# Halfway House, Inc. v. City of Portland

> Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · February 5, 1996 · 670 A.2d 1377

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9629872

## Case

- **Full name:** HALFWAY HOUSE, INC., D/B/A Pharos House v. CITY OF PORTLAND, Et Al.
- **Court:** Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
- **Decided:** February 5, 1996
- **Citations:** 670 A.2d 1377; 1996 Me. LEXIS 38
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Glassman
- **Judges:** Wathen, Roberts, Glassman, Clifford, Rudman, Dana, Lipez
- **Cited by:** 74 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9629872

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding that Pharos House had standing to challenge constitutionality of City ordinance where its existing business interests were directly affected by the ordinance
- holding that potential economic injury that results from government action is sufficient to confer standing

## Opinion text

GLASSMAN, Justice,
with whom ROBERTS, Justice, joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Although I agree with the Court as to its disposition of Count I of the Pharos House complaint, I must respectfully dissent from that part of the Court’s decision relating to the trial court’s dismissal without prejudice of Counts II and III of the Pharos House complaint. By Count I of its complaint, the Pharos House sought review of the Planning Board’s denial of its conditional use permit. By Count II of its complaint, Pharos House sought a declaration that the amended ordinance constituted a taking of Pharos House’s property rights without due process of law. *1382 By Count III, it sought costs, interest and an award of reasonable attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the violation of its constitutional rights by the City as alleged in Count II.
The trial court determined that because “[t]he Planning Board’s decision to deny the conditional use permit was not based on the amended zoning ordinance [and] [t]hus, Pha-ros House is not affected by the amended ordinance in a specific way that creates a ‘case or controversy”’ and, accordingly, dismissed Counts II and III without prejudice. A fair reading of the trial court’s decision reveals that, after the court in affirming the denial determined that the Board’s denial of the permit was not based on the amended ordinance, it properly determined that in the context of the case before it there was no remaining justiciable issue presented by Pha-ros House in Counts II and III of its complaint. I would affirm the trial court’s judgment as to Counts II and III.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9629872. Public record. Not legal advice.