# People v. Letourneau > California Supreme Court · November 29, 1949 · 34 Cal. 2d 478 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9628263 ## Case - **Full name:** The PEOPLE, Respondent, v. ARMAND LETOURNEAU, Appellant - **Court:** California Supreme Court - **Decided:** November 29, 1949 - **Citations:** 34 Cal. 2d 478; 211 P.2d 865; 1949 Cal. LEXIS 181 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Carter - **Judges:** Schauer, Edmonds, Carter - **Cited by:** 38 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9628263 ## Opinion text CARTER, J. I dissent. Again we have an acknowledgment of the rule that evidence of mental condition is admissible on the trial of the “not guilty” plea as bearing on premeditation, intent, and malice, followed by the refusal to apply it. The same paradox is presented as that which existed in People v. Wells, 33 Cal.2d 330 [ 202 P.2d 53 ], and People v. Danielly, 33 Cal.2d 362 [ 202 P.2d 18 ], where, in my dissents, I pointed out the injustice which is bound to flow therefrom. This case presents another illustration of the hopeless position occupied by counsel and the trial court in attempting to present evidence on the subject, and the plain intent of this court to find some reason for not applying the rule it has declared to be applicable. In the Wells case, supra, it was held that testimony of a physician who had examined defendant was material and pertinent to the issue, but its exclusion was not prejudicial. In the Danielly case other grounds for refusal to apply the rule were borne and given vitality in the fertile mind bent on withholding the benefit of the rule from the defendant. There a physician was offered as a witness to show that defendant did not possess the mental 'faculties for forming an intent or premeditation, but the majority found it irrelevant, and that the offer of proof was insufficient. Thus the Wells case was *499 deserted in its holding of materiality. In the case at bar, the court again uses irrelevancy and failure to make an offer of proof, adding a “kicker” that no foundation was laid. Defendant put a question to the autopsy surgeon, a duly qualified physician, as to whether the manner in which the bodies were mutilated in the course of the killings would show an abnormal mind. On the score of lack of foundation, whatever may be meant by that, there are several answers. If the ‘ ‘ foundation' ’ argument refers to qualification, the parties stipulated to the doctor’s qualifications. No objection was made on the ground of insufficient foundation. If it is meant that there was no showing that the manner of killing would have a bearing upon the mental state of the defendant, the answers are even more numerous. In addition to those above mentioned, it should be noted that neither the trial court nor this court knows whether a physician may given an opinion on mental condition from the manner in which the killing was accomplished. The majority opinion makes the situation even worse when it says: “ ... it will not be presumed that from mere examination of the wounds, the autopsy doctor could do more than speculate as to what the state of the mind of the killer . . . might have been; . . . ” It will not presume a doctor could so testify, but by its very holding it presumes conclusively that he could not so testify. In other words, it assumes to know what it holds a doctor cannot know, and precludes the ascertaining of what a doctor may or may not know in his field. Lying at the base of the holding must be the thought that the offer of proof was not sufficient, but the court clearly indicated its intent that no evidence of that class—mental state, would be allowed and therefore an offer of proof is unnecessary. (People v. Duane, 21 Cal.2d 71 [ 130 P.2d 123 ]; Caminetti v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 23 Cal.2d 94 [ 142 P.2d 741 ]; Lawless v. Calaway, 24 Cal.2d 81 [ 147 P.2d 604 ]; Eeimann v. City of Los Angeles, 30 Cal.2d 746 [ 185 P.2d 597 ].) I say that must be the real basis, for the majority states: “There is no showing that the doctor had, or legitimately could form an opinion which could aid the jury in determining the state of mind of the killer who inflicted the wounds. ’ ’ That is to say, it demands that defendant show that the doctor’s answer would be favorable to him. We are not told how he is expected to show that or that a doctor could give an opinion on mental state from the circumstances of the killing. By sustaining the objection to the question put to the doctor, he is foreclosed from showing those very things that the majority criticizes him for failing to *500 establish. Prom all that appears, the doctor may have had an opinion on defendant’s mental state and been able to justify it by his learning and knowledge that there is a rational connection between a person’s mental condition and the manner in which he commits a homicide. I also agree with Justice Edmonds that prejudicial error at the trial on the not guilty plea is not cured by evidence offered upon the trial of the issue of insanity. In my opinion, the errors committed during the trial were prejudicial and justify a reversal of the judgment. Traynor, J., concurred. Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied December 27, 1949. Edmonds, J., Carter, J., and Traynor, J., voted for a rehearing. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9628263. Public record. Not legal advice.