# Commonwealth v. Carson > Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · December 27, 2006 · 590 Pa. 501 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9645469 ## Case - **Full name:** COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Samuel CARSON, Appellant - **Court:** Supreme Court of Pennsylvania - **Decided:** December 27, 2006 - **Citations:** 590 Pa. 501; 913 A.2d 220; 2006 Pa. LEXIS 2555 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Cappy - **Judges:** Cappy, Castille, Newman, Saylor, Eakin, Baer, Baldwin - **Cited by:** 202 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9645469 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - concluding that the following prosecutorial argument did not improperly prevent the jury from giving full effect to the appellant’s mitigation evidence: “[A]ny argument to say that [the appellant] didn’t have that opportunity [to climb out of poverty and make *98 something out… - holding that a general request for PCRA discovery upon speculation that the requested materials will uncover exculpatory evidence is insufficient even to establish the more lenient good cause standard applicable in connection with the first, - 14 - J-S11006-24 counseled petiti… - explaining that this Court “has held that a Simmons instruction is mandated only ..if two events occur: (1) the prosecutor must place the defendant’s future dangerousness in issue; and (2) the'defendant must have requested that the trial.court issue the instruction” - concluding that the prosecutor properly referred to the appellant’s unrealized opportunities for rehabilitation while in juvenile detention, because evidence of his offenses as a juvenile had been admitted into evidence at the penalty phase of trial - holding that the victim’s mother did not provide victim impact evidence by testifying that: before the crime occurred her son was alive and well; the next time she saw him he was dead; and she identified his body at the medical examiner’s office ## Opinion text Chief Justice CAPPY, concurring. I join the majority opinion save for footnote 35 on pages 593-94, 913 A.2d at 274. Respectfully, I disagree with the interpretation the majority forwards regarding “future dangerousness” as that concept has evolved in Pennsylvania. Although Simmons 1 itself may have narrowly limited the instruction requirement to instances when “future dangerousness” arose as a stand-alone aggravator, I believe that any *609 inquiry regarding Simmons must be informed by Pennsylvania law following Simmons. Accepting that the state of the law in Pennsylvania remained uncertain at the time of this court’s plurality decision in Commonwealth v. Christy, any lack of clarity was rectified in its immediate aftermath. Following Christy, our case law spoke in terms of “future dangerousness” being placed “at issue” by either party, and did not place a restriction on the rule that it was limited to those circumstances when future dangerousness was raised as a stand-alone aggravator. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. King, 554 Pa. 331 , 721 A.2d 763, 779 (1998) (pointing out that a Simmons instruction was not required when “the issue of future dangerousness was not before the jury. At no time during either phase of trial did the prosecutor argue or suggest that the death penalty should be imposed because Appellants could potentially hurt someone else ....”) (emphasis added); Commonwealth v. Chandler, 554 Pa. 401 , 721 A.2d 1040, 1046 (1998) (noting that a Simmons instruction was required “[ujnder the current state of the law, where future dangerousness is at issue and a specific request is made by a capital defendant”) (emphasis added); Commonwealth v. Clark, 551 Pa. 258 , 710 A.2d 31, 36 (1998) (extending rule in Christy to include either counsel and noting that in Christy, “this court acknowledged the applicability of Simmons to cases in Pennsylvania decided subsequent to Simmons, where the issue of the defendant’s future dangerousness was raised”); Commonwealth v. Smith, 544 Pa. 219 , 675 A.2d 1221, 1232 (1996) (noting that “[t]his court held in Christy that Simmons mandates that where future dangerousness is at issue and a specific request is made by the capital defendant, it is a denial of due process to refuse to tell a jury what the phrase ‘life sentence’ means”); see also Commonwealth v. Trivigno, 561 Pa. 232 , 750 A.2d 243 (2000)(0pinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court) (concluding that it was error for prosecutor to argue future dangerousness as part of the criminal history aggravator). Accordingly, I tend to agree with Madame Justice Baldwin that defense counsel would be obliged to request a Simmons instruction whenever the prosecutor injected “future dangerousness” into the penalty phase after Christy. *610 Nevertheless, I join- the majority’s analysis of this issue, since I agree that the statement at issue related to past conduct and did not implicate Appellant’s “future dangerousness.” See Commonwealth v. Williams, 557 Pa. 207 , 732 A.2d 1167, 1186 (1999); Commonwealth v. Robinson, 554 Pa. 293 , 721 A.2d 344, 355 (1998). 2 . Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 , 114 S.Ct. 2187 , 129 L.Ed.2d 133 (1994) (plurality). . We have implied in the past that statements allegedly implicating "future dangerousness” must be read in context, and when read in context, I agree with the majority that the statement related to past conduct. See Commonwealth v. Fisher, 559 Pa. 558 , 741 A.2d 1234, 1244 (1999). --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9645469. Public record. Not legal advice.