# State Ex Rel. Juvenile Department v. Gohranson > Court of Appeals of Oregon · August 28, 1996 · 143 Or. App. 36 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9631412 ## Case - **Full name:** In the Matter of Myrna Gohranson and Paul Gohranson, Jr., Minor Children. STATE Ex Rel JUVENILE DEPARTMENT OF MULTNOMAH COUNTY, Myrna Gohranson and Paul Gohranson, Jr., Appellants, v. Paul GOHRANSON, SR., and Judy Gohranson, Respondents - **Court:** Court of Appeals of Oregon - **Decided:** August 28, 1996 - **Citations:** 143 Or. App. 36; 923 P.2d 1259; 1996 Ore. App. LEXIS 1338 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurring in part by De Muniz - **Judges:** Muniz, Deits, De Muniz, Haselton - **Cited by:** 7 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9631412 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding a parent’s abuse of any child is relevant in terminating that parent’s parental rights - rejecting assertion that mother’s alleged progress in “internalizing” what she had learned about sexual abuse precluded termination, where there was no evidence that “mother has applied, in any way, the information that she has learned to her own life” ## Opinion text *53 DE MUNIZ, J., concurring in part; dissenting in part. I agree with the majority that father’s parental rights should be terminated. However, the state did not prove that mother abused or neglected her children, and it did not prove that she is returning to a relationship with father. On my review of the record, I cannot agree with the majority that the state proved that mother is unable or unwilling to change so as to make the return of her children improbable. Accordingly, I dissent from the majority’s conclusion that mother’s rights should be terminated. The majority acknowledges that the proper inquiry is whether mother can protect her children in the foreseeable future. 143 Or App at 46-47. However, it ignores that that determination must be made by clear and convincing evidence that mother is unable or unwilling to change after being offered reasonable social services “for such extended duration of time that it appears reasonable that no lasting adjustment can be effected.” ORS 419B.504(5). Rather, the majority relies in large part on events that occurred before services were offered. The majority blames mother for the abuse of Roby when mother “was in the house on at least two occasions when the sexual abuse occurred.” 143 Or App at 46. It provides details ofMyrna’s physical examination, 1 concluding that, “[d]uring the time period that Myrna was abused,' mother was the primary caretaker of both Myrna and Paul. Yet, she completely denies that the children displayed any unusual behaviors or signs of abuse.” 143 Or App at 45. The majority continues, contrasting mother’s lack of awareness with the foster mother’s details of the children’s responses. 2 *54 Implicit in that discussion and comparison is that mother is responsible for permitting the sexual abuse. However, the standard against which we must measure mother’s progress is her ability to change after being offered reasonable social services. I find nothing in this record that shows that, until Roby’s allegations precipitated the intervention of CSD in Portland, mother was ever offered any services that might have heightened her awareness to sexually abusive environments or that could have helped her to recognize signs of such abuse and to intervene to prevent it. What the record does show is that the degree of knowledge about sexual abuse that the majority assumes mother should have had is not likely to have existed, given her lack of education and sophistication and her poverty. Being uneducated, unsophisticated and poor does not excuse mother’s behavior, but it does provide the basis from which we assess her ability to change. Unlike the majority, I conclude that the record does show that mother has benefitted from the services offered and is likely to continue to do so. After CSD removed the children from their parents’ care in January 1993, mother participated in all the services required of her. Gorrín, the CSD caseworker who received the case in January, testified that, at the time he made his six-month narrative, mother was in full compliance with the service plan. Mother had attended CSD’s nonoffending parents group, had completed a psychological evaluation, was in CSD-approved parent-training classes, maintained regular and consistent visitation with the children, cooperated with CSD home visits, maintained contact with her CSD worker, kept CSD informed of her whereabouts and provided requested releases. Mother received positive reports from the service providers. She was reliable in her attendance at the six-week parent-training course in which, among other things, the class addressed general issues around offenders in the home, such as anger cycles, risk factors, and detecting sexual abuse. Mother impressed the group leader by her ability to work through her fears and become more assertive. She was respectful, active in the group and demonstrated skill in doing behavior management exercises and in understanding *55 child development information. Mother regularly attended a support group for domestic violence for six or seven months. The leader found that mother participated well, was responsive to and supportive of others in the group, and appeared to benefit and learn from the group. The leader found that mother “displays a huge amount of commitment and love toward her children and has worked diligently to regain custody of them.” The majority brushes aside the positive reports that mother received because “at least two of those reports were based on incorrect information provided by mother.” 143 Or App at 47. It finds that Spohn was “laboring under two serious false impressions,” id. — that the charges of sexual abuse had been dropped and Dr. Hull did not find evidence of abuse. Yet the sexual abuse charges against father were dropped: He pled no contest to a charge of cruelty and endangering the health of a child. There is nothing in the record to indicate that mother had any understanding of the nuances of reduced charges through plea negotiations. Also, Dr. Hull’s assessment was “suspected” child abuse, and he referred Myrna for further evaluation. The majority also places much importance on mother’s return to California. It implies that the reason was to be with father and that mother’s stated reasons — financial difficulties and family support — were specious, and that mother did not make sufficient efforts to try to avoid a move. However, I cannot agree that the evidence shows that mother was devious or that her move from Portland indicates that she was unwilling to make efforts to remain near her children. The trial court found that mother had “valid reasons” for the move, and I agree with that finding. Mother had never lived in Portland until shortly before CSD intervened. Despite the majority’s contention otherwise, the record does show that mother had family support in California. 3 Furthermore, although her rent increased “only $30.00,” 143 Or App *56 at 40, that is not an insignificant amount for a person, such as mother, employable at minimum-level wage jobs. 4 Furthermore, I do not read mother’s landlord’s testimony of accepting, in the past, “whatever amount of rent that mother could afford,” as meaning that she could ignore the increase in rent. The accommodation that he made was not requiring her to pay all the amount at once. He testified that “[s]he did pay all that she owed.” Also, before moving in April 1994, mother wrote to the court, providing a California address and information as to the reasons for her move. Her caseworker acknowledged that she had discussed the move with him. When in California, mother contacted CSD in May to tell them that she had been ill, and she let them know that she was with family. 5 The majority also finds it significant that, in California, mother did not show any efforts “to pursue services designed to help her care for her children on an independent basis.” 143 Or App at 41. However, it is not clear to me what mother could have done in the three months between her move in April 1994 and CSD’s decision to staff the case for termination in early July 1994, when CSD made no move to act on her request for an Interstate Compact. In fact, what the record does show is that CSD moved for termination instead of requesting an Interstate Compact, even though the psychological evaluation of mother, done by Volkin and provided to CSD in May 1994, recommended that “the children be moved to a foster home in the state of California where they can be near their mother and have regular visitation with her there.” Riggs, the caseworker, testified: “Q Why did you disagree with Dr. Volkin’s recommendation [for Interstate Compact] back in May of 1994? “A Well, when I — when I received the report, I reviewed it, and to be real frank, I — I didn’t — I thought it was a mistake. I thought the recommendations — They were so inconsistent with the body of the report, I thought there was an error. *57 “The whole — My reading of the report, it was instance after instance of [mother] not believing, and blaming the children. And yet, the recommendations are inconsistent with that. That’s why I didn’t follow through with all Mrs.— Or Dr. Volkin’s recommendations.” As does the majority, I find troubling mother’s denial of father’s sexual abuse. However, unlike the majority, I do not find that mother remains implacable in that denial. When the reports are considered in their entirety, and in the light of the other evidence, I find that mother has progressed in “internalizing” what she has learned about sexual abuse. That mother would initially refuse to admit any possibility of father’s abuse is not an unusual response. Gorrín testified that he had removed children in other instances where there was an allegation of sexual abuse on the part of one parent and that the other parent did not “generally” accept the information “at first blush.” The May 1994 report from Volkin does show that mother still did not acknowledge that father was an abuser, but it also shows that mother was gaining an awareness of sexual abuse. Volkin reported that mother recognized that “clues to offender tendencies include being too nice as well as too prone to isolation and controlling behaviors.” The March 1995 pretrial report of Dr. Vien, a psychologist, states that mother remains “equivocal” about father’s abuse but that mother “was able to verbalize general and specific behavioral signs in abuse victims, demonstrating a level of retention from her prior treatment.” Furthermore, even though mother did not acknowledge father’s abuse, neither Volkin nor Vien concluded that mother could not be reunited with her children. Volkin stated that “[i]t is difficult to reach definitive conclusions regarding [mother’s] capacity to be protective of her children,” but, if mother maintained her separation from father, Volkin recommended “that a plan be developed for reuniting her” with the children. Vien concluded: “[Mother’s] evaluation results suggest that she is capable of gradually resuming care of her children with adequate environmental support. She seems genuinely committed to her offspring and will likely cooperate with court and social service recommendations. Her geographic proximity to her *58 family in California also enhances her parenting capacity. Therefore, it is concluded with reasonable clinical certainty that [mother] is and will remain for the foreseeable future, capable of adequately parenting her children.” (Emphasis supplied.) We have upheld the termination of parental rights for a parent’s failure to protect a child from sexual abuse. In State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. DeVore, 108 Or App 426 , 816 P2d 647 (1991), the mother’s rights were terminated when she repeatedly allowed her daughter to be alone with people who she knew had abused her daughter and when she continued to associate with people who were harmful to her daughter. Likewise, in State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. Ricks, 118 Or App 566 , 848 P2d 630 (1993), the mother’s rights were terminated when she continued to associate with the father, who had sexually abused the child, and lied to CSD about separating from him. In those cases, the mothers remained in abusive environments. Here, the state did not present any evidence that mother is in such an environment. The state presented no evidence to rebut mother’s evidence that she was divorcing father. It presented no evidence to rebut the evidence that, even if mother’s original reason for the divorce was to “put the children first,” the couple has subsequently grown apart. In other words, unlike in DeVore and Ricks , there was no evidence that mother would be returning the children to an abusive environment, and, in fact, Vien’s report regarding mother’s proximity to her family shows the contrary. My de novo review of the record, transcripts and exhibits does not convince me by clear and convincing evidence that mother has failed to adjust her conduct after reasonable efforts by available social agencies for such an extended duration of time that no lasting adjustment can be effected. The trial court, which had the opportunity to assess mother’s demeanor, refused to terminate mother’s parental rights. I concur with that determination. Haselton, J., joins in this dissent. That detail can only be meant to bolster the majority’s decision to terminate mother’s parental rights. It suffices to say that the abuse occurred, because there has never been any dispute about Myrna’s sexual abuse and never any suggestion that mother was the perpetrator of that abuse. It should also be made clear that the record does not prove that father was the perpetrator of the abuse of Myrna. The majority also notes that the foster mother said that the children were in constant need of knowing that food was available because, “[a]pparently, mother and father kept locks on the cupboards and refrigerator to keep food costs down.” 143 Or App at 45. The inference is that the parents deprived the children of food. However, it is abundantly evident that this family was poor. The locked cupboards show only that the family’s poverty affected the amount of available food. There is a December 1993 letter, apparently to CSD or the court, from mother’s father. It concludes: “We couldn’t be more pleased than to receive a phone call from Judy saying; ‘Hey Dad — come to Portland and bring me and the kids home.’ “I would be in Portland the very next day.” At the time of trial, mother was working at Burger King. The record also contains a copy of a June 1994 letter sent by mother to the caseworker to be read to the children. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9631412. Public record. Not legal advice.