# DeGrandy v. Wetherell > District Court, N.D. Florida · May 29, 1992 · 794 F. Supp. 1076 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9637021 ## Case - **Full name:** Miguel DeGRANDY, Mario Diaz-Balart, Andy Ireland, Casimer Smericki, Van B. Poole, Terry Ketchel, Roberto Casas, Rodolfo Garcia, Jr., Luis Rojas, Lincoln Diaz-Balart, Javier Souto, Justo Luis Poso, Alberto Cardenas, Rey Velazquez, Luis Morse, Alberto Gutman, Karen E. Butler, Sgt. Augusta Carter, Jean Van Meter, Anna M. Pinellas, Robert Woody, Gina Hahn, Bill Petersen, Terry Kester, Margie Kincaid, and Brooks White, Plaintiffs, v. T.K. WETHERELL, in His Official Capacity as Speaker of the Florida House of Representatives, Gwen Margolis, in Her Official Capacity as President of the Florida Senate, Lawton Chiles, in His Official Capacity as Governor of the State of Florida, Jack Gordon, in His Official Capacity as Chairman of the Senate Reapportionment Committee, Peter R. Wallace, in His Official Capacity as Chairman of the House Reapportionment Committee, Jim Smith, in His Official Capacity as Secretary of State of Florida, Robert Butterworth, in His Official Capacity as Attorney General of Florida, Defendants; FLORIDA STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES, T.H. Poole, Sr., Whitfield Jenkins, Leon W. Russell, Willye Dennis, Turner Clayton, Rufus Brooks, Victor Hart, Kerna Iles, Roosevelt Walters, Johnnie McMillian, Phyllis Berry, Mary A. Pearson, Mable Butler, Iris Wilson, Jeff Whigham, Al Davis, Peggy Demon, Carlton Moore, Richard Powell, Neil Adams, Leslie McDermott, Robert Saunders, Sr., Irv Minney, Ada Moore, Anita Davis, and Calvin Barnes, Plaintiffs, v. Lawton CHILES, in His Official Capacity as Governor of Florida, Jim Smith, in His Official Capacity as Secretary of State of Florida, Robert Butterworth, in His Official Capacity as Attorney General of Florida, Gwen Margolis, in Her Official Capacity as President of the Florida Senate, T.K. Wetherell, in His Official Capacity as Speaker of the Florida House of Representatives, Jack Gordon, in His Official Capacity as Chairperson of the House Reapportionment Committee, and Peter R. Wallace, in His Official Capacity as Chairman of the House Reapportionment Committee, Defendants - **Court:** District Court, N.D. Florida - **Decided:** May 29, 1992 - **Citations:** 794 F. Supp. 1076; 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16143; 1992 WL 145189 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Vinson - **Judges:** Hatchett, Stafford, Vinson - **Cited by:** 21 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9637021 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - finding that Florida’s current congressional districts violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution, the one-person-one-vote principle and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended 42 U.S.C. § 1973 - rejecting a plan because it contained African-American populations in Tampa and Orlando that were likely to have competing interests ## Opinion text VINSON, District Judge, specially concurring. I join in the opinion and judgment of this court. However, I have serious reservations about the geographic shape and form of some of the districts in the plan we adopt. For example, District 3, in north Florida, has the appearance of something lifted from a Rorschach test. It wanders, web-like, from south of Orlando through *1091 out northeast Florida. [See testimony of Dr. Arrington, Tr. Vol. Ill, pp. 8, 79]. The reason for these odd shapes, of course, arises from taking several concentrations of minority population, which alone are not large enough to be the basis of a majority black or majority Hispanic district, and connecting them together in order to create such a district. The experts acknowledge that doing so, while advancing the political representation opportunities for racial and language minorities, sacrifices other important redistricting values. [See, e.g., Dr. Arrington’s testimony, Vol. Ill, pp. 8-11, 20-21, 38-42, 77-82]. No plan can be perfect, and the challenge is to try to reach a fair and equitable balance among the competing values. The Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, prohibits any standard, practice, or procedure which acts “to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color ... [or] because he is a member of a language minority group.” [ 18 U.S.C. §§ 1973 , 1973b(f)(2) ]. As several of the parties have pointed out, “proportionality” 1 is not a requirement of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. [See, e.g., Tr. Vol. Ill, pp. 40-41]. It is not our goal, therefore, under Section 2 of the Act to draw as many minority districts as possible. [Tr. Vol. Ill, p. 38]. But we should draw as many as can be reasonably done. Several of the plans proposed do not contain the geographic distortion evident in some of the districts. For example, the plan filed by the politically-neutral party, Common Cause, 2 maintains both compact districts and keeps fifty of Florida’s sixty-seven county boundaries intact in crafting the congressional districts. [Tr. Vol. II, p. 247, et seq.] In a slightly different context, the Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that Section 2’s voting dilution prohibition applies to minority groups that are “sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district.” Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50 , 106 S.Ct. 2752, 2766 , 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986). The parties have debated what, if anything, that standard of “geographically compact” means in the context of redistricting cases such as this one. Certainly, the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States are the law of the land just as much as are the underlying statutes enacted by Congress. If the standard has any validity in this context, as I believe it does, then it must bear some relationship to what is objectively reasonable. 3 As the Special Master rightly observed: “I conclude that the law supports the drawing of a minority district where, in light of minority concentrations and community of interests, such a district can reasonably be drawn.” [Sp. Master’s Rpt., p. 14 (emphasis added)]. When drawing districts to achieve majority voting status for minority populations, a court must keep in mind that the sword it uses is two-edged. It is, to be sure, creating a remedial district in order to provide better racial or language minority political participation opportunities, in accordance with the Section 2 goals and standards. However, at the same time, it is deliberately relegating another group of individuals within that district to minority voting status which, assuming polarized voting, may effectively negate that group’s ability to elect candidates of its choice. We should, *1092 therefore, be very careful in how we draw such districts. Equally important, the “community of interests” represented within a congressional district encompasses not only individual interests, or interests of particular groups, but also interests associated with the communities in which they live, including the municipalities and counties. It remains to be seen whether those interests can be consistently and rationally represented in the democratic process when the district is itself comprised of a series of fractional enclaves from widely separated areas. These odd-shaped districts will present administration difficulties. The census tracts utilized in drawing the districts overlap established voting precincts and will not easily jibe with other state and local district boundaries. They are disconnected from the traditional way we view the formation of such districts. They follow few recognized political boundaries. They will undoubtedly present campaigning problems for the candidates within those districts. Perhaps most importantly, I do not believe that these districts will make sense among the public. [See, e.g., Tr. Vol. Ill, pp. 8, 38], They appear to be something created by Gov. Elbridge Gerry. Without some objective geographical compactness standard to evaluate districts, the potential for future abuse in crafting district boundaries is virtually unlimited. I believe the plan we adopt is fair and accomplishes what we are striving to do, but I would much prefer 23 districts which comply with some reasonable standard of compactness. . See Solomon v. Liberty County, Florida, 899 F.2d 1012, 1036, n. 13 (special concurring opinion of C.J. Tjoflat) (11th Cir.1990, en banc). . As all the parties recognize, most of the plans submitted were slanted toward either Republican orientation or Democratic orientation, while the Common Cause posture was generally acknowledged to be politically neutral. Common Cause’s expert witness, Dr. Arrington, pointed out in his testimony that newly-created districts having a majority of African-Americans can be expected to be one-party Democratic, while newly-created districts having a majority of Hispanic voters can be expected to be one-party Republican — at least as long as the present political orientations continue. [Tr. Vol. Ill, pp. 19-20]. ."Compactness” does not seem to have an agreed-upon legal definition, but it can be calculated mathematically by dividing the area within the district by the distance around its perimeter. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9637021. Public record. Not legal advice.