# Los Angeles County Transportation Commission v. Richmond

> California Supreme Court · April 30, 1982 · 31 Cal. 3d 197

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9630732

## Case

- **Full name:** LOS ANGELES COUNTY TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION, Petitioner, v. GEORGE U. RICHMOND, as Executive Director, Etc., Respondent
- **Court:** California Supreme Court
- **Decided:** April 30, 1982
- **Citations:** 31 Cal. 3d 197; 182 Cal. Rptr. 324; 643 P.2d 941; 1982 Cal. LEXIS 161
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Kaus
- **Judges:** Mosk, Kaus, Richardson
- **Cited by:** 61 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9630732

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting ambiguities in an initiative "may be resolved by referring to the ballot summary, the arguments and analysis presented to the electorate"

## Opinion text

KAUS, J.
I concur in the judgment.
Although the language of section 4 of Proposition 13 (art. XIII A) is far from clear, the description and discussion of this provision in the election pamphlet which was before the voters suggest to me that the purpose of this section was simply to limit the authority of a city, county or special district to impose new “special taxes” to replace prop *209 erty tax revenue that the city, county or special district lost as a result of the other portions of Proposition 13. (See also Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1978) 22 Cal. 3d 208, 230-231 [ 149 Cal.Rptr. 239 , 583 P.2d 1281 ]; Board of Supervisors v. Lonergan (1980) 27 Cal.3d 855, 863 [ 167 Cal.Rptr. 820 , 616 P.2d 802 ]; County of Fresno v. Malmstrom (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 974, 983 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 777 ].) Given this purpose, it appears sensible under ordinary principles of constitutional interpretation to construe section 4’s reference to “special districts” to apply only to those special districts which had the authority to impose property taxes, for it is only those districts which could suffer property tax losses for which the new special tax revenues would serve as a replacement. 1 Inasmuch as the plaintiff district never had the authority to levy a property tax, I agree with the court that the limitations of section 4 do not apply to it.
Newman, J., concurred.
This definition of “special district” is not unique to this context. As the court notes, a number of statutes explicitly provide that “‘[s]pecial district’ does not include any agency which is not authorized by statute to levy a property tax rate.” (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 2215; Gov. Code, § 16271, subd. (d).)

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9630732. Public record. Not legal advice.