# State v. James > Utah Supreme Court · October 15, 1991 · 171 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9633474 ## Case - **Full name:** STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Steven Ray JAMES, Defendant and Appellant - **Court:** Utah Supreme Court - **Decided:** October 15, 1991 - **Citations:** 171 Utah Adv. Rep. 12; 819 P.2d 781; 1991 Utah LEXIS 139; 1991 WL 208250 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Howe - **Judges:** Hall, Howe, Stewart, Durham, Zimmerman - **Cited by:** 132 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9633474 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that “to constitute grounds for a new trial,” newly discovered evidence must, among other things, “render a different result probable on the retrial of the case” (footnote and citation omitted) - noting that appellate courts only provide guidance for purposes of remand on "(issues that are fully briefed" (emphasis added) - stating that “[an] inference is made that the natural consequences of that act were intended to occur” and that “intent is of necessity proven by circumstantial evidence” ## Opinion text HOWE, Associate Chief Justice (concurring and dissenting): I concur in the majority opinion except as to that portion of part II which holds that the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for a new trial based on the allegation that Ronald Peterson testified falsely at defendant’s trial. We held in State v. Gellatly, 22 Utah 2d 149, 153 , 449 P.2d 993, 995-96 (1969), that before a new trial can be granted, the newly discovered evidence must be such as to render a different result probable on the retrial of the case. I cannot agree with the majority that “[wjithout Peterson’s testimony, ... it is probable that a reasonable jury would have had reasonable doubt as to whether defendant had the requisite intent to commit murder.” Instead, I agree with the trial judge, who said: The defendant, in the Court’s opinion, was not convicted on the testimony of Ronald Peterson. The defendant was convicted on an exceptionally strong circumstantial evidence case. Historically, circumstantial evidence has been as persuasive as direct evidence. The Court heard the testimony day after day after day, regarding the allegations against the defendant. The Court finds that the tests for newly discovered evidence relating to a new trial do not exist. Even if they did exist, the Court agrees totally and completely with the jury verdict rendered in this case, and is absolutely of the opinion that the outcome of this case would have not been any different whether Ron Peterson testified or not. For that, all of those reasons, and all of those findings, the Court denies the defendant’s motion for a new trial. The “exceptionally strong circumstantial evidence” which the trial judge referred to includes (1) the bruises and falls sustained by the baby while in defendant’s care; (2) the insensitivity shown to the baby by defendant; (3) defendant’s anger when questioned by police and his urging DeLeon not to give them certain information; (4) his jealousy of the baby; (5) his concern about the expense of raising the baby; (6) the fact that he was the last person to be with the baby prior to the baby’s disappearance; (7) his elaborate explanation for the baby's disappearance; and (8) the baby’s body found wrapped in a mattress cover which belonged to defendant. It is true that the State was never able to prove the exact means by which the child was killed, but that does not diminish the fact that “exceptionally strong circumstantial evidence” linked defendant to the baby’s death. In view of the circumstantial evidence, I cannot join the majority in ruling that the trial judge abused his discretion in not granting a new trial for “newly discovered evidence.” Regardless of whether any judge of this court would have ruled differently, it is clear that the trial judge who observed the witnesses and heard their testimony day after day acted within the ambit of his discretion in concluding that the proffered testimony of Lisner would not have produced a different verdict. Our own cases hold that the refusal to grant a new trial based merely on new evidence of the lack of credibility of a witness will generally not be overturned on appeal. See State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 851 (Utah 1988), and cases cited therein. The trial judge properly assessed Lisner’s proffer of testimony as resulting in “nothing more than a push and pull match between prisoners ... and that verbal tug of war could endure indefinitely.” In light of the strong circumstantial evidence linking defendant to the crime, the testimony of a fellow prisoner either for or against defendant is pale by comparison. Peterson’s testimony that defendant admitted killing the child and the proffered testimony of Lisner that Peterson admitted lying do not diminish the strong circumstantial evidence which still persists and which is sufficient to sustain the conviction. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9633474. Public record. Not legal advice.