# Commonwealth v. Smith

> Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · April 28, 1977 · 472 Pa. 492

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9644106

## Case

- **Full name:** COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Barry SMITH Appellant (Two Cases)
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** April 28, 1977
- **Citations:** 472 Pa. 492; 372 A.2d 797; 1977 Pa. LEXIS 652
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Manderino
- **Judges:** Eagen, O'Brien, Roberts, Pomeroy, Nix, Manderino, Former, Jones, Mandebino
- **Cited by:** 67 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9644106

## Opinion text

MANDERINO, Justice,
concurring.
I join the majority opinion and agree that appellant’s statement should have been suppressed because the prosecution failed to show that he had effectively waived his constitutional rights prior to giving that statement. I would like to add, however, that in addition to the three pre-requisites discussed by the majority opinion, the prosecution must show that meaningful consultation between the juvenile and the interested and informed adult actually took place.
The majority summarizes the first three parts of the test to be applied to determine whether a juvenile has validly waived his constitutional rights as follows:
“Under our formulation, failure by the Commonwealth to establish either the adult was one interested in the welfare of the juvenile accused, that the adult was aware of the rights of the accused, or that the minor had an opportunity to consult, would justify the conclusion that the purported waiver was ineffective.”
Initially, I agree with the majority that the prosecution must show that the adult involved was interested in the juvenile’s welfare; that the “father” in this case, did not measure up to that standard; and that appellant’s “waiver” was ineffective for that reason alone.
Secondly, I agree with the majority that the prosecution must establish that the adult was informed as to the juvenile’s constitutional rights and, I would add, the prosecution must show that the adult was aware of the consequences of the juvenile’s waiver of those rights. Although the requirement of an awareness of the consequences of a waiver is not explicitly stated in the majority’s “formulation” as quoted above, it is implicit in earlier portions of the majority opinion. Again, appellant’s *506 “waiver” was ineffective because the prosecution failed to establish this part of the test.
I also agree with the majority that the prosecution must show that the juvenile had an opportunity to consult with an adult who meets the first two portions of the test, and that appellant’s “waiver” was ineffective because the prosecution failed to establish this prong of the test.
I believe, however, that the constitutional rights of a juvenile accused can be adequately protected only if it is also shown that meaningful consultation actually took place. Only after actual consultation can it be said that the juvenile’s immaturity did not place him at a “unique disadvantage in the custodial interrogation process.” Any less stringent standards would allow the court to rule that a juvenile’s “waiver” was effective so long as the prosecution (having proved points one and two of the “formulation”) showed simply that the juvenile and the adult advisor sat together, even if it were also shown that they did not speak to each other. To allow such a result would be tantamount to accepting the conclusion —expressly disavowed by the majority opinion — that the inquiry as to the effectiveness of the juvenile’s “waiver” ends when it is shown that the formal pre-requisites have been met. Only by requiring that meaningful consultation actually take place can we begin to assure that the juvenile has, in fact, comprehended the situation.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9644106. Public record. Not legal advice.