# Caporale v. C. W. Blakeslee & Sons, Inc.

> Supreme Court of Connecticut · November 21, 1961 · 149 Conn. 79

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9635857

## Case

- **Full name:** Michael Caporale Et Al. v. C. W. Blakeslee and Sons, Inc.
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Connecticut
- **Decided:** November 21, 1961
- **Citations:** 149 Conn. 79; 175 A.2d 561; 1961 Conn. LEXIS 259
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Murphy
- **Judges:** Murphy, Baldwin, King, Mubphy, Alcokn
- **Cited by:** 65 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9635857

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that use of a pile driver capable of delivering 15,000 foot-pounds of energy was intrinsically dangerous.
- holding that pile driving is an ultrahazardous activity

## Opinion text

Murphy, J.
(concurring). Had the opinion sustained the judgment on the count alleging nuisance, I could agree, since there is no doubt in my mind that the damage to Caporale’s buildings was caused *87 by the defendant’s pile driving operations. I am willing to concede, however, that a rather hairsplitting distinction would be required to sustain the judgment on the nuisance count, since the plaintiffs consented to judgment for the defendant on the count alleging negligence and have thus eliminated liability on the theory of nuisance arising from negligence. Although it may be difficult to spell out an absolute nuisance, as distinguished from one arising from negligence, I feel that under the rule of Beckwith v. Stratford, 129 Conn. 506, 509 , 29 A.2d 775 , and cases cited therein, an absolute nuisance could be found. Parenthetically, it may be noted that if the count in negligence had remained, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur would have applied. Briganti v. Connecticut Co., 119 Conn. 316, 320 , 175 A. 679 ; see Bonczkiewicz v. Merberg Wrecking Corporation, 148 Conn. 573, 579 , 172 A.2d 917 .
In Greeley v. Cunningham, 116 Conn. 515, 518 , 165 A. 352 , we said that “[a]n automobile, while capable of doing great injury when not properly operated upon the highways, is not an intrinsically dangerous instrumentality to be classed with ferocious animals or high explosives.” I cannot conceive that a pile driver is any more dangerous than some of the high-powered cars and gargantuan tractor-trailers that infest our roads today. An inherently or intrinsically dangerous work is work that is necessarily attendant with danger no matter how skilfully or carefully it is performed. Janice v. State, 201 Misc. 915, 920 , 107 N.Y.S.2d 674 ; Wright v. Phoenix Utility Co., 198 N.C. 204, 206 , 151 S.E. 241 . The effect of the majority opinion is to impose absolute liability, that is, liability without fault, whenever a pile driver is used. See Whitman Hotel *88 Corporation v. Elliott & Watrous Engineering Co., 137 Conn. 562, 576 , 79 A.2d 591 (concurring opinion). I do not feel that a pile driver is intrinsically dangerous.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9635857. Public record. Not legal advice.