# Edmiston v. Superior Court > California Supreme Court · November 27, 1978 · 22 Cal. 3d 699 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9629654 ## Case - **Full name:** ERIN LEE EDMISTON Et Al., Petitioners, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent; SHERRIE LAGOMARSINO Et Al., Real Parties in Interest - **Court:** California Supreme Court - **Decided:** November 27, 1978 - **Citations:** 22 Cal. 3d 699; 150 Cal. Rptr. 276; 586 P.2d 590; 1978 Cal. LEXIS 311 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Tobriner - **Judges:** Clark, Tobriner - **Cited by:** 18 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9629654 ## Opinion text TOBRINER, J. I dissent. The majority opinion confuses two distinct statutory provisions: (1) the discretionary power of the trial court, under Code of Civil Procedure section 2032, subdivision (a) to impose protective conditions on the taking of a medical examination; and (2) the right of the parties under subdivision (b) to a written report of the examining physician’s medical findings and conclusions. In consequence of this confusion, the majority arrive at the illogical holding that videotaping of the examination, a protective condition imposed pursuant to the court’s discretion under *705 subdivision (a), is impermissible because it does not constitute a written medical report under subdivision (b). The Legislature, in section 2032, subdivision (a), authorized the trial court to impose protective conditions upon the taking of a medical examination, but did not specify precisely which conditions could be imposed, leaving that matter “to the sound discretion of the court.” (Edwards v. Superior Court (1976) 16 Cal.3d 905, 913 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 14 , 549 P.2d 846 ].) Despite the lack of explicit legislative authorization, the courts have approved a variety of conditions, .including the presence of counsel (Sharff v. Superior Court (1955) 44 Cal.2d 508, 510 [ 282 P.2d 896 , 64 A.L.R.2d 494 ]), a stenographic transcription of the examination (Gonzi v. Superior Court (1959) 51 Cal.2d 586, 589 [ 335 P.2d 97 ]), and a tape recording of the examination (Ebel v. Superior Court (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 934 [ 114 Cal.Rptr. 722 ]). In the latter case the court noted that since the purpose of allowing a stenographic reporter at the examination was “to make certain that the injured plaintiff will have an accurate and complete record of the proceeding, the use of any mechanical device capable of attaining the same objective is permissible.” ( 39 Cal.App.3d at p. 937 .) Videotaping is a mechanical device capable of ensuring the injured plaintiff a complete and accurate record of the examination, and thus authorized within the cited language of Ebel v. Superior Court. It is, moreover, superior to the methods previously approved by judicial decision because it provides an impartial visual record of the physical examination. The majority assert, however, that videotaping is not necessary to protect the plaintiff’s interests—that previously approved methods such as presence of counsel, stenographic reporting, and tape recording suffice. Necessity, however, is not the issue. When an action of a trial court is challenged by extraordinary writ as an abuse of discretion, we do not ask if the action below was “necessary”; we ask only whether the action was one which exceeds the bounds of reason. (See, e.g., Continental Baking Co. v. Katz (1968) 68 Cal.2d 512, 527 [ 67 Cal.Rptr. 761 , 439 P.2d 889 ].) Surely we cannot hold that the trial court’s approval of a superior method of recording a medical examination, hedged with conditions fashioned to minimize any disruptive effect of the medium, is a decision which exceeds the bounds of reason. The majority further note that subdivision (b) of section 2032 entitles the examined party on request to “a detailed written report of the *706 examining physician setting out his findings and conclusions. . . .” Relying on Bailey v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 970 [ 140 Cal.Rptr. 669 , 568 P.2d 394 ], which held that the videotape of a deposition was not a writing, the majority conclude that the videotape of a medical examination cannot qualify as the written report of the examining physician under subdivision (b). That conclusion is unquestionably correct, but unquestionably irrelevant. The trial court order did not substitute the videotape for the written report of the physician; its order clearly envisions both the videotaping of the examination and the subsequent preparation of a written report. Nothing in section 2032 limits the plaintiff’s protection to the receipt of a written report. To the contrary, subdivision (a) clearly authorizes the court to impose additional protective conditions, and case law confirms that such conditions may serve the purpose of providing an accurate record of the examining process itself. In short, plaintiff is entitled to both an accurate recording of the examination and to a written report of the examiner’s findings and conclusions; we cannot hold that the trial court acted beyond the bounds of reason in permitting her to use a new and superior method of obtaining an accurate record of the examination on the ground that the record does not satisfy the independent statutory requirement for a written medical report. Newman, J., concurred. The petition of the real parties in interest for a rehearing was denied December 27, 1978. Tobriner, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9629654. Public record. Not legal advice.