# Taylor v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance > Arizona Supreme Court · June 10, 1993 · 175 Ariz. 148 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9632212 ## Case - **Full name:** Bobby Sid TAYLOR, Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, an Illinois Corporation, Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellant - **Court:** Arizona Supreme Court - **Decided:** June 10, 1993 - **Citations:** 175 Ariz. 148; 141 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 3; 854 P.2d 1134; 1993 Ariz. LEXIS 48 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Corcoran - **Judges:** Feldman, Corcoran, Moeller, Zlaket, Hathaway, Ariz, Const - **Cited by:** 253 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - **Yellow flag:** Modified on other grounds by Taylor v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance, 185 Ariz. 174 (1996). - Negative treatments: 1 - Distinguished by: 0 - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9632212 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - stating that the judge may not consider the offered evidence where “the asserted meaning of the contract language is so unreasonable or extraordinary that it is improbable that the parties actually subscribed to the interpretation asserted by the proponent of the extrinsic evi… - explaining that if the contract language is “reasonably susceptible” to the interpretation suggested by the extrinsic evidence, the evidence is admissible to determine the parties’ intended meaning - holding that when a contract term is “reasonably susceptible” to more than one interpretation, extrinsic evidence is admissible to discern the parties’ intent - stating that “a court is obligated to enforce the agreement according to the parties’ intent, even if the language ordinarily might mean something different” - stating 8 that Defendant’s reading makes Paragraph 51 “override” Paragraph 3.3 and “subordinates” 9 Paragraph 3.3 to Paragraph 51 ## Opinion text CORCORAN, Justice, specially concurring: I concur with the opinion — but without enthusiasm. It is certainly true that wavering and overlapping lines of interpretation, rather than bright straight borders prevail in this area of contract interpreta *160 tion. I don’t know whether our opinion helps. The canon of interpretation which we propound today is amorphous. The problem with an amorphous rule is that in the end, only this court can make a final determination in construing any contract. Our interpretation will be based upon which parol evidence impresses us the most. That ultimately means that this court must decide every contract dispute subject to this analysis. As the history of this case shows, the trial court may go one way and the court of appeals another and this court yet another. I fear that this opinion makes this court the supreme court of arguments “that white is black and that a dollar is fifty cents” — to use the colorful words of Professor Corbin. APPENDIX Full Text of Release: AGREEMENT This Agreement made and entered into this 4tii day of August, 1981, by and between BOBBY SID TAYLOR and the STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, (hereinafter referred to as STATE FARM), by and through its agent undersigned. WHEREAS, BOBBY SID TAYLOR was covered by an automobile insurance policy issued by STATE FARM, which was in effect on the 9th day of April, 1977, providing liability and uninsured motorist coverage to him, and WHEREAS, an automobile collision occurred on April 9, 1977 between vehicles operated by BOBBY SID TAYLOR, DOUGLAS ALAN WISTROM and ANNE L. RING, and WHEREAS, a trial took place in the Superior Court of Maricopa County, State of Arizona in consolidated causes C-382960 and G-383090, resulting in a jury verdict against BOBBY SID TAYLOR in the total amount of $2,621,000, and judgments having been entered against BOBBY SID TAYLOR in accordance with said jury verdicts, and WHEREAS, having been fully apprised of all settlement offers made by the plaintiffs in the consolidated cases referred to above, during the discovery process, prior to trial, during the trial, and subsequently, BOBBY SID TAYLOR maintained and does now maintain that the operation of his motor vehicle on April 9, 1977 did not contribute to the injuries sustained by the plaintiffs, and at no time has he insisted, demanded, or even encouraged his insurer to settle the plaintiffs’ claims within his policy limits, and WHEREAS, one of the drivers of an automobile involved in the collision on April 9, 1977, to wit: DOUGLAS ALAN WIS-TROM, was uninsured on the date of said collision, and BOBBY SID TAYLOR having a bona fide belief that the negligence of DOUGLAS ALAN WISTROM contributed to his bodily injuries sustained in that collision, and WHEREAS, BOBBY SID TAYLOR has demanded compensation from STATE FARM under the uninsured motorist coverage afforded to him, and WHEREAS, BOBBY SID TAYLOR desires to settle the uninsured motorist claim, and to relieve STATE FARM of any and all other contractual claims, interests, or causes of action he has or may have against STATE FARM, and WHEREAS, STATE FARM has agreed that uninsured motorist coverage is available to BOBBY SID TAYLOR and appropriate under the facts surrounding the collision on April 9, 1977, and STATE FARM having been fully apprised in the premises, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual [covenants contained herein, STATE FARM agrees to pay the sum of $15,000 to BOBBY SID TAYLOR in full satisfaction of all contractual rights, claims, and causes of action he has or may have against STATE FARM under the policy of insurance referred to herein, in connection with the collision on April 9, 1977, and all subsequent matters, and BOBBY SID TAYLOR hereby accepts that sum pursuant to the recitals contained herein. [SIGNATURES] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9632212. Public record. Not legal advice.