# SMI Realty Management Corp. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London

> Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston) · November 29, 2005 · 179 S.W.3d 619

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9642980

## Case

- **Full name:** SMI REALTY MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, Appellant, v. UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYD’S, LONDON, Appellee
- **Court:** Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston)
- **Decided:** November 29, 2005
- **Citations:** 179 S.W.3d 619; 2005 WL 2123726
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Radack
- **Judges:** Laura Carter Higley
- **Cited by:** 12 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9642980

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that insurance polices are interpreted according to the rules of contract construction, and that to give effect to the parties’ intent courts construe the terms of the contract as a whole and consider all of its terms

## Opinion text

SHERRY RADACK, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
Because I believe that the policy unambiguously excludes coverage for all “leakage,” both sudden and gradually occurring, I respectfully dissent. In Criswell v. European Crossroads Shopping Center, Ltd., 792 S.W.2d 945, 948 (Tex.1990), the supreme court stated that use of semicolons in drafting an agreement indicates that each phrase set off by a semicolon is to be read as having independent significance. In this case, the items in the list of excluded perils are set apart by semi-colons. Therefore, I believe that each has independent significance, and one item cannot be used to modify another. As such, the policy provides that it excludes “leakage” and “any other gradually occurring loss.” I cannot read the policy to exclude only “gradually occurring leakage,” as the term “leakage” is not so modified in the policy. See County of Maverick v. Tex. Ass’n of Counties Workers’ Comp. Self-Ins. Fund, *629 852 S.W.2d 700, 705 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1993, no writ) (“[If] one party’s interpretation would require the insertion of a qualifying phrase, that interpretation must be rejected as violating the rule of giving language its ordinary meaning.”). Accordingly, I dissent. I would affirm the summary judgment granted in favor of Underwriters.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9642980. Public record. Not legal advice.