# Ridgely v. Federal Emergency Management Agency

> Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · January 4, 2008 · 512 F.3d 727

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9631884

## Case

- **Full name:** Diane RIDGELY; Judy Sturken; David Bellinger; Tamica Dickson, on Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY; United States Department of Homeland Security; Michael Chertoff, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security; R. David Paulison, Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency; And Their Successors in Office, Defendants-Appellants
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
- **Decided:** January 4, 2008
- **Citations:** 512 F.3d 727; 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 130; 2008 WL 54799
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Dennis
- **Judges:** King, Barksdale, Dennis
- **Cited by:** 123 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9631884

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that in determining whether statutes and regulations limit official discretion, court is to look for “ ‘ “explicitly mandatory language,” i.e., specific directives to the decisionmaker that if the regulations’ substantive predicates are present, a particular outcome…
- finding it unlikely that applicants for FEMA rental assistance had a property interest in those benefits because neither statutes nor regulations contained “‘explicitly mandatory language’ that entitles an individual to receive benefits if he satisfies that criteria”
- holding that the statutes and regulations governing Federal Emergency Management Agency did not create a property interest in enforcement where “mandatory language is wholly absent”
- finding that plaintiffs did not have a property interest in that case, but accepting the premise that if such an interest existed it would justify finding irreparable harm

## Opinion text

DENNIS, Circuit Judge,
specially concurring and concurring in the judgment:
I concur in Parts I, II, III-A, and IV of the majority opinion and in the judgment. I do not think it necessary or desirable to reach the subjects in Part III-B and therefore do not join it.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9631884. Public record. Not legal advice.