# Clemmer v. Key Bank National Ass'n

> Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · August 22, 2008 · 539 F.3d 349

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9627561

## Case

- **Full name:** Michael CLEMMER, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KEY BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, Defendant-Appellee
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
- **Decided:** August 22, 2008
- **Citations:** 539 F.3d 349; 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 18010; 2008 WL 3876200
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Rogers
- **Judges:** Gilman, Rogers, McKeague
- **Cited by:** 19 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9627561

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that, for questions under TILA and EFTA, "courts draw upon case law interpreting one statute for persuasive authority for another statute" because TILA and EFTA have "the common purpose of ... protect[ing] consumers with respect to financial credit"
- explaining that the Act “protects individual consumer rights by ‘provid[ing] a basic framework establishing the rights, liabilities, and responsibilities of participants in electronic fund transfer systems’”
- discussing purposes of the disclosures

## Opinion text

*356 ROGERS, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I concur, but my reasoning differs a little from that of the majority. In my view, the statutory language, 15 U.S.C. § 1693b(d)(3)(A) & (B)(ii), does not preclude Key Bank from charging a fee following an on-screen notice that the ATM-user is subject to a fee charge, even if the fee may in actuality not be charged to some classes of users. The relevant statutory language is identical to language regarding on-machine notice, see id. § 1693b(d)(3)(A) & (B)(i), as to which the regulations explicitly permit such qualified notice, 12 C.F.R. § 205.16 (c)(l)(ii). Because the on-screen notice in this case clearly notified Clemmer that he was subject to a charge, it is not necessary for us to determine whether the on-screen message told him that he would in fact be charged. It is also not necessary for us to determine whether the Commissioner could by regulation impose a flawless notice requirement for on-screen messages.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9627561. Public record. Not legal advice.