# Montanez v. State

> Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas · April 26, 2006 · 195 S.W.3d 101

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9643347

## Case

- **Full name:** Anibal MONTANEZ A/K/A Ivan Montilla-Pena, Appellant v. the STATE of Texas
- **Court:** Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
- **Decided:** April 26, 2006
- **Citations:** 195 S.W.3d 101; 2006 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 830; 2006 WL 1083917
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Womack
- **Judges:** Keasler, Price, Hervey, Holcomb, Cochran, Keller, Meyers, Womack, Johnson
- **Cited by:** 918 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9643347

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that the reviewing court must decide whether, "after affording almost total deference to the trial court's determination of historical facts that are supported by the record, the trial court abused its discretion by finding that the State proved by clear and convincing…
- explaining that a clearly erroneous standard, which requires the appeals court to give deference to the trier of fact, applies to the review df a ruling from a suppression hearing that addressed whether the defendant voluntarily consented to the search in a case that included …
- holding that “the deferential standard of review in Guzman [v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997),] applies to a trial court’s determination of historical facts when that determination is based on a videotape recording admitted into evidence at a suppression hearing”
- holding that “the deferential standard of review in Guzman [v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997
- holding “that the deferential standard of review . . . applies to a trial court’s determination of historical facts when that determination is based on a videotape recording admitted into evidence at a suppression hearing”

## Opinion text

WOMACK, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion.
The Court decides, “on [its] own initiative, [to] review whether the court of appeals correctly decided that an implied adverse ruling on Montanez’s motion to suppress was made by the trial court.” Ante, at 104.
I believe that the Court should give the parties notice of this decision and an opportunity to brief the issue. That “the State briefed and Montanez had an opportunity to brief in the court of appeals” (ibid.) is not satisfactory. First, the issue in the Court of Appeals was whether the trial court’s ruling was erroneous, while the issue in this court is the Court of Appeals’ decision. It could not have been briefed before the Court of Appeals rendered its decision.
More important is the principle, which is a rudiment of due process, that a party should have notice that a court will consider an issue and an opportunity to be heard.
I respectfully dissent to the decision of the issue without notice.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9643347. Public record. Not legal advice.
