# Redding v. Safford Unified School Dist. No. 1 > Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · July 11, 2008 · 531 F.3d 1071 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9635256 ## Case - **Full name:** April REDDING, Legal Guardian of Minor Child, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SAFFORD UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT #1; Kerry Wilson, Husband; Jane Doe Wilson, Wife; Helen Romero, Wife; John Doe Romero, Husband; Peggy Schwallier, Wife; John Doe Schwallier, Husband, Defendants-Appellees - **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - **Decided:** July 11, 2008 - **Citations:** 531 F.3d 1071; 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 14756; 2008 WL 2698101 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Gould - **Judges:** Kozinski, Pregerson, Hawkins, Silverman, Wardlaw, Fisher, Gould, Paez, Bea, Smith - **Cited by:** 14 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - **Red flag:** Reversed on other grounds by Safford Unified School District 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364 (2009). - Negative treatments: 1 - Distinguished by: 0 - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9635256 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - explaining that the school policy defined “drugs” to include “ ‘[a]ny prescription or over-the-counter drug, except those for which permission to use in school has been granted’ ” - noting that the "dictates of reason and common sense,” along with "the two-step inquiry of T.L.O. should have sufficed” to clearly establish that the actions of the defendants were unconstitutional (internal quotation marks omitted) ## Opinion text GOULD, Circuit Judge, with whom SILVERMAN, Circuit Judge, joins, dissenting: Although I conclude that the Supreme Court’s precedent in New Jersey v. TLO, 469 U.S. 325 , 105 S.Ct. 733 , 83 L.Ed.2d 720 *1090 (1985), and common sense show that the strip search of Savanna was unreasonable and unconstitutional, I dissent from the court’s judgment because I conclude, contrary to the majority in Part II-B of its opinion, that the defendants are entitled to a qualified immunity from liability. I also conclude that constitutional rights were impaired under TLO by a slightly different analytical frame-work than that advanced by the majority. In my view, it is most sound to ask, in the language of the first prong of TLO , whether any search of Savanna was justified in its inception, and then to ask, in the language of the second prong of TLO , whether the search was reasonable in scope under the total circumstances when it progressed to an invasive strip search requiring Savanna to shed all of her clothes except for undergarments in front of the school nurse and employee Helen Romero, and to shake her bra and underpants before the officials’ eyes. See TLO, 469 U.S. at 346-47 , 105 S.Ct. 733 (considering each element of the search step-by-step). I would hold that some search of Savanna was justified at the inception because of concerns about illicit distribution of drugs at the school and the tip that she had supplied Marissa with prescription strength ibuprofen. To my thinking, to focus at the outset on the strip search poses the risk that we give inadequate heed to the real needs for some search of Savanna. I am confident that a reasonable school official should have proceeded to some search of Savanna in light of what Marissa had disclosed. Savanna does not contend otherwise; her complaint is only that the school officials went too far in requiring her to disrobe. Officials had been told by a person with an illicit drug that Savanna had supplied it, and that more distribution was to occur later that day involving others. This justified the school’s request to search and its subsequent search of Savanna’s pockets and backpack, and may have warranted other search or inquiry activities to interdict any further distribution of ibuprofen at levels beyond what could be bought without prescription. However, it was unreasonable to proceed to a strip search. Nothing in Marissa’s tip suggested, or would have led one to believe, that Savanna had likely hidden ibuprofen in her underwear. She was observed from the first moment she was confronted, and certainly from that point would not likely have been able to hide any illicit drugs in her underpants or bra. More important is the fact, apparently unrecognized by the school officials, that to force a teenage girl to strip upon school command would lead to an embarrassment of her that could cause deep and lasting psychological harm. Without more concrete and specific justification, the scope of the search conducted in the nurse’s office was excessively intrusive and an affront to what most parents would consider common sense treatment of their children at school. Thus I agree with my colleague Judge Wardlaw’s conclusion that the strip search was unreasonable. Finally, although I think our ruling should be crystal clear that schools may not subject a student to a strip search under circumstances as presented here, and although the general principles in TLO and other cases are well established, I can understand how school officials, even though they made an erroneous decision, should have some insulation from liability before our declaration of how these principles applied to this case. The fact that the district court and a majority of a prior panel of our court thought, and some dissenting judges on this panel continue to think, the scope of the search reasonable to me says something about a lack of *1091 clarity in our law. I am glad to agree with the majority opinion that the strip search was unreasonable in order to fix that. However, I conclude that the school officials are entitled to qualified immunity, and in this respect agree with the conclusion reached by my colleague Judge Hawkins in Section III of his opinion. In my view, qualified immunity is available because the law heretofore did not give adequate guidance to the school officials. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9635256. Public record. Not legal advice.