# Incollingo v. Ewing

> Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · October 7, 1977 · 474 Pa. 527

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9635557

## Case

- **Full name:** Mary Ann INCOLLINGO, a Minor by Vincent Incollingo, Her Guardian and Vincent Incollingo and Connie Incollingo v. Peirce G. EWING, Defendant. Appeal of Karen BLANCK. Firemen’s Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, of the Continental Insurance Group and Medical Protective Company of Fort Wayne, Indiana, Garnishees-Appellees
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** October 7, 1977
- **Citations:** 474 Pa. 527; 379 A.2d 79; 1977 Pa. LEXIS 831
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Packel
- **Judges:** Jones, Eagen, O'Brien, Roberts, Pomeroy, Nix, Manderino, Packel
- **Cited by:** 35 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- **Yellow flag:** Limited by Caruso v. MEDICAL PROF. LIAB. CATASTROPHE LOSS FUND, 858 A.2d 620 (2004).
- Negative treatments: 1
- Distinguished by: 0
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9635557

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that post-verdict interest is a cost of defense -under the terms of an insurance contract similarly worded to the contracts in the instant litigation
- holding that a joint tortfeasor is liable for the entire amount of the judgment entered on behalf of plaintiff

## Opinion text

PACKEL, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I concur on the ground that Firemen’s promise to pay “all interest accruing after the entry of judgment” in its context is ambiguous. As such it is construable against the insurer and can readily mean all interest due and owing after the entry of judgment. A strict interpretation that the phrase means interest only on the judgment produces the undesirable conclusion that procrastination by the insurer after the *541 verdict and payment prior to judgment enables it to have the use of the money without any payment of interest.
The judgment included interest on the verdict and, to the extent of that interest and the interest due thereafter, it is all accruable in the sense of being owed after the entry of judgment. I see no need in this case to conclude that Hafer v. Schauer, 429 Pa. 289 , 239 A.2d 785 (1968) was wrongly decided. As the majority opinion points out, it dealt with the situation where no judgment had ever been entered.
I dissent from the holding that Medical Protective is liable for any interest. It made no promise to pay any interest and, in the context of its stated obligation, I do not agree that by interpretation “interest” should be equated with “costs.”
O’BRIEN, J., joins in this opinion.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9635557. Public record. Not legal advice.