# Leslie v. Pennco, Inc.

> Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · December 2, 1983 · 323 Pa. Super. 23

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9634387

## Case

- **Full name:** Charles LESLIE, D/B/A L & W Company, Appellant, v. PENNCO, INC.
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** December 2, 1983
- **Citations:** 323 Pa. Super. 23; 470 A.2d 110; 1983 Pa. Super. LEXIS 4447
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Spaeth
- **Judges:** Cercone, Spaeth, Hester
- **Cited by:** 8 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9634387

## Opinion text

SPAETH, Judge,
dissenting:
Rather than grant a new trial, I should vacate the judgment in favor of appellee, enter judgment n.o.v. in favor of appellant, and remand for a hearing on damages.
Not only do I find the jury verdict to be against the weight of the evidence, as does the majority, but I further find that there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict. In reviewing a trial court’s denial of a judgment n.o.v., the evidence, and all reasonable inferences from it, must be viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict winner. Szumski v. Lehman Homes, Inc., 267 Pa.Super. 478 , 406 A.2d 1142 (1979). All conflicts in the evidence must be resolved in favor of the verdict winner. Id. But if after this standard is applied it appears that there is insufficient evidence to support the verdict, judgment n.o.v. should be entered. Id. Here, as'the majority observes, the evidence is uncontroverted that the parties did not arrive at a mutual understanding as to the meaning of the phrase at issue. At 26-29. Also as the majority observes, the evidence of trade usage was insufficient to establish a custom or usage in the trade consistent with appellee’s interpretation of the phrase. At 29-31. Accordingly, *32 the verdict, representing as it did a finding that the parties had agreed upon appellee’s interpretation of the phrase, was unsupported by the evidence.
Given that the parties did not arrive at a mutual understanding as to the meaning of the phrase at issue, the court was required to rely upon a rule of construction to resolve the dispute. Since the writing in question was drafted by appellee, and since it was ambiguous, the appropriate rule of construction was that it should be construed against appellee. 1 See Central Transportation, Inc. v. Board of Assessment Appeals of Cambria County, 490 Pa. 486 , 417 A.2d 144 (1980); In re Breyer’s Estate, 475 Pa. 108 , 379 A.2d 1305 (1977); Burns Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. Boehm, 467 Pa. 307 , 356 A.2d 763 (1976). See also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 206 (1981). The reasoning behind this rule of construction is well-stated in Comment a to Section 206 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts:
Where one party chooses the terms of a contract, he is likely to provide more carefully for the protection of his own interests than for those of the other party. He is also more likely than the other party to have reason to know of uncertainties of meaning. Indeed, he may leave meaning deliberately obscure, intending to decide at a later date what meaning to assert. In cases of doubt, therefore, so long as other factors are not decisive, there is substantial reason for preferring the meaning of the other party.
I should therefore hold that the phrase in question did not give appellee the right to terminate the contract upon quarterly review.
Accordingly, I should vacate the judgment in favor of appellee, enter judgment n.o.v. in favor of appellant, and remand for a hearing on damages.
. Although the phrase in question may more naturally be read as interpreted by appellant, it is not so free from ambiguity as to warrant application of the plain meaning rule. See Steuart v. McChesney, 498 Pa. 45 , 444 A.2d 659 (1982).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9634387. Public record. Not legal advice.