# State Ex Rel. Department of Transportation v. Pile

> Supreme Court of Oklahoma · November 13, 1979 · 603 P.2d 337

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9628279

## Case

- **Full name:** STATE of Oklahoma Ex Rel. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION of the State of Oklahoma, Appellant, v. Mrs. C. v. PILE, Appellee
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Oklahoma
- **Decided:** November 13, 1979
- **Citations:** 603 P.2d 337; 1979 OK 152; 1979 Okla. LEXIS 321
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Barnes
- **Judges:** Hargrave, Lavender, Irwin, Williams, Hodges, Simms, Opa-La, Doolin, Barnes
- **Cited by:** 21 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9628279

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that a statute prohibiting billboards along state highways did not cover non-commercial speech, thus avoiding constitutional doubt as to its validity

## Opinion text

BARNES, Justice,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
In the case before us, the Department of Transportation, in seeking an injunction against Appellee, has alleged that Appellee is maintaining a billboard within 660 feet of a highway covered by 69 O.S.1971, §§ 1271-1275. The maintenance of Appellee’s sign is, as plead, a violation of the 660-foot restriction contained in our statutes. On the basis of this maintenance contrary to law, the State seeks an injunction. The trial court held that such did not state a cause of action, implicitly ruling that to interpret the statute to include Appellee’s billboard would be unconstitutional as a deprivation of free speech. The majority, in affirming the trial court’s sustaining of the demurrer, has implicitly ruled that the imposition of such a restriction is not justified by the presence of a significant State interest. Yet, it is the sustaining of the demurrer which deprives the Department of Transportation of the opportunity to present evidence showing that the restrictions serve a significant governmental interest, and that the restrictions leave open ample alternative channels for communication of Appel-lee’s message.
In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 , 96 S.Ct. 1817, 1830 , 48 L.Ed.2d 346, 363 (1976), the United States Supreme Court, in considering the constitutionality of restrictions upon advertising by pharmacists, stated:
“We have often approved restrictions of that kind [time, place, and manner restrictions] provided that they are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they serve a significant governmental interest, and that in so doing they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.” [Bracketed information added.]
The Department of Transportation argues that the restrictions in our statutory scheme are justified by two significant governmental interests, public safety and scenic beauty.
In Markham Advertising Co. v. State, 73 Wash.2d 405 , 439 P.2d 248 (1968), the Supreme Court of the State of Washington upheld the constitutionality of that State’s *344 billboard control act. At page 255 of that decision, the Court quoted with approval the findings of fact of the trial court, which included the finding that the defendants had introduced sufficient evidence to permit reasonable men to find that a reasonable relationship existed between outdoor advertising and traffic safety. In so ruling, the trial court stated:
“ * * * The evidence indicates that (a) outdoor advertising structures along the highways are intended to, and do, cause inattention to the driving task which, in turn, results in increased stopping distances and driver reaction times. Such factors contribute to traffic accidents; . . .(c) advertising signs compete with official highway signs for driver attention, and decrease the effectiveness of cautionary and directional messages essential for the safety of the traveling public; (d) highway billboards, which cause driver inattention, are contrary to the principles of modern interstate highway design, since highways are being built to permit higher speeds and increased traffic loads, thus placing greater demands on motorists’ attention and alertness; .
“2. Signs located more than 660 feet from the highways are less obtrusive and are less likely to constitute a traffic safety hazard than signs located closer to the right-of-way.
<<g * * *
“4. Roadside advertising in scenic areas is detrimental to the appearance of these, areas and is inconsistent with the purpose for which these areas were established.”
In affirming the action of the trial court, the Washington State Supreme Court stated:
“ * * * It is, in our opinion, within the reasonable scope of the police power to preserve from destruction the scenic beauties bestowed on the Commonwealth by nature in conjunction with the promotion of safety of travel on the public ways
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that aesthetic considerations do come within the scope of public welfare, and therefore may form the basis for the exercise of a sovereign’s police power. In Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 , 75 S.Ct. 98, 102 , 99 L.Ed. 27, 38 (1954), the United States Supreme Court stated:
“ * * * The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. . The values it represents are ■ spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled.” [Citations omitted.]
More recently in State v. Lotze, 92 Wash.2d 52 , 593 P.2d 811, 815 (1979), the Washington Supreme Court again found ample justification for restrictions similar to those before us. In so finding, the Washington Court stated:
“We conclude that RCW 47.42 [the Washington statute being interpreted] as applied to appellants’ billboards does not violate their First Amendment rights of free speech. The traffic safety rationale upheld in Markham Advertising Co. v. State, supra, and not refuted at trial in these cases is sufficiently compelling to outweigh the minimal restraint on appellants. The statutory scheme represents a reasonable place and manner limitation on speech leaving ample alternative channels of communication for appellants. Appellants’ speech is not in any way being controlled as to content; its stricture is narrowly confined to place and manner. The entire panoply of means to communicate their views is open to appellants except for the limited restrictions of RCW 47.42.”
In sustaining the demurrer to the petition, the trial court by implication held that the place restrictions imposed by the statutes were not applicable to Appellee. The majority opinion, in affirming this holding, reasoned that the place restrictions could not be interpreted as being applicable to *345 Appellee, as such a construction would render the statute unconstitutional. The majority’s conclusion is based upon the assumption that the place restrictions, if imposed upon the Appellee, could not be justified, as such restrictions could not serve a significant governmental interest, and did not leave ample alternative avenues of communication open to Appellee. Since I believe it is at least possible for such restrictions to be justified, I would not have affirmed the sustaining of the demurrer based upon the assumption that the 660-foot place restriction was incapable of being justified. Accordingly, I must dissent from the majority opinion.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9628279. Public record. Not legal advice.
