# Pascack Ass'n, Ltd. v. Mayor & Coun. Washington Tp. > Supreme Court of New Jersey · March 23, 1977 · 74 N.J. 470 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9635521 ## Case - **Full name:** Pascack Association, Limited, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Mayor and Council of the Township of Washington, Bergen County, New Jersey, Defendants-Respondents; Waldy, Inc., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. the Board of Adjustment and the Township Council of the Township of Washington, Bergen County, New Jersey, and Washington Lakes Association, a Corporation of the State of New Jersey, Defendants-Respondents - **Court:** Supreme Court of New Jersey - **Decided:** March 23, 1977 - **Citations:** 74 N.J. 470; 379 A.2d 6; 1977 N.J. LEXIS 169 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Schreiber - **Judges:** Conford, Sullivan, Schreiber, Pashman - **Cited by:** 35 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9635521 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - finding Mount Laurel doctrine only applied to developing municipalities when considering challenge to zoning ordinance in “fully developed, predominantly single-family residential community” ## Opinion text Schreiber, J., concurring. The Mt. Laurel 1 principle, as I view it, of prohibiting a municipality from utilizing its zoning power to exclude low and moderate income families in order to escape an adverse financial impact, should be applicable to all municipalities. See Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Madison Tp., 72 N. J. 481, 619 (1977) (Sehreiber, J., concurring). 2 Equitably I cannot envision any sound policy which would justify a differentiation in the duty owed by a, developing or a fully developed community. If a municipality, motivated by fiscal reasons, has zoned to exclude low and moderate income people and has successfully accomplished that end, contrary to the general welfare, the courts should not absolve that municipality from its underlying duty simply because it has already completed its illegal objective. The fact that a settled and developed community may not have any vacant or undeveloped land does not and should not bar fulfillment of that obligation once it is found that the zoning has been enacted with fiscal considerations in mind. As soon as the wrong is adjudicated, the municipality must rezone. The municipality’s duty, as Justice Hall stated in Mt. Laurel, would be satisfied if its zoning afforded the opportunity for low and moderate income housing. 67 N. J. at 174 and 179. Although rezoning undeveloped land for this purpose may be desirable, developed acreage *495 may likewise be utilized. In each of these developed communities there appear to be some vacant tracts, and, in addition, some sections may be ripe for redevelopment. Irrespective of sufficient vacant land and areas in need of redevelopment, the municipality should rezone whatever area is needed to permit the construction of low and moderate income housing, even though those projects may not become economically feasible until sometime in the future. In this manner, the municipality will acquit its obligation. However, the enactment of zoning ordinances in some municipalities, such as in the Township of Washington, was not motivated by fiscal considerations. As Judge Conford suggests, the Township adopted its ordinance for reasons consistent with N. J. S. A. 40:55-32, “its most dominant notes being ,(a) avoidance of undue crowding of uses: e.g., ‘lessen congestion in the streets; . . . provide adequate light and air; prevent the overcrowding of land or buildings; avoid undue concentration of population . . .’; and (b) consideration of the character of the district and its peculiar suitability for particular uses and encouraging the most appropriate use of land throughout the municipality.” 74 N. J. at 483. He points out that “[djuring the period of development of Washington Township it served a widespread contemporaneous demand of people employed elsewhere for single-family residential housing — a kind of housing traditionally highly valued by the American family — and until fairly recent years affordable by the average family.” 74 N. J. at 484. Its initial zoning ordinance in 1941 encouraged construction of single-family homes, and the 1963 master plan recognized the municipality had and was “predominantly developed” as a single-family community. Thus we find that the invidious motive condemned by Mi. Laurel is non-existent and its principle inapplicable. I concur and join in the judgment as modified by the majority. *496 Outline of Dissenting Opinion I Defining the Duty to Provide for Regional Needs 496 II Limiting Obligations Under Mt. Laurel to “Developing” Communities 503 III Practical Effect of the Majority Decision 505 IY Applying an Affirmative Obligation to “Developed” Communities 516 Y Conclusion 517 Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Mt. Laurel Tp., 67 N. J. 151, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U. S. 808 , 96 S. Ct. 18 , 46 L. Ed. 2d 28 (1975). The majority recognizes, as I have previously indicated in Oakwood, that the intent of Mt. Laurel was to relieve the housing needs “of persons of low and moderate income.” 74 N. J. at 480. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9635521. Public record. Not legal advice.