# Wright v. Superintending Sch. Com., City of Portland > Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · January 28, 1975 · 331 A.2d 640 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9637583 ## Case - **Full name:** Stanley W. WRIGHT, Jr. v. SUPERINTENDING SCHOOL COMMITTEE, CITY OF PORTLAND, and City of Portland - **Court:** Supreme Judicial Court of Maine - **Decided:** January 28, 1975 - **Citations:** 331 A.2d 640; 1975 Me. LEXIS 411 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Archibald - **Judges:** Dufresne, Weatherbee, Pomeroy, Wer-Nick, Archibald, Delahanty, JJ- - **Cited by:** 21 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9637583 ## Opinion text ARCHIBALD, Justice (concurring). I concur with the result reached in the majority opinion. My problem lies in the definition ultimately given the statutory language, “unfitness to teach.” As I read the majority opinion, this language will, hereafter, be interpreted as necessarily incorporating “moral impropriety,” or “professional incompetence” or “unsuitability,” any one of which must be shown to “undermine the teacher’s future classroom performance and overall impact on his students.” To that extent I agree with the dissenting opinion that the admonition in Footnote 3 ís “dwarfed” by the sweep of the majority opinion. In short, the opinion can be read (as I think it will be) as a limitation on the discretionary right of a school committee to dismiss a teacher for unfitness beyond that which the Legislature intended. The majority opinion relies strongly on Morrison v. State Board of Education, 1 Cal.3d 214 , 82 Cal.Rptr. 175 , 461 P.2d 375 (1969). However, it must be remembered that Morrison should be read in the context of a California statute. 1 In Maine there is no comparable statute and I believe we overextend ourselves in the area of statutory construction when we interpret our statute, not by our own standards, but by those adopted by a legislature of another state. I would prefer to interpret our statute by the simple device of giving common meaning to the language used. 1 M.R.S.A. § 72(3). 20 M.R.S.A. § 473(4) permits a school committee to dismiss “any teacher . who proves unfit to teach.” This is a simple expression couched in ordinary language not necessarily premised on concepts such as immoral conduct. Initially, the Legislature deemed that dismissal could not be arbitrary but must be based on proof of unfitness. Furthermore, this “proof” must be causally related to the ability of the teacher “to teach,” i. e., to instruct, educate, train or discipline, his students. Within this broad concept, the school committee may consider such evidence, or proof, as may exist which has relevance to the ability of a teacher to impart necessary information or skill within his assigned area of teaching so that his students may learn therefrom. He may be dismissed, I believe, only if proof is submitted which rationally supports the conclusion that he is unable to meet this broad standard. *648 To revert to the proof upon which the defendant committee based its reason for dismissal, the record only shows that the decision was premised on a single incident (other adduced facts being ignored) which the committee viewed in complete isolation. The decision reached did not even reveal the underlying rationale therefor. Whether evidence exists is a legal question. I am not prepared to hold that a single incident enisled from any educational concept, even though characterized as “a grave lack of judgment,” is lawful evidence in and of itself, upon which a school committee can premise a finding of unfitness to teach. Therefore, I agree that the appeal should be sustained. . See Morrison , n. 1 at 377. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9637583. Public record. Not legal advice.