# Ver Brycke v. Ver Brycke

> Court of Appeals of Maryland · February 13, 2004 · 379 Md. 669

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9629652

## Case

- **Full name:** Lisa VER BRYCKE v. J. Russell VER BRYCKE, III, Et Al.
- **Court:** Court of Appeals of Maryland
- **Decided:** February 13, 2004
- **Citations:** 379 Md. 669; 843 A.2d 758; 2004 Md. LEXIS 44
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Wilner
- **Judges:** Bell, Raker, Wilner, Cathell, Harrell, Battaglia, Eldridge
- **Cited by:** 63 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9629652

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that in distinguishing whether an action sounds in law or in equity for purposes of identifying the applicable limitations period, “the determination is dependent upon the remedies sought”
- observing that a quasi-contractual claim for unjust enrichment “would have been untenable” had plaintiffs argued that they had a contract with defendants
- explaining that “[w]hether a party is entitled to pre-judgment interest generally is left to the discretion of the fact finder” (citation omitted)
- stating that an unjust enrichment claim that seeks the remedy of restitution for money is a claim “at law”
- holding claims for unjust enrichment and promissory estoppel “were claims at law because they were claims seeking the remedy of restitution for money”

## Opinion text

Concurring Opinion by
WILNER, J.
I concur in the judgment. I do not agree with the Court’s conclusion, apparently one of law, that the condition did not fail until the property was sold, especially as the Court does not indicate whether, by “sold,” it means contracted for sale or actually conveyed. The condition was that John and Lisa move into Rabbitt Hill, and there was evidence from which the jury, or the judge, could have found that the Ver Bryckes knew, or had good reason to know, before the property was “sold” that John and Lisa were not, in fact, going to move into it. The focus should be on when that knowledge existed, not *704 when it became legally or even practically impossible for the condition to be met.
I agree with the Court’s ultimate judgment because the evidence would support a finding that such knowledge did not exist until a point within three years of the filing of the suit— i.e., a time after March 23, 1996. It may have come when John and Lisa separated in 1997, or when divorce proceedings began in January, 1998. It may have been manifest when the Ver Bryckes decided to record the deed of trust in July, 1998, and it certainly would have existed when John and Lisa contracted to sell the property in November, 1999. Whether the Ver Bryckes knew or had reason to know prior to March 23,1996 that the condition would not be met was in substantial dispute. As the jury did not clearly answer that question because of the ambiguous wording of Question 3C, the judge had to make that call, and I would not disturb the judge’s decision.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9629652. Public record. Not legal advice.