# Commonwealth v. Weaver

> Superior Court of Pennsylvania · December 23, 1982 · 309 Pa. Super. 509

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9641784

## Case

- **Full name:** COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Keith WEAVER, Appellant
- **Court:** Superior Court of Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** December 23, 1982
- **Citations:** 309 Pa. Super. 509; 455 A.2d 1199; 1982 Pa. Super. LEXIS 6015
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Montemuro
- **Judges:** Cercone, Montemuro, Van Voort
- **Cited by:** 7 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
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## Opinion text

MONTEMURO, Judge,
dissenting:
I dissent. Considering the totality of circumstances, I cannot agree with the majority’s application of the “mere presence” standard to the facts of this case. This standard, in my opinion, is applicable in situations where per chance anyone could have stepped innocently within close proximity to the scene of the crime. This would include doorways, Commonwealth v. Goodman, 465 Pa. 367 , 350 A.2d 810 (1976), sidewalks, Commonwealth v. Roscioli, 454 Pa. 59 , 309 A.2d 396 (1973) and any other common or public area. However, it is highly unlikely that a person could find himself innocently and coincidentally situated on a rooftop at 12:30 in the morning, a mere fifty feet away from the commission of a crime. Concededly, it is possible that a *517 person thus situated may have been disinterested in and unaware of the burglary that was in progress and certainly a vivid imagination can produce an infinite number of reasons for the appellant’s presence at this particular location so late at night. But to pursue this line of reasoning, I believe, is to ignore the mandates of common sense.
Although we recognize that the mere presence of an individual at the scene of a crime is not sufficient in itself to support a finding of guilt, Commonwealth v. Manson, 230 Pa.Super. 527 , 327 A.2d 182 (1974), the appellant’s presence was not so minimal as to justify a reversal of his conviction. The test for sufficiency of the evidence requires an acceptance of the evidence presented by the Commonwealth in its most favorable light and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom. Commonwealth v. Whack, 482 Pa. 137 , 393 A.2d 417 (1978). The majority cites a number of “rooftop” cases where the inference of guilt was drawn from a combination of factors present, including the appellant’s participation in the crime. See, Commonwealth v. Whalen, 189 Pa.Super. 351 , 150 A.2d 133 (1959); Commonwealth v. Cimaszewski, 447 Pa. 141 , 288 A.2d 805 (1972); In the Interest of Gonzales, 255 Pa.Super. 217 , 386 A.2d 586 (1978). Likewise, in Commonwealth v. Jones, 298 Pa.Super. 199 , 444 A.2d 729 (1982), this court sustained the conviction of a person who, upon fleeing from the scene of a rooftop burglary, was found hiding from the police in a doorway that opened onto a neighboring alley. In this case, we held that “an attempt to flee or conceal oneself from the police is an additional circumstance from which guilt can be inferred.” Id., 298 Pa.Superior Ct. at 204, 444 A.2d at 731 (emphasis added). Moreover, it is established that “when a person commits a crime, knowing that he is wanted therefor, and flees or conceals himself, such conduct is evidence of the consciousness of guilt and may form the basis in connection with other proof from which guilt may be inferred.” Commonwealth v. Whack, supra, 482 Pa. 142 , 393 A.2d at 419 (quoting Commonwealth v. Tinsley, 465 Pa. 329, 333 , 350 A.2d 791, 792-793 (1976)) (Emphasis added). Even where no direct evidence is presented to *518 establish actual knowledge that he was being sought by police, circumstantial proof of such knowledge may be sufficient. Commonwealth v. Osborne, 433 Pa. 297 , 249 A.2d 330 (1969).
In the instant case, in addition to the appellant’s unusual location, the lateness of the hour, the absence of any evidence to account for his presence at the scene and the close proximity to the criminal occurrence (his position on the rooftop was easily accessible from the roof where the crime took place), it is emphasized that minutes after co-defendants spotted the police, the appellant was found covering his head and lying in a fetal position closely behind a two-foot high partition. His behavior in the context of the accompanying circumstances unquestionably infers an attempt to conceal himself from the arresting police officers and sufficiently indicates, beyond speculation, conjecture and reasonable doubt that the appellant is guilty.
I would affirm the judgment of sentence.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9641784. Public record. Not legal advice.