# State Ex Rel. Pan American Production Co. v. City of Texas

> Texas Supreme Court · May 22, 1957 · 157 Tex. 450

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9636034

## Case

- **Full name:** State of Texas Ex Rel Pan American Production Co. Et Al v. City of Texas City, Texas Et Al
- **Court:** Texas Supreme Court
- **Decided:** May 22, 1957
- **Citations:** 157 Tex. 450; 303 S.W.2d 780; 1957 Tex. LEXIS 540
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Griffin
- **Judges:** Culver, Norvell, Griffin, Smith, Walker
- **Cited by:** 69 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## Opinion text

Mr. Justice Norvell joined by Justices Griffin, Smith and Walker,
dissenting.
From the standpoint of the political theorist plausible arguments may undoubtedly be marshalled to support the proposition that the internal governmental organization of a state or commonwealth is purely a political matter and that one unjustly treated by reason thereof should address his appeal to the legislative rather than to the judicial branch of government. However, as I understand the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Myles Salt Co. v. Board of Commissioners, 239 U.S. 478 , 36 Sup. Ct. 204, 60 L. Ed. 393 , it is a flat holding to the contrary of the proposition stated. When confronted with the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, the distinction between a Louisiana drainage district and a Texas city escapes me. Neither drainage *460 districts, cities nor other forms of state internal organizations are mentioned in the amendment, which simply provides that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.” This wording applies to action by the state itself or by any and all of the political subdivisions thereof, no matter how broad or limited their governmental powers may be. The ’Myles Salt Company case holds that the inclusion of certain lands within the boundaries of a political subdivision of a state may constitute a deprivation of property without due process of law.
Under this holding municipal annexation proceedings which by. Texas law necessarily operate to subject property to taxation cannot be removed beyond the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment by classifying them as being political in character. The distinction between the drainage district on one hand and the city on the other is not found in the substantial nature of such organizations — both are governmental and political — , but rather in the scope of benefits conferred by the respective organizations and their relationship to the public at large. The deprivation of property by the simpler district having for its purpose the one function of draining lands may be much clearer than a somewhat similar but vastly more complicated. situation involving a city which is a highly complex organization performing multitudinous governmental and . proprietary functions. While the mere taxing of land which cannot be drained makes obvious the fact that one man’s property is being “taken” for the benefit of another, the exercise of jurisdiction by a city over a given territory may present a problem difficult of solution because of the necessary consideration of municipal needs and the various detriments and benefits, direct and indirect, usually attendant upon including lands within the boundaries of a city. This circumstance, however, relates to the question of whether there has been a deprivation of property and constitutes no basis for saying that the simple organization is controlled by the Fourteenth Amendment while the complex organization is essentially political and hence beyond the reach of the judicial power.
In my opinion the Court of Civil Appeals correctly held that the due process clause of the general constitution has application to the' annexation ’ of additional territory by a city. The opinion of that Court also suggests the controlling factors which determine the validity of an annexing ordinance. Benefits or lack thereof accruing to the owner of property sought to be *461 annexed cannot be made the sole test of the validity. Property is held subject to the general good, and if essential to municipal needs, a city’s action in assuming authority or jurisdiction over such property cannot be gainsaid, although no direct benefit accrues to the owner of the property. When, however, property that will receive no benefits from the municipality, either immediate or reasonably prospective, which is wholly unrelated to the city’s present or reasonably prospective economic or municipal needs is subjected to the jurisdiction of a city and its taxing powers by means of an annexation ordinance, then such action must be considered as unreasonable and arbitrary and hence invalid as constituting an unwarranted deprivation of property within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution.
The Court of Civil Appeals seemingly regarded the allegations of the petitioner’s pleadings as being insufficient to contradict the presumption of constitutionality which attends legislative actions. In so doing, I think the court clearly erred. While the ultimate question of the constitutionality of the ordinance may be one of law, this does not preclude a consideration of facts. When in the nature of things, knowledge of a particular economic, local geographic, or other special situation is desired and cannot be supplied by judicial notice or common knowledge, it is essential that evidence be received. This principle was recognized by the Court of Civil Appeals when it said that:
* * a claim of deprivation of property without due process is to be determined always as a matter of law, never as a question of fact, althoug'h such determination may involve the finding of facts. We quote the text of 82 C.J.S., Statutes, Sec. 79, p. 134, ‘Whether a seeming act of a legislature is or is not a law is a judicial question to be determined by the court, and not a question of fact to be tried by a jury, even though a determination of the question may involve a finding of fact.’ ”
The majority opinion sufficiently summarizes the allegations of the petition for the present purpose. Briefly, the territory sought to be annexed embraces some 2,000 acres of land owned by the State of Texas which underlies the waters of the sea. It is alleged that such territory is unsuited for human habitation, that it has no need for urban services, that it is wholly unsuited to any legitimate municipal need, either immediate or prospective, and was annexed for the sole purpose of taxing petitioners’ mineral estates underlying the water of the bays. Petitioners complain that while the Court of Civil Appeals recog *462 nizes the right of judicial review, it nevertheless effectively deprives them of such right by substituting a set of hypothetical facts in lieu of those alleged by the petitioners. In my opinion there is merit in this complaint. We are dealing with a local situation beyond the ken of common knowledge. To my mind, considering the total lack of evidence, it is mere surmise to speculate upon the possible municipal need the 2,000 submerged acres would fulfill. If we may mentally envision ports, docks, parks for fishing and boating, turning basins and the like, in order to justify the present attempted annexation, could not a similar technique be employed to authorize municipal annexation of a drilling platform, three leagues seaward from the Texas shore line? Speculations outside the field of common knowledge constitute poor guides for the definition of property rights, and this case calls for the same species of factual information that was deemed pertinent in Borden’s Farm Products v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194 , 55 Sup. Ct. 187, 79 L. Ed. 281 , wherein the 1933 New York Milk Control Law was attacked as being violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the case mentioned the Supreme Court of the United States, in an opinion by Chief Justice Hughes, reversed a decree of the District Court and remanded the cause for a hearing upon the facts. In the opinion it was said that:
“In view of the peculiar nature and effect of this provision [of the Milk Control Act], and of the novel and important constitutional question that it presents, we think that the complaint should not have been dismissed for inufficiency upon its face and that the plaintiff is entitled to have the case heard and decided with appropriate findings by the trial court, unless it satisfactorily appears, upon facts of common knowledge or otherwise plainly subject to judicial notice, that the provision should be sustained as resting upon a rational basis consistent with constitutional right.”
In speaking of the nature of the presumption relating to the validity of legislative action, Chief Justice Hughes said:
“Respondents invoke the presumption which attaches to the legislative action. But that is a presumption of fact, of the existence of factual conditions supporting the legislation. As such, it is a rebuttable presumption. (Citing authorities.) It is not a conclusive presumption, or a rule of law which makes legislative action invulnerable to constitutional assault. Nor is such an immunity achieved by treating any fanciful conjecture as enough to repel attack. When the classification made by the legislature *463 is called in question, if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, there is a presumption of the existence of that state of facts, and one who assails the classification must carry the burden of showing by a resort to common knowledge or other matters which may be judicially noticed, or to other legitimate proof, that the action is arbitrary.”
It is perhaps worthy of note that Justices Stone and Cardoza concurred in the result with a memorandum, which inter alia contained the following:
“We are in accord with the view that it is inexpedient to determine grave constitutional questions upon a demurrer to a complaint, or upon an equivalent motion, if there is a reasonable likelihood that the production of evidence will make the answer to the questions clearer.”
The answer to the question of the validity of the annexation ordinance may be more justly and accurately given after the hearing of evidence. If there be a substantial constitutional question involved it cannot be resolved upon the basis of common knowledge or judicial notice alone, nor by resort to presumptions of doubtful application. It follows then that the petitioners are entitled to be heard upon the facts. In such a hearing and only then can it be satisfactorily determined if the annexation ordinance is arbitrary and void. I would reverse the judgments of the courts below and remand the cause for development of the facts. I accordingly respectfully dissent from the order of affirmance.
Opinion delivered May 22, 1957.
Rehearing overruled July 24, 1957.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9636034. Public record. Not legal advice.