# Commonwealth v. Frisbie > Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · December 18, 1984 · 506 Pa. 461 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9635459 ## Case - **Full name:** COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Charles FRISBIE, Appellee - **Court:** Supreme Court of Pennsylvania - **Decided:** December 18, 1984 - **Citations:** 506 Pa. 461; 485 A.2d 1098; 1984 Pa. LEXIS 383 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Nix - **Judges:** Nix, Larsen, Flaherty, McDermott, Hutchinson, Zappala, Papadakos - **Cited by:** 75 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9635459 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - explaining that “[h]ad the legislature intended to preclude multiple punishments under [the REAP statute], that section would read: “a person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if he recklessly engages in conduct which places or may place another person or persons in d… - concluding that reckless endangerment statute, which prohibited conduct jeopardizing “ ‘another person,’ ” “was written with regard to an individual person being placed in danger of death or serious bodily injury, and that a separate offense is committed for each individual pe… - concluding that reckless endangerment statute, which prohibited conduct jeopardizing "`another person,'" "was written with regard to an individual person being placed in danger of death or serious bodily injury, and that a separate offense is committed for each individual pers… ## Opinion text *468 NIX, Chief Justice, concurring. The majority seeks to frame this case as presenting the difficult question of whether the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits multiple sentences for a single unlawful act. I have serious question as to whether or not the facts of this case raise that issue. To the contrary, I would view this situation as presenting successive injuries, albeit within a short interval of time and space, each admitting to its own punishment. On May 2, 1980, Philadelphia police attempted to stop á vehicle appellee was operating in a highly erratic manner. When an officer walked up to Frisbie, he locked his car door and sped away. The officer again attempted to approach the vehicle when appellee was forced to stop in heavy traffic. To avoid being apprehended, Frisbie, without warning, drove through a crowd of people waiting for a trackless trolley. “Bodies went flying as a result of this act.” At least nine people were jeopardized and sufficiently injured so as to require hospital treatment. Frisbie sped away and was apprehended only after a high speed chase which culminated when his car went out of control and turned over on the Schuylkill Expressway. It is obvious that appellee throughout this erratic episode placed all who were in proximity in danger of serious bodily injury. It is equally apparent that there were successive batteries and not a single battery on the individuals who were struck. My quarrel with the majority’s analysis is that it views this situation as being equivalent to one firing a projectile as a result of a single act of depressing the trigger where the consequences result in the wounding of several victims. In the hypothetical case the single act theory comes into play and the discussion that the majority indulges in would be. appropriate. However, the driving of an automobile is a series of continuous acts and is not a single act. *469 Since the conduct which created the danger was not a single act but a series of consecutive acts, I would conclude that there are no double jeopardy concerns involved. Accordingly, for these reasons I would join in the mandate of the majority. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9635459. Public record. Not legal advice.