# In Re Jones

> Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · May 9, 1984 · 505 Pa. 50

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9635608

## Case

- **Full name:** In Re Nomination Petition of Roxanne H. JONES for the Nomination of the Democratic Party for Senator in the Pennsylvania General Assembly From the Third Senatorial District. Appeal of Roxanne H. JONES
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** May 9, 1984
- **Citations:** 505 Pa. 50; 476 A.2d 1287; 1984 Pa. LEXIS 251
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by McDERMOTT
- **Judges:** Nix, Larsen, Flaherty, McDermott, Hutchinson, Zappala, Papadakos, Commonwealth, Code
- **Cited by:** 26 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9635608

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that judicial inquiry into the qualifications of a prospective legislator running for office violates separation of powers, but that a quo warranto action is available to test an elected legislator's right to hold public office
- noting that parties are "desirous of selecting a standard bearer who shared their political views and who could best articulate their needs and aspirations"
- discussing analogous rule that one governmental body cannot determine composition of its successors

## Opinion text

*71 McDERMOTT, Justice,
dissenting.
The people may specify the qualification of those who serve them. The issue here is simply who shall determine when those qualifications have been met. There are two bodies so empowered. Under Article 2, section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, the legislature is empowered to determine the qualifications of its members. The opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Nix bespeaks that authority. Under the Election Code, 1 the courts are empowered to rule on the qualification of those who aspire to the legislative office. The opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Nix bespeaks that authority. The contratemps here is that the opinion confined itself exclusively to the legislative prerogatives and avoided, with almost loving impercipience, the authority granted to the courts under the Election Code. The rationale appears to be that the objectors neither raised nor argued the Election Code. Mr. Justice Hutchinson, in his able dissent, adequately dissolves that contention.
The Election Code was designed to protect the electoral process, that the franchise would not be squandered on the imposter, fraud or comedian. To ignore that duty, in this case, is to hide in a semantic sanctuary, believing that special elections will absolve our neglect. Given the intimations offered here, special elections might become routine harbingers of Spring.
Judge Rogers in the Commonwealth Court grasped and decided the issue with his usual perspicacity. We should let his judgment stand.
I dissent and join Mr. Justice Hutchinson.
Mr. Justice Hutchinson joins in this Dissenting Opinion.
. Act of June 3, 1937, P.L. 1333, 25 P.S. § 2601 et seq., as amended.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9635608. Public record. Not legal advice.