# Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Brobeck

> California Supreme Court · July 30, 1998 · 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 749

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9627363

## Case

- **Full name:** JORDACHE ENTERPRISES, INC., Et Al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. BROBECK, PHLEGER & HARRISON Et Al., Defendants and Respondents
- **Court:** California Supreme Court
- **Decided:** July 30, 1998
- **Citations:** 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 749; 18 Cal. 4th 739; 98 Daily Journal DAR 8219; 958 P.2d 1062; 98 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5893; 1998 Cal. LEXIS 4687
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Kennard
- **Judges:** Chin, Kennard, George, Mosk
- **Cited by:** 99 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9627363

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that statute of limitations is tolled until occurrence of actual injury

## Opinion text

KENNARD, J,, Concurring.
is the fourth decision in as many years in which this court has addressed the question of what constitutes “actual injury” from professional malpractice for purposes of applying a statute of limitations. In the first two decisions, a majority of the court made a misguided attempt to formulate “bright line” rules to govern the actual injury determination. (International Engine Parts, Inc. v. Feddersen & Co. (1995) 9 Cal.4th 606 [ 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 150 , 888 P.2d 1279 ] (Feddersen); ITT Small Business Finance Corp. v. Niles (1994) 9 Cal.4th 245 [ 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 552 , 885 P.2d 965 ] (ITT).) In each, I disagreed with the majority and authored a separate opinion pointing out that the majority’s proposed “bright lines” were ultimately impractical and that the question of when a plaintiff has suffered actual injury is necessarily a question of fact to be decided on a case-by-case basis. (Feddersen, supra, at p. 623 (cone, and dis. opn. of Kennard, J.); ITT, supra, at p. 258 (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).)
In the third decision, in which- I concurred, a majority of the court recognized that the actual injury determination is a question of fact and that “[t]he number of potential variables, which do not necessarily follow a set pattern, precludes defining the point of harm as a fixed point or event because reasonable application becomes too problematic.” (Adams v. Paul (1995) 11 Cal.4th 583, 588-589 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 594 , 904 P.2d 1205 ] (Adams), see also id. at p. 593 (cone. opn. of Kennard, J.).) The decision in the present case, in which I fully concur, not only reaffirms this principle, but also expressly overrules one of our earlier, erroneous decisions ( ITT, supra, 9 Cal.4th 245), and it distinguishes the other erroneous decision ( Feddersen, supra, 9 Cal.4th 606) as construing a statutory provision (Code Civ. Proc., § 339, subd. 1) that is not at issue here. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 763.)
In this decision and in Adams, supra, 11 Cal.4th 583 , the majority has made a welcome correction in the course of the law’s development. This correction should and, I expect, ultimately will be completed when this court overrules Feddersen, supra, 9 Cal.4th 606.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9627363. Public record. Not legal advice.