# Calcote v. Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co.

> Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · July 31, 1946 · 157 F.2d 216

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9638044

## Case

- **Full name:** Calcote v. Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co.
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
- **Decided:** July 31, 1946
- **Citations:** 157 F.2d 216; 167 A.L.R. 413; 1946 U.S. App. LEXIS 3285
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Hutcheson
- **Judges:** Hutcheson, Holmes, Lee
- **Cited by:** 76 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9638044

## Opinion text

HUTCHESON, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
The principles governing the determination of whether parties are indispensable or merely necessary are apparently simple and constant. In applying them, however, in individual cases, the decisions have made, and are making, it increasingly difficult for courts to say categorically and with the voice of authority who are and who are not indispensable parties. 1 It might be supposed then that in the general confusion I should regard myself as without sure guide and compass and as compelled, therefore, to concur in, rather than dissent from, the considered judgment of my associates, that Calcote’s royalty grantees were indispensable parties whose absence requires a reversal of the cause. But my concession that the decisions have caused confusion has not gone so far as to admit that the fog is impenetrable. Certainly I have not admitted that I see the question this record presents as “through a glass darkly” and not face to face. On the contrary, I think I see it and its answer quite clearly, and, because I do, I feel obligated not only to dissent from an opinion which I regard as adding to the confusion but to give my reasons quite simply and briefly for doing so.
It is undeniable that the statements in Shields v. Barrow, 17 How. 130 , 15 L.Ed. 158 , which are so often quoted with assurance as authority for opinions which answer the same questions on the same state of facts in wholly different ways, are rather dogmatic in nature. But it is equally undeniable that “there is no prescribed formula for determining in every case whether a person or corporation is an indispensable party or not,” Niles-BementPond Co. v. Iron Moulders Union, 254 U.S. 77 , 41 S.Ct. 39 , 65 L.Ed. 145 . The truth of the matter is that the classification of parties as necessary or indispensable depends entirely upon the particular facts of each case and that the same facts should produce the same holding. Further, though some of the decisions exhibit more than a little confusion about it, it is undeniable that the error in non-joinder of parties, either necessary or indispensable, is not jurisdictional. 2 Finally, it is clearly settled that even if a party is indispensable, his absence from a suit will not be ground for dismissing it or reversing a judgment in it, if it clearly appears that no relief can be, or has been, obtained in the suit which injuriously affects his interest. 3 In this case the plaintiffs have elected, as I think they had a right to do, to sue without joining their mineral vendees, and the defendant, having the same right, has elected to maintain its cross action without joining them. The judgment below went in favor of the continuance of the lease whose cancellation was sought in plaintiffs’ suit and whose confirmation and affirmance was sought in defendant’s cross bill. Neither plaintiffs-appellants, nor cross-plaintiff-appellee are here complaining of the absence of parties. This court of its own motion raises and presses the point that the mineral grantees were indispensable parties, contrary, I think, to the settled jurisprudence *224 of this Circuit 4 and elsewhere. 5 Thus the majority in reversing the judgment on the ground that the mineral grantees were indispensable and their absence requires a reversal holds, and in effect declares, that though the original parties to the lease were satisfied below to try out between themselves the issues arising on the lease and are satisfied here to try out whether the judgment was right on the merits and should be affirmed or was wrong on the merits and should be reversed for a new trial, they may not do so. It seems clear to me that this view is untenable. I think that the mineral vendees are not indispensable parties and that since their joinder was neither sought by appellants or appellee nor required by the court, the judgment ought .not to be reversed merely because they were not made parties. But if they could be regarded as indispensable parties to the suit is originally filed, it is quite plain, I think, that the failure to make them parties was not an error for which the. suit should be reversed. The attack upon the lease failed. The judgment confirmed instead of cancelling it. It, therefore, did not and could not possibly affect the rights of the mineral grantees who claim under the lease. In this situation, it seems to me a vain thing to reverse for the absence of parties a judgment whose rights it does not adversely affect I respectfully dissent.
Sneed v. Phillips Pet. Co., 5 Cir., 76 F.2d at page 789 and authorities collated. State of Washington v. United States, 9 Cir., 87 F.2d at page 427.
Sneed v. Phillips Pet. Co., supra; Bourdieu v. Pac. Oil Co., 299 U.S. at pages 70, 71, 57 S.Ct. 51 , 81 L.Ed. 42 .
Spring v. Ohio Oil Co., 5 Cir., 108 F.2d 560 ; Seeley v. Cornell, 5 Cir., 74 F. 2d 353 ; Id., 5 Cir., 90 F.2d 562 ; Seeley v. Hunt, 5 Cir., 109 F.2d 594 .
Home Ins. Co. v. Scott, 6 Cir., 46 F.2d 10 ; Id., 284 U.S. 177 , 52 S.Ct. 72 , 76 L.Ed. 229 .
The duty of the court to raise the question of its own motion is well settled. In Hoe v. Wilson, 9 Wall. 501 , 19 L.Ed. 762 , in delivering the opinion of the court, Mr. Justice Swayne said, 9 Wall at pages 503, 504, 19 L.Ed. 762 : “But Zephania Jones, the complainant in the suit in which the decree of sale was made, and the other heirs-at-law of Ann R. Dermott, are indispensable parties. No relief can be given in the case before us which will not seriously and permanently affect their rights and interests. According to the settled rules of equity jurisprudence the case cannot proceed without their presence before the court. The objection was not taken by the defendant, but the court should, sua sponte, have caused the bill to be properly amended, or have dismissed it, if the amendment were not made. Instead of this being done the cause was heard and decided upon its merits. This was manifest error.”
The reason for the application of the rule in this ease is that while the district court had potential jurisdiction to cancel or confirm the lease, it did not have complete active jurisdiction to do either in the absence of indispensable parties. Therefore, in raising the question of its own motion, this court was merely looking into its own active jurisdiction to do full and complete justice in the matter before it. We found that both the district court and this court, though possessing complete potential jurisdiction to grant adequate relief, failed to acquire active jurisdiction of the royalty grantees, or of their interest in the res against which this proceeding was directed. As to the absent parties, this proceeding is as truly coram non judiee as if potential jurisdiction were lacking.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9638044. Public record. Not legal advice.