# Borough of Green Tree v. Board of Property Assessments, Appeals & Review

> Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · November 20, 1974 · 459 Pa. 268

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9645841

## Case

- **Full name:** BOROUGH OF GREEN TREE Et Al., Appellants, v. the BOARD OF PROPERTY ASSESSMENTS, APPEALS AND REVIEW OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY, Pennsylvania, Et Al., Appellees. Appeal of BOROUGH OF CRAFTON at No. 142. Appeal of BOROUGH OF BRENTWOOD at No. 159
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** November 20, 1974
- **Citations:** 459 Pa. 268; 328 A.2d 819; 1974 Pa. LEXIS 471
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Roberts
- **Judges:** Jones, Eagen, O'Brien, Roberts, Pomeroy, Nix, Manderino, Eagan
- **Cited by:** 147 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9645841

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that “[w]here the administrative process has nothing to contribute to the decision of the issue and there are no special reasons for postponing its immediate decision, exhaustion should not be required”
- stating that “where the administrative process has nothing to contribute to the decision of the issue and there are no special reasons for postponing its immediate decision, exhaustion should not be required”
- stating that our Commonwealth's constitution empowers our legislature to limit the equitable jurisdiction of our courts of common pleas by establishing statutory methods for seeking redress
- noting that “statutorily[]prescribed [administrative] remedies may [not] be aborted simply by an allegation in a complaint in equity[] of a constitutional issue”
- stating that the equitable jurisdiction of a trial court is subject to statutory limitations

## Opinion text

ROBERTS, Justice
(concurring).
I concur in the Court’s conclusion that the court of common pleas sitting in equity has jurisdiction to decide appellants’ constitutional challenge. Our decision in Lynch mandates this result. Regardless of the availability of a specific statutory remedy, a court of equity has jurisdiction to decide a broad constitutional challenge to the validity of a taxing statute or ordinance. Lynch v. Owen J. Roberts School District, 430 Pa. 461 , 244 A.2d 1 (1968); Studio Theaters, Inc. v. City of Washington, 418 Pa. 73, 79 , 209 A.2d 802, 805 (1965). See also Rochester & Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Board of Assessment, 438 Pa. 506, 511 , 266 A.2d 78, 80 (1970) (dissenting opinion of Roberts, J., joined by Bell, C. J.); Crosson v. Downingtown Area School District, 440 Pa. 468, 481 , 270 A.2d 377, 383 (1970) (dissenting opinion of Roberts, J., joined by Belize. J.).
In Lynch this Court said:
“While we agree with the general proposition that equity will not entertain an action where plaintiff has an adequate statutory remedy at law, we also acknowledge the presence of an exception to that doctrine, existing where a taxing statute is made the subject of a constitutional challenge.
“ ‘The teaching of our case law is that, where the controversy involves a challenge to the constitutional *284 validity of a taxing statute or ordinance, such a controversy falls within the general class of cases wherein equity does have jurisdiction and competency to act. [Citations omitted.]’ Studio Theaters, Inc. v. City of Washington, 418 Pa. 73, 79 , 209 A.2d 802, 805 (1965). See also, Philadelphia Life Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 410 Pa. 571 , 190 A.2d 111 (1963); Young Men’s Christian Assoc. of City of Reading v. City of Reading, 402 Pa. 592 , 167 A.2d 469 (1961) (dictum); cf. Blue Cross Appeal, 416 Pa. 574 , 209 A.2d 799 (1965). Moreover, that this rule applies even in cases where there is a specific statutory remedy is shown clearly by Studio Theaters . . ..”
430 Pa. at 565-566 , 244 A.2d at 3-4 .
The opinion announcing the judgment today departs from these principles by adopting a new balancing test which, it is asserted, will determine the jurisdiction of equity to resolve constitutional challenges to tax statutes. In my view, the suggested test, which is neither Lynch nor Rochester & Pittsburgh Coal Co., only confuses the issue.
The opinion announcing the judgment begins its analysis by correctly observing that the “determination of the constitutionality of enabling legislation is not a function of the administrative agencies thus enabled.” It then balances the “utility” of a constitutional adjudication before the tax review board under its specialized procedures against the “inconvenience, delay and expense involved” in these procedures. On the basis of this test, the majority concludes that, at least in this case, the “utility” of a tax appeals board decision is outweighed by the negative factors and concludes that the equity court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the challenge despite the statutory appeal procedure.
In my judgment, this analysis is totally unnecessary because it will always lead to exactly the same conclusion the Court reached in Lynch . Tax appeals boards were *285 created to review real estate tax assessments. They are totally unsuited both by skill and purpose to adjudicate constitutional issues. The board procedures may perhaps be adequate for deciding individual claims of improper assessment, * but they are plainly inadequate when faced with a broad-based attack on the constitutionality of a taxing statute, as here, or the assessment procedure. Necessarily, the multiple proceedings before the board involving separate and numerous challenges will always involve “inconvenience, delay and expense” which far exceeds the “utility” of board procedures. It should be noted that superimposed upon these disadvantages is the added burden of multiplicitous litigation and long periods of financial uncertainty for taxpayers and local government.
Under the variation of Rochester & Pittsburgh Coal Co., as under Lynch , suggested in the opinion announcing the judgment a court of equity will always have jurisdiction to hear a constitutional challenge to a tax statute. All the majority presently does is inject extraneous and unhelpful factors into the courts’ determinations and create confusion by suggesting that there is now some nebulous class of constitutional challenges that will somehow be denied consideration in equity.
Of course, the experimentation with the new balancing procedure is totally unnecessary for the result here. Under the holding of either Lynch or Rochester & Pittsburgh Coal Co., the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas has equitable jurisdiction to determine the consti *286 tutionality of the statute. Therefore, there is no decir sional need to choose between them, or to create the variation of Rochester & Pittsburgh Coal Co. suggested by the majority.
O’BRIEN, J., joins in this concurring opinion.
See, e. g., Morris v. Board of Property Assessment, 417 Pa. 192 , 209 A.2d 407 (1965); Deitch v. Board of Property Assessment, 417 Pa. 213 , 209 A.2d 397 (1965); McKnight Shopping Center, Inc. v. Board of Property Assessment, 417 Pa. 234 , 209 A.2d 389 (1965); Pittsburgh Miracle Mile Town & Country Shopping Center, Inc. v. Board of Property Assessment, 417 Pa. 243 , 209 A.2d 394 (1965); Rieck Ice Cream Co., Appeal, 417 Pa. 249 , 209 A.2d 383 (1965); Casa Loma, Inc. v. Board of Property Assessment, 417 Pa. 257 , 209 A.2d 387 (1965); H. J. Heinz Co. v. Board of Property Assessment, 417 Pa. 259 , 209 A.2d 418 (1965).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9645841. Public record. Not legal advice.