# National Labor Relations Board v. Bell Oil & Gas Co. > Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · July 21, 1937 · 91 F.2d 509 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9640218 ## Case - **Full name:** NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. BELL OIL & GAS CO. Et Al. - **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit - **Decided:** July 21, 1937 - **Citations:** 91 F.2d 509; 1 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 649; 1937 U.S. App. LEXIS 4272 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Holmes - **Judges:** Foster, Hutcheson, Holmes - **Cited by:** 20 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9640218 ## Opinion text HOLMES, Circuit Judge (dissenting). I concur in the opinion of the court that the Board had jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties, and properly directed the re-employment of Bebermeyer with reimbursement for the time lost, but I dissent from the conclusion that the order is ambiguous or not properly framed, and that enforcement thereof should be delayed until further action by the Board. I think the order of the Board is wholly valid and should be enforced without any modification. It was made upon findings, fully supported by evidence, that respondents were engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce, as defined in the act. The statute provides that such findings shall be conclusive. The principles to which the courts should adhere in reviewing orders of this character are the same as those applicable to orders of other fact-finding tribunals with quasi judicial powers. If the Board gives interested persons an opportunity to be heard, if it does not refuse to consider relevant evidence, if it does not proceed upon a mistake of law, if it acts upon substantial evidence sufficient to support its findings, the courts should not undertake to weigh such evidence, to inquire into the soundness of the reasoning which induced the Board’s conclusions, or to question the wisdom of the provisions or requirements prescribed in the order. The sole function of this court is to “reverse or modify the findings only if clearly improper or not supported by substantial evidence.” Washington, Virginia & Maryland Coach Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 57 S.Ct. 648, 650 , 81 L.Ed. -; National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, 57 S.Ct. 615 , 81 L.Ed. -, 108 A.L.R. 1352 ; National Labor Relations Board v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 57 S.Ct. 645 , 81 L.Ed. -, 108 A.L.R. 1352 ; National Labor Relations Board v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 57 S.Ct. 642 , 81 L.Ed. —, 108 A.L.R. 1352 ; Agwilines, Inc., v. National Labor Relations Board (C.C.A.) 87 F.(2d) 146, 151 ; National Labor Relations Board v. Associated Press (C.C.A.) 85 F.(2d) 56, 58 , affirmed Associated Press v. National Labor Relations Board, 57 S.Ct. 650 , 81 L.Ed.-; National Labor Relations Board v. National New York Packing & Shipping Co., Inc. (C.C.A.) 86 F.(2d) 98, 99 . The order to dismiss Maxwell, if necessary, was designed to restore the situation existing prior to the discriminatory discharge. Unless the Board has this power, the law may easily be nullified by displacing striking employees with new men. In some of the cases cited above the Supreme Court sustained the validity of orders for reinstatement with back pay, without regard to the fact that the company, immediately upon the discharge of the old employees, had hired new ones to replace them. Since the reinstatement of discharged employees in any case might necessitate the dismissal of employees hired to take their places, [ see no objection to the order providing for that contingency, and no reason to construe the order as a limitation upon the right of the respondents with reference to the retention of the other two engineers at the repressure plant. The intention of the Board expressed in the findings, headed “The Remedy,” may be vague and indefinite, but this intention was not incorporated in the order, and, ‘therefore, is not mandatory upon respondents. It can neither be construed as a finding of fact nor a conclusion of law. I see nothing “moot” in the provision for “dismissing Maxwell, if necessary.” By that provision, the Board merely intended to grant its approval of the dismissal of Maxwell, if the respondents, in their discretion, saw fit to do so. As Maxwell is not now in their employ, this permission has become unnecessary, if it ever was, but, in that view, it is mere surplusage, and does not in *516 validate the other provisions which the Board deemed necessary and incorporated in this order. ■ The petition to enforce it should be granted. . --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9640218. Public record. Not legal advice.