# National Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commission

> Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · January 18, 1943 · 132 F.2d 545

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9637723

## Case

- **Full name:** NATIONAL BROADCASTING CO., Inc., v. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (MATHESON RADIO CO., Inc., Et Al., Intervenors)
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
- **Decided:** January 18, 1943
- **Citations:** 132 F.2d 545
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Miller
- **Judges:** Groner, Stephens, Miller, Vinson, Edgerton, Rutledge
- **Cited by:** 21 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9637723

## Opinion text

MILLER, Associate Justice
(dissenting).
I find no substantial allegation of injury in any of appellant’s reasons for appeal. Surely it is not enough, to secure standing to appeal on the basis of affectation of interest or aggrievement, that electrical interference will occur beyond that previously occurring. Surely some injury, actual or anticipated, should be the minimum requirement. And if injury has occurred or is threatened, what other test or measure of its substantiality could there be than that it is financial ?
In the Sanders case the Supreme Court said: “Congress had some purpose in enacting section 402(b) (2). It may have been of opinion that one likely to be financially injured by the issue of a license would be the only person having a sufficient interest to bring to the attention of the appellate court errors of law in the action of the Commission in granting the license.” 1 [Italics supplied.] Of course, stated as it is in speculative form concerning legislative purpose, it is possible to argue that this language was not intended to say that only a person likely to be financially injured has a sufficient interest, within the meaning of Section 402(b) (2). But I think that is exactly what the Supreme Court intended to say. As the Commission in its brief points out, the word financially, which I have italicized, was added after the opinion was first released. 2
While intangibles such as prestige, or position, in the broadcasting world may seem valuable to a licensee, still they are unimportant — in view of that free competition which Congress intended should exist in the field of broadcasting- — unless injury to them would result in financial injury. If, for example, loss of prestige should result in -loss of advertising then, perhaps, a tangible injured interest would appear which would give standing to appeal. But if there is no interest, of such character, that it will reveal itself in terms of financial injury, then there is no sufficient interest to give standing to appeal.
This is true even of a licensee which is operating on a nonprofit basis, a college, a church, or a benevolent institution. Financial backing is required to maintain such a licensee. If the injury threatened, endangers that financial backing then the licensee may have standing to appeal; otherwise not. Where else could the line be *566 drawn? Would it be sufficient that a Methodist organization was aggrieved by hearing Baptist doctrine preached in the same listening area; or that one college should be disturbed by the songs and cheers of a rival institution of learning?
It is apparent in the present case, therefore, that unless electrical interference was likely to result in financial injury appellant was not an aggrieved or affected person within the meaning of the statute. And if financial injury was likely to result, the licensee could have spelled out that fact in his reasons for appeal. It imposes no undue burden upon one who seeks judicial review of the Commission’s decision, to require that he specify clearly, unequivocally, precisely, the nature of his alleged injury. This, appellant has failed to do. 3 Consequently, I would dismiss the appeal.
Federal Communications Comm. v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 477, 642 , 60 S.Ct. 693, 698 , 84 L.Ed. 869, 1037 .
See Federal Communications Comm. v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station, 309 U.S. 642 , 60 S.Ct. 693 , 84 L.Ed. 1037 .
Stuart v. Federal Communications Comm., 70 App.D.C. 265, 267 , 105 F.2d 788, 790 ; Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 125 , 60 S.Ct. 869, 876 , 84 L.Ed. 1108 : “Nor can respondents vindicate any general interest which the public may have in the construction of the Act by the Secretary and which must be left to the political process. Respondents, to have standing in court, must show an injury or threat to a particular right of their own, as distinguished from the public’s interest in the administration of the law.” .

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9637723. Public record. Not legal advice.