement that there be a single official list of eligible voters would seem to be a semantic, rather than a meaningful, argument.” (Motion for Reconsideration at 9 n.8). We disagree. Under § 3-504(5) of the Maryland Election Code, “[registrants placed on the inactive list shall be counted only for purposes of voting and not for such official administrative purposes including petition signature verification, establishing precincts, and reporting official statistics.” In the case at bar, the Board’s practice of striking the names of “inactive” voters from the Green Party’s nominating petitions presented a very meaningful problem for Mr. Gross; he was kept off the ballot.
The provisions of the Help America Vote Act cited by the Board do not appear to help its position. As the Board points out, § 15483(a) of the Help America Vote Act provides for the implementation and maintenance of statewide computerized voter registration lists. Subsection (a)(2) provides:
“(2) Computerized list maintenance. (A) In general. The appropriate State or local election official shall perform list maintenance with respect to the computerized list on a regular basis as follows:
*180 (i) If an individual is to be removed from the computerized list, such individual shall be removed in accordance with the provisions of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993
Insofar as removal from the voter registry is concerned, the Act merely seems to embody the National Voter Registration Act’s requirements. Likewise, § 15483(a)(4) of the Help America Vote Act provides that “[t]he State election system shall include provisions to ensure that voter registration records in the State are accurate and are updated regularly, including ... [a] system of file maintenance that makes a reasonable effort to remove registrants who are ineligible to vote from the official list of eligible voters.” Section 15483(a)(4)(A) explicitly requires that such a system be “consistent with the National Voter Registration Act of 1993.”
Additionally, in its motion, the Board asserts (Motion for Reconsideration at 8) (emphasis added):
“[I]f a specimen ballot or other election mailing to the old address is returned by the post office with a forwarding address, election officials determine whether the new address is inside or outside the county and inside or outside Maryland. If the new address is in-county, the registrant’s record is updated and a confirmation notice is mailed. Whether or not election officials receive a response, the voter’s name remains on county rolls. If the new address is in another Maryland county, the registrant’s voter registration record is updated and transferred to the new county and a confirmation notice is mailed. Whether or not election officials receive a response, the voter’s name remains on the voter registry in the new county. On the other hand, if the new address is outside Maryland, election officials place the voter’s name on the [inactive] list and send a confirmation notice .... ”
But a plain reading of § 3-504(f) of the Maryland Election Code indicates that, “[i]f a voter fails to respond to a confirmation notice sent based on information that the voter moved to a different residence outside the local board’s jurisdiction, the *181 voter’s name shall be placed on a list of inactive voters.” The Maryland Election Code does not differentiate between the voters whose new address is in-county as opposed to those whose new address is in a new county or outside of Maryland. It simply relegates all voters who do not reply to the confirmation notice to the inactive list and, inter alia, strips them of their ability to be counted as petition-signers.
The Maryland Constitution, as interpreted in our opinion does not countenance a program in which a voter is labeled “inactive,” and eventually removed from the registry, without affirmative proof that the voter has been rendered ineligible to vote in the district in question by his or her change in residence to another district. Our opinion rejects a program which authorizes removal from the registration rolls by reason of a voter’s inaction which, as we pointed out, “might be caused by numerous factors other than moving to a different election district.” Section 3-504(e)(1) allows an election official to remove a voter who confirms in writing that he or she has changed his or her residence to a location outside the county in which he or she was originally registered. We held that this satisfies the requirement for affirmative proof of a change in domicile. The option presented in § 3-504(e)(2), which allows an election official to remove a voter who does not respond to the confirmation notice and fails to vote in the prescribed period, does not satisfy the requirement for affirmative proof of a voter’s change in domicile.
II.
The State Board of Elections asserts that “the holdings in Part III of the Court’s opinion ... appear to make it impossible for election officials to comply with the mandates in the [National Voter Registration Act and Help America Vote Act].” (Motion for Reconsideration at 3.) The Board further states that “there is no way that Maryland election officials can comply with both federal law and this Court’s decision.” (Ibid.). As discussed above, however, there appears to be no mandatory procedure in the National Voter Registration Act or the Help America Vote Act that is inconsistent with our *182 opinion. On the contrary, many of the provisions of the federal statutes cited by the Board dovetail with Part III of our opinion. Indeed, the Board seems to concede in its motion that placing voters who do hot respond to confirmation notices on an inactive list is not required by the federal statutes and that “should this Court find [that practice] inconsistent with the State Constitution, Maryland election officials could stop the practice without violating clear mandates of federal law.” (Motion for Reconsideration at 12 n.10). There would seem to be many ways to establish a program that complies with the requirements in the federal statutes and with the Maryland Constitution.
Nevertheless, we have remanded this case for further proceedings, and specifically a new declaratory judgment to be crafted and filed by the Circuit Court. In the interests of justice, upon remand to the Circuit Court, and prior to the entry of a new declaratory judgment, the State Board of Elections should be given the opportunity to demonstrate, if it can, any circumstances where there is an irreconcilable conflict between Maryland Constitutional requirements and man-, dates of federal law. If, in the judgment of the Circuit Court, the Board makes such a showing, obviously, under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, the federal statutes should prevail and the new declaratory judgment should so reflect.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION GRANTED TO THE EXTENT INDICATED ABOVE, AND OTHERWISE DENIED.
. The current version of this is found at Maryland Code (2003), Election Law, § 1-101(mm).
. This decision also helps to explain why Maryland allows candidates representing the major political parties to use the primary process to access the ballot instead of using nomination petitions. The historically established broad support of the major political party ensures the State that its ballots will not be overrun with frivolous candidates, an insurance that is lacking with minor political party candidates.
. The term "registrar's jurisdiction" is defined in § 1973gg-6(j), in pertinent part, as follows:
"(1) an incorporated city, town, borough, or other form of municipality;
"(2) if voter registration is maintained by ... [another] unit of government that governs a larger geographic area than a municipality, the geographic area governed by that unit of government; or "(3) if voter registration is maintained on a consolidated basis for more than one municipality or other unit of government by an office that performs all of the functions of a voting registrar, the geographic area of the consolidated ... units.”
. See, e.g., Dimensions Health Corp. v. Md. Ins. Admin., 374 Md. 1, 17 , 821 A.2d 40, 50 (2003); State v. Crescent Cities Jaycees Found., Inc., 330 Md. 460, 468 , 624 A.2d 955, 959 (1993); Gruver-Cooley Jade Corp. v. Perlis, 252 Md. 684, 692, 251 A.2d 589, 594 (1969); Clerk of Circuit Court v. Chesapeake Beach Park, Inc., 251 Md. 657, 664 , 248 A.2d 479, 483 (1968); State Dep’t of Assessments & Taxation v. Ellicott-Brandt, Inc., 237 Md. 328, 335 , 206 A.2d 131, 135 (1965); Associated Acceptance Corp. v. Bailey, 226 Md. 550, 556 , 174 A.2d 440, 443 (1961); Maguire v. State, 192 Md. 615, 623 , 65 A.2d 299, 302 (1949) (" ‘A statute should be so construed that all its parts harmonize with each other and render them consistent with its general object and scope,” ’ quoting Pittman v. Housing Authority of Baltimore City, 180 Md. 457, 463-464 , 25 A.2d 466, 469 (1942)).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9646148. Public record. Not legal advice.