# Commercial Credit Claims v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Lancaster)

> Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · March 26, 1999 · 556 Pa. 325

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9630845

## Case

- **Full name:** COMMERCIAL CREDIT CLAIMS, Appellant, v. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD (LANCASTER), Appellee
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** March 26, 1999
- **Citations:** 556 Pa. 325; 728 A.2d 902; 1999 Pa. LEXIS 831
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Nigro
- **Judges:** Flaherty, Zappala, Cappy, Castille, Nigro, Newman, Saylor
- **Cited by:** 41 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9630845

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining "there was no evidence that claimant was disabled from a psychiatric standpoint at the time that this [n]otice was executed.’’
- explaining that the disposition of the case was “plainly dictated by the relevant statutory provisions”
- declining to “strain the humanitarian goals underlying the [Act]” by requiring employers to disprove a causal relationship between the physical injuries described in the NCP and a subsequently alleged psychological injury

## Opinion text

NIGRO, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I join in the majority’s determination that in its termination petition Employer did not have the burden to disprove a causal relationship between the work-related injury and the subsequent psychiatric injury. I dissent, however, from the majority’s granting of the termination petition on this basis.
Rather, I believe that this case should have been remanded to the Workers’ Compensation Judge for a determination as to whether the original physical injury as described in the Notice of Compensation Payable is still operative without reference to any psychological overlay, and whether, as a result, Claimant is still disabled.
In order to terminate benefits, the employer must establish that all disability related to a compensable injury has ceased. Pieper v. Ametek-Thermox Instruments Division, 526 Pa. 25 , 584 A.2d 301 (1990). Where the claimant complains of continued pain, this burden is met when an employer’s medical expert unequivocally testifies that it is his opinion, within a reasonably degree of medical certainty, that the claimant is fully recovered, can return to work without restrictions, and there are no objective medical findings which either substantiate the claims of pain or connect them to the work injury. *335 Udvari v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (USAir, Inc.), 550 Pa. 319, 327 , 705 A.2d 1290, 1293 (1997).
Here, the record shows that the WCJ found credible both the testimony of Claimant and the testimony of Employer’s medical witness. With regard to Claimant’s physical injury, Employer’s medical witness testified that Claimant suffers from “a fair amount of pain generated from [Claimant’s] accident” and the development of “a chronic pain syndrome.” Furthermore, Employer’s medical witness admitted to having only “inconsistent” objective diagnostic data from his physical examination of Claimant because of his severe bodily tremors. Therefore, the WCJ’s decision was inconclusive as to whether Employer met its burden to prove that all disability from a work-related physical injury has ceased.
Since the record is inclusive and does not show whether Employer’s medical witness met this burden, I would, therefore, remand this case to the WCJ for a determination as to whether Claimant has recovered from his original physical disability.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9630845. Public record. Not legal advice.